PSQ

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Colin Dueck
Ray Takeyh — Iran's Nuclear Challenge

Christopher Hemmer — The Lessons of September 11, Iraq, and the American Pendulum

Miroslav Nincic
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Richard S. Conley — Presidential Republics and Divided Government: Lawmaking and Executive Politics in the United States and France

Aaron M. Hoffman — The Structural Causes of Trusting Relationships: Why Rivals Do Not Overcome Suspicion Step by Step

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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

COLIN DUECK and RAY TAKEYH describe the political, ideological and security motivations behind Iran's nuclear program and examine various strategic alternatives available to the United States. They conclude that the United States should pursue comprehensive, direct negotiations with Tehran on the nuclear issue, within an overarching framework of containment.

CHRISTOPHER HEMMER examines the impact of September 11 on the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq. He also explores the potential dangers for American foreign policy that could result from an over-active interventionist policy.

MIROSLAV NINCIC and MONTI NARAYAN DATTA challenge the conventional wisdom that the political values of the United States and Europe are increasingly diverging. They argue that the divergence does not so much separate Europeans from Americans as it does U.S. Republicans from the rest of the political West.

RICHARD S. CONLEY compares the impact of institutional prerogatives and informal resources available to American and French presidents in their quest to manage legislative outcomes under split-party control of national institutions in each country.

AARON M. HOFFMAN explores how certain European states overcame their suspicion and developed trusting relationships. He challenges the view that trusting relationships can be established gradually. Instead, he argues that trusting relationships emerge when governments guarantee one another a voice in collective decisions and limit each other's exposure to domestic political pressures.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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Iran's Nuclear Challenge

COLIN DUECK
RAY TAKEYH

Four years after the United States went to war to disarm Saddam Hussein's Iraq, it faces a far more dangerous and real proliferation crisis in Iran. Should the Islamic Republic cross the nuclear threshold in defiance of the international community and its long-standing treaty commitments, it would effectively undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that has been the mainstay of global counterproliferation efforts for nearly four decades. Indeed, a nuclear Iran, with its expressed antagonism toward the United States, would be in a far better position to assert its regional influence, altering both the strategic and the political alignments of the Middle East.

Why does Iran want the bomb? What impact has the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had on Iran's nuclear deliberations? Is there anything the United States and the international community can do to press Iran toward restraining its ambitions? The answer to these questions requires a better understanding of the interlocking calculations that have propelled Iran toward the nuclear option in the first place.

Revelations and Continuities

Iran's nuclear ambitions did not begin with the onset of the Islamic revolution in 1979. The nuclear program actually started in the early 1970s under the Shah, who, with the assistance of West Germany, France, and South Africa, sought to construct an infrastructure of nuclear power plants. Approximately $40 billion was earmarked for this ambitious project, whose purpose was the construction of at least twenty reactors. Suspicion lingered that behind the Shah's declared desire for nuclear energy lay a determination to construct

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nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Shah's former foreign minister, Ardeshir Zahedi, has all but confirmed such concerns, noting that

> the Iranian strategy at that time was aimed at creating what is known as surge capacity, that is to say ... the know-how, the infrastructure and the personnel needed to develop a nuclear military capacity within a short time without actually doing so. But the assumption within the policymaking elite was that Iran should be in a position to develop and test a nuclear device within 18 months.[1]

Akbar Etemad, the director of Iran's nuclear program at the time of the monarchy, similarly endorses Zahedi's claim that the Shah's program was designed to grant him the option of assembling the bomb should his regional competitors move in that direction.[2]

As the theocratic regime is quick to point out, Washington was not only complicit in the Shah's program but never asked, as it persistently does today, why an oil-rich state requires nuclear power. Moreover, the European states that currently are calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment activities were busy selling the Shah the needed technology for construction of an elaborate network of nuclear plants that could have been easily misused for military purposes. The belated Western concerns regarding Iran's proliferation tendencies add to Tehran's arguments regarding the hypocrisy of the great powers and the iniquitous nature of the NPT.

During the initial decade of the Islamic Republic, the regime's preoccupations with consolidating power, the war with Iraq, and its international isolation precluded it from aggressively pursuing the nuclear option. Indeed, for the founder of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and many others within the clerical elite, the indiscriminate nature of such weapons was seen as inconsistent with Islamic canons of war. A more detailed focus on the nuclear infrastructure began during Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency in the early 1990s and was sustained by Muhammad Khatami's reformist government.

Successive U.S. administrations have sought to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions. Over the years, Washington has scored some impressive gains and managed to delay and frustrate Tehran's quest for nuclear technology. The administration of Ronald Reagan succeeded in obtaining Europe's agreement to rigorous export controls with respect to dual-use technologies and in getting Germany to abandon its cooperation with Iran's nascent nuclear program. In a similar vein, by 1996, persistent American pressure managed to get China to cease its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Given Europe's and China's unwillingness to assist in Iran's nuclear research activities, Tehran turned to a new source of aid, Russia.

The Russian Federation soon began to fill the void left by the withdrawal of the other international actors and assisted Iran in building its two nuclear

[1] Ardeshir Zahedi, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 June 2004.

[2] Abbas Milani, Michael McFaul, and Larry Diamond, *Beyond Incrementalism; A New Strategy of Dealing with Iran* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 2005), 6.

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reactors at Bushehr, which suffered from neglect during the Iran–Iraq war. Over the years, Russia has also provided Iran with fuel fabrication technology, and possibly, even uranium enrichment centrifuge plans. Throughout the 1990s, the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton attempted to deter Russia from this course by means of warnings, selective sanctions, and promises of expanded economic ties. Moscow has occasionally pledged to suspend its cooperation with Iran, only to quickly resume its activities. Indeed, all the agreements and threats have failed to alter Russian designs, and the lure of profits and strategic cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has led to sustained scientific ties between the two powers.

Throughout the 1990s, despite energetic American diplomacy, the international community appeared complacent regarding Iran's nuclear program. The successful efforts by the Clinton administration to prevent substantial international cooperation with Iran's nascent nuclear industry, coupled with Iranian corruption and mismanagement, led to perceptions that the program had stalled. Issues such as terrorism, Iran's opposition to the peace process, and its quest for missile technology and chemical weapons tended to overshadow the nuclear problem. The international community's sporadic expressions of concern did not necessarily trigger diplomatic sanctions or multilateral pressure.

All this changed in August 2002, as a series of revelations by an Iranian opposition group forced the Washington establishment to revise its previous intelligence assessments. It suddenly appeared that Iran had not only constructed a sophisticated uranium enrichment capability but was also busy developing a plutonium route to nuclear power. Even more ominous was an indication that Tehran's program was reaching the point of self-sufficiency. Although at various stages, Iran's nuclear industry has benefited from external assistance, particularly from Russia, and even more ominously, from the Abdul Qadeer Khan network in Pakistan, the sophisticated nature of these facilities revealed that Iran might have reached the point of self-reliance, at which traditional counterproliferation measures, such as more export controls and curtailment of external assistance, could not measurably slow down its nuclear timeline. Former President Rafsanjani has confirmed, "That we are on the verge of nuclear breakout is true."[3] Ali Akbar Salehi, the former Iranian representative to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), similarly stressed, "We have found the way and we do not have any scientific problems."[4]

Despite such revelations, it is still difficult to predict with any degree of accuracy when Iran will be in a position to construct a deliverable nuclear device. Once Iran completes the necessary infrastructure, from mining to enriching uranium at the suitable weapons-grade level, and masters the engineering skill required to assemble a bomb, it could cross the threshold in a

[3] Interview with Hashemi Rafsanjani, Islamic Republic News Agency, hereafter IRNA, 25 May 2004.

[4] Agence France-Presse, 25 May 2004.

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short period of time. All this would depend on the scope and scale of the program and the level of national resources committed to this task. Iran today does have an accelerated program, but not a crash program similar to Pakistan's in the early 1970s, when the entirety of national energies was mobilized behind the task of constructing a nuclear device. In this context, Iran's persistent determination to complete the fuel cycle—which it has a right to do under the NPT—is ominous, because doing so would bring the country close to a weapons capability.

Having stipulated the importance of paying attention to Iran's scientific progress, it is necessary to examine the critical international and domestic factors that condition Tehran's nuclear calculations. Historically, a state embarks on the costly path of nuclear empowerment in order to achieve certain strategic objectives. Deterrence of adversaries, national prestige, and the desire to project power in an uncertain regional environment have offered a number of states important incentives to pursue such weapons. As a nuclear industry matures, it inevitably generates domestic constituencies devoted to the perpetuation of the nuclear path, even if the initial strategic concerns that launched the program may no longer be relevant. Iran does indeed fit this pattern, as both its precarious geopolitical position and its internal development have created a state committed to its nuclear path. Iran does live in a dangerous and unpredictable neighborhood, leading its ruling elite during two very different regimes—a pro-Western monarchy and a militant theocracy—to devote considerable resources to the nuclear program. Through an assessment of external and internal factors, one can better appreciate the magnitude of the Iranian challenge.

The International Context

As Iran's nuclear program crosses successive thresholds, a wide variety of explanations have been proffered for its underlying designs. Given the regime's strident anti-Israeli rhetoric, it is often assumed that Tehran's animosity toward the Jewish state drives its nuclear determinations. At the same time, given the fact that Iran is adjacent to two states that have suffered coercive regime change at the hands of the United States, it is not unreasonable to claim that a desire to deter America guides the clerical elite. As with most states, a combination of fears and opportunities, concerns and ambitions are propelling the recalcitrant theocracy toward the option of assembling the bomb.

The question of Israel needs to be assessed carefully, for in this case, rhetorical fulminations conceal more than they reveal. To be sure, Iran views Israel as an illegitimate state, and its continued power as a product of a pernicious conspiracy. In its opposition to Israel, the Islamic Republic has violated all prevailing international norms; it frequently denies that the Holocaust occurred, calls for the elimination of a member state of the United Nations, and actively supports terrorist organizations plotting against Jerusalem. However, during the three decades since launching its nuclear program, Iran has pre-

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ferred to express its disdain for Israel through proxies and has striven hard to wage its indirect war within distinct limits or "red lines." Indeed, one of the characteristics of this most peculiar of conflicts is that both parties have sought to avoid direct military confrontation. Such a posture meets Iran's ideological and strategic interests, as it can claim the leadership of militant Islamist opposition to the "Zionist entity," while at the same time avoiding engagement with one of the most powerful military forces in the world. In this context, it is hard to suggest that Iran wants the bomb either because it fears Israel or, alternatively, as a weapon for the eradication of the Jewish state.

While Israel may be peripheral to Iran's nuclear calculations, the American shadow looms large. With the backgound of the perennial tension between the two states, the George W. Bush administration's muscular unilateralism and calls for regime change as a means of fostering stability have unsettled Iran's reactionary rulers. For many within Iran's corridors of power, the only way in which the long-term American challenge can be negated is through the possession of the "strategic weapon." The conservative newspaper *Jumhuri-ye Islami* captured Tehran's dilemma by noting, "In the contemporary world, it is obvious that having access to advanced weapons shall cause deterrence and therefore security, and will neutralize the evil wishes of great powers to attack other nations and countries."[5] In a similar vein, the leading reformist newspaper, *Aftab-e Yazd*, stressed that given the regional exigencies, "In the future Iran might be thinking about the military aspects of nuclear energy."[6] Given the asymmetry of power between the two states, a presumed nuclear capability seems to be the only viable deterrent posture against an adversary that has never accepted the legitimacy of the Iranian revolution and has long sought to isolate and contain the Islamic Republic.

America is not the only potential problem that Iran faces; to its east lies a nuclear-armed Pakistan, with its own strain of anti-Shiism. Although General Pervez Musharraf is routinely celebrated in Washington as a reliable ally in the war against terrorism, Pakistan's past is checkered and problematic. Pakistan perceived the demise of the Soviet Union as a unique opportunity to exert its influence in Central Asia and to capture the emerging markets in that critical area. Afghanistan was viewed as an indispensable bridge to Central Asia, and Pakistani intelligence services did much to ensure the triumph of the radical Taliban movement in the ensuing Afghan civil war. The rise of the Taliban and the eventual establishment of al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan had much to do with Pakistan's cynical strategy. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistani machinations caused considerable tensions with Iran, which was uneasy about the emergence of a radical Sunni regime on its northeastern border.

Although Pakistan's relations with Iran have improved since September 11, with Pakistan's final abandonment of the Taliban, the specter of instability in

[5] "Anti-Arrogance Campaign Becomes Necessary," *Jumhuri-ye Islami*, 3 November 2004.
[6] "Necessity and Choice," *Aftab-e Yazd*, 21 June 2004.

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Islamabad haunts Iran's leadership. The possibility of the collapse of the current military government and its displacement by a radical Sunni regime with access to nuclear weapons is something Iran feels it must guard against. Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998 caused considerable anxiety in Tehran, with Rafsanjani stressing, "This is a major step toward proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is a truly dangerous matter and we must be concerned." [7] Former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi also mused, "This was one genie that was much better to have stayed confined in the bottle."[8] Along with America, Pakistan is a potential threat that Iran must take into consideration as it plots its defense strategy.

Tense relations with the United States, a complex regional environment, and an unstable eastern frontier may lead one to perceive that Iran's motivations are purely defensive. However, the Middle East has undergone dramatic changes since the American invasion of Iraq, and the guardians of theocracy are sensing a unique opportunity to establish their own co-prosperity sphere in the Persian Gulf. The breakdown of Iraq removes a historic barrier to projection of Iranian power at a time when the United States is eager to leave its Arab burden behind. A presumed nuclear capability will probably convince the small Gulf sheikdoms that Iran is immune from American retribution and that they therefore have to come to terms with the clerical state. In essence, an Iranian nuclear capability will alter the psychological environment, making the appeasement of Iran a compelling strategic move by the weak Gulf states deprived of protection from their humbled imperial benefactor. In this context, the often-contemplated notion of offering Iran security guarantees in return for its disarmament has limited utility, since Tehran's drive for the bomb transcends mere deterrence and is rooted in opportunism and a quest for hegemony.

As a nation embarks on a nuclear program, its motivations cannot be limited to its geopolitical ambitions or security anxieties. Domestic politics, the perceptions of the political class, and the emergence of important constituents within the regime have an immeasurable impact on the direction of a nation's military planning. Today in Iran, the perennial factionalism of the past few years is uneasily yielding to the consolidation of power by hard-line politicians whose ideology was molded by a profound distrust of the international community and its principal guardian, the United States. In addition to the external events, one must consider Iran's changing politics before considering an approach to the Islamic Republic's nuclear challenge.

Domestic Debates

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a regime continuously divided against itself. Even in the era of conservative political hegemony, there are factions, on issues

[7] "Friday Prayer Speech by Hashemi Rafsanjani," IRNA, 17 May 1998.
[8] *The New York Times*, 7 June 1998.

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of economic reform, regional priorities, and even relations with America, and conservatives frequently find themselves at odds with one another. However, today, a unique consensus has evolved within the regime on the nuclear issue. Iran's cantankerous conservatives seem united on the notion that the Islamic Republic should have an advanced nuclear infrastructure that will offer it an opportunity to cross the nuclear threshold at some point. Whether Iran will take that step or will remain satisfied with a presumed capability just short of an actual breakout, as India did prior to 1997, will depend on a range of domestic and international developments.

It must be emphasized from the outset that for all the factions involved in this debate, the core issue is how to safeguard Iran's national interests. The Islamic Republic is not an irrational rogue state seeking such weaponry as an instrument of an aggressive, revolutionary foreign policy. This is not an "Islamic bomb" to be handed over to terrorist organizations or exploded in the streets of New York or Washington. The fact is that Iran has long possessed chemical weapons, and has yet to transfer such arms to its terrorist allies. Iran's cautious leaders are most interested in remaining in power, and fully appreciate that transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists could lead to the type of retaliation from the United States or Israel that would eliminate their regime altogether. For Iran this is a weapon of deterrence and power projection.

The primary supporters of the nuclear program are now officials in command of key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Guardian Council. A fundamental tenet of the hard-liners' ideology is the notion that the Islamic Republic is in constant danger from predatory external forces, necessitating military self-reliance. This perception was initially molded by a revolution that sought not just to defy international norms but also to refashion them. The passage of time and the failure of that mission have not necessarily diminished the hard-liners' suspicions of the international order and its primary guardian, the United States. *Jumhuri-ye Islami*, the mouthpiece of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, sounded this theme by stressing that "the core problem is the fact that our officials' outlook on the nuclear dossier of Iran is faulty and they are on the wrong track. It seems they have failed to appreciate that America is after our destruction and the nuclear issue is merely an excuse for them."[9]

In a similar vein, *Resalat*, another influential conservative paper, sounded the themes of deterrence and national interest by claiming, "In the present situation of international order whose main characteristics are injustice and the weakening of the rights of others, the Islamic Republic has no alternative but intelligent resistance while paying the least cost."[10] Given its paranoia and suspicions, the Iranian right does not necessarily object to international isolation and confrontation with the West. Indeed, for many within this camp,

[9] "Resisting the US on the Nuclear Issue Can Save Islam," *Jumhuri-ye Islami*, 3 April 2005.
[10] "Nuclear Decisions Must Be Made Based on National Interest," *Resalat*, 30 May 2004.

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such a conflict would be an effective means of rekindling popular support for the revolution's fading élan.

Iran's nuclear calculations have been further hardened by the rise of war veterans such as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to positions of power. Although the Iran–Iraq war ended nearly twenty years ago, for many within the Islamic Republic, it was a defining experience that altered their strategic assumptions. Even a cursory examination of Ahmadinejad's speeches reveals that for him, the war is far from a faded memory. In his defiant speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2005, Iran's President pointedly admonished the assembled dignitaries for their failings:

> For eight years, Saddam's regime imposed a massive war of aggression against my people. It employed the most heinous weapons of mass destruction including chemical weapons against Iranians and Iraqis alike. Who, in fact, armed Saddam with those weapons? What was the reaction of those who claim to fight against WMDs regarding the use of chemical weapons then?[11]

The international indifference to Saddam's war crimes and Tehran's lack of an effective response has led Iran's war veteran President to perceive that the security of his country cannot be predicated on global opinion and treaties.

The impact of the Iran–Iraq war on Tehran's nuclear calculations cannot be underestimated. Iraq's employment of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and combatants has permanently scarred Iran's national psyche. Whatever their tactical military utility, in Saddam's hands, chemical weapons were tools of terror, as he hoped that through their indiscriminate use he could frighten and demoralize the Iranian populace. To a large extent, this strategy succeeded; Iraqi attacks did much to undermine national support for continuation of the war.

Beyond the human toll, the war also changed Iran's strategic doctrine. During the war, Iran persisted with the notion that technological superiority cannot overcome revolutionary zeal and a willingness to offer martyrs. To compensate for its lack of weaponry, Iran launched human-wave assaults and used its young population as a tool of an offensive military strategy. The devastation of the war and the loss of an appetite for "martyrdom" among Iran's youth has invalidated that approach. As Rafsanjani acknowledged, "With regards to chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons, it was made clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. We should fully equip ourselves in both offensive and defensive use of these weapons."[12] Moreover, the indifference of the international community to Saddam's crimes also left its mark, leading Iran to reject the notion that international agreements can ensure its security. As Mohsen Rezai, the former commander of the Revolu-

[11] "President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's UN Address," IRNA, 17 September 2005.

[12] Cited in Wyn Bowen and Joanna Kidd, "The Iranian Nuclear Challenge," *International Affairs* 80 (March 2004): 257–276.

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tionary Guards, said in 2004, "We cannot, generally speaking, argue that our country will derive any benefit from accepting international treaties."[13] Deterrence could no longer be predicated on revolutionary commitment and international opinion; Iran required a more credible military response.

The legacy of the war only reinforces a nationalistic narrative that sees America's demands for Iran to relinquish its fuel cycle rights under the NPT as inherently unjust. As a country that has historically been the object of foreign intervention and the imposition of various capitulation treaties, Iran is inordinately protective of its national prerogatives and sovereign rights. The rulers of Iran perceive that they are being challenged not because of their provocations and previous treaty violations, but because of superpower bullying. In a peculiar manner, the nuclear program and Iran's national identity have become fused in the imagination of the hard-liners. To stand against America on this issue is to validate one's revolutionary ardor and sense of nationalism. Ali Husseini Tash, the Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, stressed this point, saying, "A nation that does not engage in risks and difficult challenges, and a nation which does not stand up for itself can never be a proud nation."[14] Thus, the notion of compromise and acquiescence has limited appeal to Iran's aggrieved nationalists.

Despite their bitterness and cynicism, the theocratic hard-liners are eternal optimists when it comes to their assessment of how the international community would respond to Iran's nuclear breakout. Many influential conservative voices insist that Iran's breakout would follow the model of India and Pakistan, with the initial international outcry soon followed by an acceptance of Iran's new status. Thus, Tehran would regain its commercial contracts and keep its nuclear weapons. Former Iranian Foreign Minister Akbar Velayati noted this theme when stressing, "Whenever we stand firm and defend our righteous stands resolutely, they are forced to retreat and have no alternatives."[15] The right thus rejects the notion that Iran's mischievous past and its tense relations with the United States would militate against the international community's acceptance of Iran's nuclear status.

However, should their anticipations prove misguided and Iran become the subject of sanctions, it is a price that the hard-liners are willing to pay for an important national prerogative. Ahmadinejad has pointedly noted that even if sanctions were to be imposed, "the Iranian nation would still have its rights."[16] In a similar vein, Ayatollah Jannati has noted, "We do not welcome sanctions, but if we are threatened by sanctions, we will not give in."[17] The notion of the need to sacrifice and struggle on behalf of the revolution and to resist

[13] IRNA 13 September 2004.
[14] *Farhang-e Ashti*, 28 February 2006.
[15] IRNA, 22 September 2004.
[16] "Time to Base Diplomatic Negotiations on Basij Values," *Sharq*, 25 October 2005.
[17] *Aftab-e Yazd*, 16 October 2005.

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imperious international demands is an essential tenet of the hard-liners' ideological perspective.

For the foreseeable future, the United States will confront an Iranian state whose strategic vulnerabilities, regional ambitions, and internal political alignments will push it in the direction of nuclear capability. However, this is not the first time that Washington has confronted an adversary determined to acquire the bomb. Are there lessons in the history of counterproliferation that could help in defusing the Iranian challenge? Is there anything that the United States and its allies could still do to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold and introducing such dangerous weapons into such a volatile region?

American Strategic Alternatives

The debate within the United States over how to manage Iran's regional and nuclear ambitions has frequently been characterized by the presentation of false choices. Foreign policy hawks in the United States, including key members of the present Bush administration, argue for coercion and "regime change" rather than diplomacy in relation to Iran. Foreign policy doves, on the other hand, argue for the use of inducements and engagement. Neither approach is likely to prove realistic by itself. Yet the United States and its allies have broad historical experience of managing similar challenges from hostile or threatening states—both successfully and unsuccessfully. A brief discussion of the fundamental strategic alternatives, along with their historical record in other cases, will help to enlighten the current debate over U.S. policy toward Iran. As in past and comparable circumstances, the United States has four basic strategic options in relation to Iran: containment, rollback, non-entanglement, and engagement.

Containment involves the creation of political, military, and economic counterweights around a potentially hostile or aggressive state. It is a form of balance-of-power diplomacy, most closely associated with the Cold War, but one with considerable variety in its operationalization. During the early phase of the Cold War, America's containment policy eschewed negotiations with the Soviet Union in the hope that the USSR would collapse.[18] The later Cold War version, on the other hand, typically combined containment and diplomacy. Indeed, in traditional balance-of-power diplomacy, there is nothing to prevent adversaries from negotiating even as they attempt to outmaneuver one another. So while containment certainly requires both patience and credible military commitments, it is not necessarily incompatible with diplomacy or engagement. In the case of Saddam's Iraq, successive U.S. administrations from 1991 to 2001 rightly rejected negotiations with Saddam but maintained a strategy of containment against Iraq involving regional military bases and alliances, periodic air strikes, economic sanctions, and (until 1998) UN inspections. That

[18] George Kennan to Secretary of State James Byrnes, 22 February 1946, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1946, vol. 6 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 696–709.

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strategy of containment was criticized for having failed, but the alternatives were equally unpalatable. If the objective was the deterrence of Saddam, weakening his military arsenal and ensuring that he would not invade his neighbors, then containment was in fact quite effective.[19] As in all cases, and so with Iran, the costs or imperfections of containment can only be measured in comparison to the potential costs of alternative strategies.

Rollback is a more aggressive option than containment, and the one singled out by the Bush administration for fresh use since the terrorist attacks of 2001. At the most basic level, rollback involves the use of military force to displace a hostile regime. There are also less-extreme variants of this strategy. Rollback can encompass, for example, the use of diplomatic or economic sanctions in the hope that such pressures will provoke the demise of the targeted regime. There are certainly historic cases where nothing short of direct rollback would have sufficed to remove a deadly international danger, the obvious case being Hitler's Germany. However, not every unsavory regime is Nazi Germany. Many of America's enemies are not powerful states determined to employ military force to achieve their objectives. Indeed, the most important contribution that George Kennan made to the strategy of containment was his assessment that while the Soviet leadership was implacably hostile to the West, it would refrain from war.[20] This critical factor made possible the containment of the USSR. When rollback is successful, it has the advantage of removing a given threat altogether. The strategy of rollback has always proven tempting to the American public, as it pledges quick and decisive results. But this very feature comes with a downside: just as direct military rollback is the most assertive of the four basic strategic alternatives under discussion, so it is also potentially the most costly and risk prone. It is precisely for this reason that the administration of Harry Truman rejected General Douglas MacArthur's argument for rollback against China in 1951. The failure of rollback, however, can be devastating. The botched invasions of North Korea in 1950–1951 and Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 stand as stark reminders of the high price of unsuccessful rollback operations. In Iraq, the Bush administration succeeded in overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein but has thus far failed to put any stable government in its place. The cost of Saddam's rollback to American interests, in terms of military, political, and international credibility, has been considerable. Direct military rollback is therefore a very shaky premise upon which to base American policy. A declared policy of rollback inevitably faces the question of whether we should act upon the stated goal directly and militarily. Even a verbal commitment to regime change carries risks of its own, since the stated goal of overthrowing a given political system obviously complicates diplomacy and may invite preventive attack.

[19] Daniel Byman, "After the Storm: U.S. Policy Toward Iraq Since 1991," *Political Science Quarterly* 114 (Winter 2001–2002): 493–516.

[20] Kennan to Byrnes, 706–708.

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Non-entanglement is another basic strategic alternative, and one that probably receives insufficient consideration. Its most important element is a refusal to embark on any initiatives, whether in terms of offering inducements or threats, in relation to the adversarial state. In cases where American interests are limited, and where the costs of intervention outweigh the benefits, non-entanglement can be a perfectly good option. Nonetheless, when America is compelled to intervene to protect its essential interests—as for example in Kuwait in 1991—then the previous inactivity can act as a source of conflict. When the United States tries to pursue a strategy of non-entanglement, it often ends up having to intervene later, at greater cost and embarrassment. In the meantime, moreover, hostile states are allowed free rein to pursue their revisionist ambitions. In the long term, therefore, non-entanglement can also be a very risky strategy.

Engagement is the final alternative, one that appears to have a wide variety of distinct meanings. There is engagement as *activism*, in reference to a basic stance of political, strategic, or commercial activity worldwide. There is engagement as simple *contact* with an existing adversary, diplomatically or economically. There is engagement as *integration*, in which such diplomatic or economic contact is used as a strategy in itself, in the hopes of creating patterns of cooperation, integration, and interdependence between hostile states.[21] There is engagement as *détente*, in which adversaries enter into a limited range of cooperative agreements alongside continued rivalry. Finally, there is engagement as *bargaining* or negotiation, in which specific and concrete concessions between adversaries are mutual and reciprocal. Both bargaining and détente can be distinguished from an ill-advised strategy of appeasement, in which concessions are made unilaterally in the hope of sating or altering an adversary's aggressive intentions. Observers often call on the United States to "engage" Iran, without specifying exactly what they have in mind. Yet the concept of engagement includes a range of distinctive strategies that must not be confused with one another. There are historic precedents for such confusion. The collapse of the USSR, for example, is frequently attributed to the subversive influence of increased contact with the West. However, there is good reason to believe that the infusion of Western trade temporarily strengthened the Soviet bloc. In that case, a strategy of intended subversion had the converse effect of empowering an adversary.[22] It is important to note, however, that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not perceive détente as a full-blown strategy of integration, but as a way to reduce the risk of nuclear war while maintaining a more inexpensive and discriminate form of containment. Within

[21] Richard Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 16–42, 115–135, 171–182.

[22] See, for example, in the case of East Germany, Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993), 367–368; and M.E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente and Ostpolitik, 1969-1973* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 169–178.

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such a framework, engagement as détente can be viewed as having achieved its limited goals.

The concept of engagement through integration in relation to Iran has received growing attention in U.S. foreign policy circles. The weakness of such a strategy, however, is that it badly underestimates the hostility of most factions within the Iranian government toward the United States. It also underestimates the high value that Iran's political leaders in general place upon their nuclear weapons program. The modest existing diplomatic and economic inducements on offer from the EU will not alter Tehran's determination to go nuclear, especially in the absence of credible coercive threats. On the contrary, recent experience suggests that Iranian negotiators will probably try to wring whatever concessions they can from any process of negotiation, without abandoning their nuclear or regional ambitions. The Bush administration obviously caused deep apprehension in Tehran when it declared a policy of regime change, but the problem goes deeper than that, since Iran's nuclear program well pre-dates the current administration.

Simply hoping for Iranian democratization, on the other hand, is not really a coherent strategy. We can certainly root for the eventual victory of dissident democratic reformers within Iran, but there are no indications of their imminent success, to say the least. In practical terms, direct military rollback is not a serious option either. An American invasion and occupation of Iran aimed at dismantling Tehran's nuclear capabilities is simply not going to happen. Even more-limited U.S. air strikes against Iran and its weapons sites would probably fail to destroy Iran's nuclear program, and the political fallout would be immense: a nationalist backlash among the Iranian public, international condemnation of the United States, the strengthening of Iran's hard-liners, the potential disruption of Persian Gulf oil supplies to the industrialized world, and Iranian-sponsored attacks against American troops and interests throughout the region.[23]

What then is to be done? The Bush administration has repeatedly declared its support for the overthrow of Iran's theocratic regime. Over the past two years, however, the administration has shown considerable patience in allowing an alternative diplomatic track to move forward. The EU was initially encouraged by Washington to put a number of economic and diplomatic carrots on the table in order to induce Iran to negotiate. Iran's response was so gratuitously uncooperative that the United States was able to win limited economic and weapons-related sanctions against Iran from the UN Security Council in December 2006. These events represent a real diplomatic success for the Bush administration. But the question now is what happens next. The existing limited sanctions will probably have no dramatic effects on Iran's economy, its leadership, or its nuclear weapons program—Moscow has made sure of that. China and Russia are very unlikely to agree to any truly punishing sanctions—

[23] Geoffrey Kemp, "Desperate Times, Half Measures," *The National Interest* 80 (Summer 2005): 53–56.

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for example, against Iranian oil and gas. Nor are the French or Germans likely to support UN-approved military action against Iran. The current diplomatic track may, therefore, have run its course, since it is unlikely to bring any major changes in position on either side. It must be stressed that throughout these deliberations, the United States has never made a significant offer to Iran, apart from insisting that it will participate in negotiations should Tehran suspend its enrichment activities.

The United States has never taken the lead on the diplomatic side, allowing the EU to do so instead. Rather, the Bush administration has acted for the most part as if the very idea of direct, bilateral negotiations with Iran would represent a great concession on the part of the United States. Of course, they would be no such thing. Just as negotiation is not a worthy end in itself, neither is the absence of negotiation an end it itself, if such absence hurts American interests—and in this case it has. Indeed, the practical effect of the American attitude has been that Iran has moved closer and closer to having nuclear weapons: call it "malign neglect," an intransigent form of containment mixed with non-entanglement. The EU, for its part—with the notable exception of Tony Blair's Britain—has been unwilling to seriously consider the eventual prospect of military action. Fortunately, the Europeans have recently moved in a more hard-line direction against Iran—at least in terms of economic sanctions—than many thought possible only a few months ago. That gives the American position more leverage in relation to Tehran.

A better starting point for U.S. strategy toward Iran would be neither integration, nor rollback, nor malign neglect, but containment, supplemented by direct bargaining over the issue of Iran's nuclear weapons. Effective containment requires clarity about the consequences of aggression, along with credible military capabilities, commitments, and alliances within the region. Washington still has those regional capabilities and alliances, much weakened, however, by the quagmire in Iraq. Iran can therefore be deterred from direct military aggression, an unlikely event in any case. But it would be in America's interest to supplement this baseline strategy of containment with direct, comprehensive negotiations over the nuclear issue. While Iran's conservative and hard-line leaders collectively place a very high value on their nascent nuclear program, they do not necessarily agree among themselves on the exact weight or significance of that program in comparison to other goals. Iran's economy, for example, while benefiting from oil revenues, is in serious need of outside investment and reform. If presented by the West with a clear choice between nuclear weapons and the avoidance of economic damage caused by truly effective sanctions—or a clear choice between nuclear weapons and genuinely significant economic incentives—the more pragmatic members of Iran's ruling class, including Supreme Leader Khamenei, could very well choose economic benefits over nuclear weapons. Indeed, the very prospect of such a stark choice might allow a faction of pragmatic hard-liners to outmaneuver the more extreme President Ahmadinejad and thus secure their own power domestically.

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But they will only do so if the costs and benefits are altered by the United States and its allies so as to give them sufficient incentive to bargain in earnest.[24]

The general parameters of a serious potential offer or bargain are visible and well understood: Iran would agree to verifiably disclose and freeze its uranium enrichment and plutonium programs, under close inspection by the IAEA. The fact of effective nuclear disarmament would be more important than the formal renunciation of Iran's "rights" to nuclear power. Iran would also abandon support for terrorist activities as part of this agreement. In turn, the United States and its allies would agree to lift long-standing sanctions, unfreeze Iranian assets, encourage foreign investment, ease Iran's entry into the World Trade Organization, and provide supervised technical assistance with the peaceful use of nuclear energy, if necessary. Both sides would normalize relations and offer security assurances to one another. The consequence could very well be a kind of détente between Iran and the United States, albeit a strictly limited one. It is entirely possible, even probable, that Iran would reject such an offer, and refuse to abandon its nascent nuclear weapons program regardless. But the effort is necessary. If diplomacy breaks down entirely, then the United States will be in a better position to ratchet up the pressure on Tehran with new international support. Such support will not be available unless the United States makes a genuine, comprehensive, and direct effort at a negotiated solution—an effort that still has not been made.

Clearly, the exact elements of any comprehensive nuclear settlement with Iran are absolutely vital; a number of rules should guide this initiative. First, negotiations should not be based upon the assumption that diplomatic or economic contact by itself will transform Iran's theocratic regime into a democracy. Such an assumption could tempt the United States into excessive compromise with an essentially adversarial state. The only acceptable rationale for a diplomatic initiative is to terminate Iran's nuclear program at an acceptable price. Second, to increase its diplomatic leverage, the United States will have to use not only carrots but sticks in order to persuade Iran to come to a negotiated settlement. The latter could include, for example, threats of new, intensified economic sanctions, or even threats of military action. Third, the United States should conduct its bargaining strategy in tandem with its European allies as well as Russia. It must be Tehran rather than Washington that is outnumbered internationally. Finally, we cannot expect that a nuclear agreement with Iran will automatically terminate the long-standing regional rivalry between Iran and the United States. Iran's theocratic regime will very likely be continuously hostile toward the United States in the medium term, regardless of any diplomatic arrangement.

The idea that Iran can be appeased or its ambitions sated through positive, unilateral inducements alone is an improbable one. In fact, a strategy of pure

[24] Kenneth Pollack, "Iran: Three Alternative Futures," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10 (June 2006): 73–80.

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accommodation would be positively dangerous, creating a mistaken image of unending passivity on the part of the United States and its allies. The threatened "sticks" of sanctions, compellence, and containment must therefore be a major part of U.S. policy toward Iran. Nonetheless, certain forms of containment are too unsophisticated to serve the American interest, since containment is frequently most effective when complemented by focused inducements and measured diplomacy. Positive economic incentives and diplomatic recognition are policy instruments, or "carrots," that the United States holds along with military power and economic sanctions. No such policy instrument can be usefully dismissed in the abstract; to do so is to unilaterally diminish our leverage over Iran. The critical thing is to view any positive economic and political inducements as of a piece with a comprehensive strategy in which the promise of rewards is linked to the threat of punishments, as well as to verifiable concessions. Thus far, the sticks and carrots employed by the United States have simply not provided sufficient leverage against Iran. That combination of sticks and carrots must be much more hefty and considerable than at present to have any real impact on Tehran's own calculus of the costs and benefits of its nuclear program.

Any proposal for diplomatic negotiations must think ahead to their possible failure. If Washington enters into direct talks with Tehran, and those talks collapse, then the United States will be faced with the unpalatable alternatives of either: launching air strikes against Iranian weapons sites, probably without much international support; giving tacit approval to an Israeli air strike with the same purpose; accepting Iran as a nuclear weapons power, in fact, if not in form; or containing Iran in a more aggressive fashion. The first alternative is extremely unappealing, for reasons discussed before, but it would be even less popular without prior diplomatic efforts. The second option is not much better, but the United States may be unable or unwilling to stop it. The third alternative is inadequate, especially in relation to Iran's current and particularly repugnant president. The United States must therefore consider ways in which it and its allies can pressure Iran much more aggressively—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—should all nuclear talks break down. The very prospect of such ratcheted pressure, if sufficiently serious, might help tilt the Iranian government toward a negotiated settlement beforehand. Tehran's hardliners cannot count on America's infinite patience in this matter, no matter how confident they may be right now. Again, this threat will be more convincing if the United States can be shown to have gone the extra mile in reaching for a diplomatic solution. One outcome that is entirely possible, however, is a prolonged standoff, during which Iran continues to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities. Such a standoff will require steady nerves in U.S. foreign policy circles, along with the ability to distinguish reality from rhetoric. Under such unwanted circumstances, it will be useful to recall that while we would far prefer a nuclear-free Iran, Tehran—like previous authoritarian but survival-oriented governments—is extremely unlikely to use such awesome weapons

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in a suicidal manner. Iran's leaders undoubtedly know that any use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies, either directly, or indirectly through transfer to terrorist groups, would bring about their own utter destruction. An Iranian nuclear deterrent would therefore probably function much as Soviet nuclear weapons did during the Cold War, amplifying Iran's diplomatic leverage within the region and complicating but not erasing the effects of American military commitments. This would be a severe setback for the United States, but not a fatal one. The American focus would then be upon minimizing the effects of proliferation within the Middle East, for example, through regional arms control arrangements and confidence-building measures. Israel, however, would probably act militarily prior to this eventuality; we can hardly expect the Israelis to accept with equanimity the prospect of a nuclear-armed regime that hosts international conferences in order to deny that the Holocaust occurred.

Simply walking through the probable outcomes of the current crisis is to realize the imperative of serious and comprehensive negotiations between Tehran and Washington right now. Advocates of both engagement and rollback often suggest that theirs is the best route to political change within Iran, but regime change is a hope rather than a strategy. The Iranian theocracy has already outlasted several U.S. presidents; it looks unlikely to collapse any time soon.[25] A well-intentioned but misguided strategy of integration through engagement could very well strengthen the Iranian government without altering its foreign policy intentions or nuclear capabilities. On the other hand, a strategy of direct rollback risks American diplomatic isolation or possibly even a war that cannot redound to U.S. interests. Since the United States is not about to invade and occupy Iran, an unwillingness to engage in diplomacy with its government amounts to tacit consent as Tehran develops the bomb. The United States must therefore avoid the twin risks of rollback and appeasement, and instead pursue containment supplemented by some direct, hard bargaining with Iran. Such a strategy represents the only chance that the United States still has to prevent Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

[25] Elliot Hen-Tov, "Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism," *The Washington Quarterly* 30 (Winter 2006–2007): 163–179.

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TERRORIST ATTACKS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: STRATEGIES FOR OVERLAPPING DANGERS

Edited by
DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY
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

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The Lessons of September 11, Iraq, and the American Pendulum

CHRISTOPHER HEMMER

In a seminal 1974 article, Michael Roskin argued that U.S. policy toward interventions overseas has varied depending on the central historical lessons that different generations of policymakers had derived from recent historical events.[1] Since it has been over a generation since Roskin's article appeared, it is worth revisiting his approach for insights regarding America's current and future foreign policy. The Vietnam generation that Roskin saw as coming to the fore in the mid-1970s and supplanting the World War II generation has had its era, and today the lessons of Vietnam are being increasingly challenged by lessons derived from the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The purpose of this article is to document the lessons that policymakers in the George W. Bush administration have learned from September 11, argue that those lessons were a necessary cause of the administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and explore what the continued applications of those lessons could mean for the future of American foreign policy.

In an irony that Roskin surely would have anticipated, the lessons of September 11 bear a striking similarity to the earlier lessons of World War II (including the lessons of Pearl Harbor and Munich). As President Bush put it, "The events of September the 11th were as decisive as the attack on Pearl Harbor and the treachery of another September in 1939. And the lesson of all those events is the same: aggression and evil intent must not be ignored or appeased; they must be opposed early and decisively."[2] It was this lesson that

[1] Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (Fall 1974): 563–588.

[2] George W. Bush, "Remarks to the People of Poland," Krakow, 31 May 2003. This and all cited presidential statements are available from www.whitehouse.gov and were accessed on 12 February 2004.

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helped lead America to war with Iraq in 2003. Thus, instead of a revolution,[3] the Bush administration's foreign policy may represent a restoration—a swing of the pendulum back to an interventionist policy more characteristic of the post-World War II generation than the post-Vietnam generation.

Intervention in the affairs of other states is more a matter of degree than a simple binary choice of whether to intervene or not. To yield or withhold diplomatic recognition, for instance, is by itself a kind of intervention. This type of intervention, however, is a far cry from using a state's military forces to invade another country, evict a particular regime, and install another one. Thus, in looking at the pattern of American interventions overseas, it is important to look at the scale and purpose of these interventions and not just the basic question of whether the United States decided to intervene or not. For example, although the United States conducted a number of military interventions in the eighties and nineties, these interventions were limited in size (Grenada and Panama), goals (Libya and Bosnia), blood and treasure the United States was willing to expend (Lebanon and Somalia), or some combination of these (Haiti and Kosovo). Indeed, many of these interventions and the difficulties they presented, especially Lebanon and Somalia, served to reinforce the lessons of Vietnam and to further limit America's appetite for bold interventions overseas.

In the case of Iraq specifically, enforcing the no-fly zones, supporting United Nations sanctions, and aiding opponents of Saddam Hussein's regime were American interventions in Iraqi politics that had been ongoing since the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Indeed, regime change in Iraq has been an official policy goal of the United States at least since President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. These interventions, however, were strictly limited, in keeping with Presidents George H.W. Bush's 1991 decision not to use the full power of the U.S. military to evict Saddam Hussein from power by marching on Baghdad following Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait, a decision that was in part driven by fears of a Vietnam-type quagmire if the United States were to get involved in an Iraqi civil war.[4] The no-fly zones produced no American casualties, the sanctions were more focused on containment of Iraq's military capabilities than regime change, and the amount of support given to Iraqi opposition groups was paltry. It was these limits, however, that the George W. Bush administration decided to ignore in the aftermath of September 11, opting instead for a policy of immediate, largely unilateral, and forcible regime change.

[3] See Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). For a view that stresses more continuity (but some change), see Melvyn P. Leffler, "9/11 and American Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 29 (June 2005): 395–413.

[4] Yuen Foong Khong, "Vietnam, The Gulf, and U.S. Choices: A Comparison," *Security Studies* 2 (Autumn 1992): 74–95.

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The following section explains the analogical approach to American foreign policy used in this article. Then, the article discusses the specific lessons that members of the Bush administration have derived from September 11 and the similarities of those lessons to the lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor, and argues that those lessons were a necessary but not sufficient cause of the administration's decision to invade Iraq. The subsequent section explores some alternative explanations for the Bush administration's actions and their relationship to the analogical explanation offered here.

Making a conclusive case that the lessons of September 11 are going to have a generational-type effect on American foreign policy similar to the lessons of Munich or Vietnam is obviously impossible at this point. By necessity, any definitive argument along those lines will only be possible after the cohort of policymakers who experienced September 11 have had more time in power. While this article does attempt to document the individual learning that has taken place as a result of September 11 within the Bush administration and its impact on U.S. policy toward Iraq, there is an unavoidable gap between this and a fully demonstrated generational argument.[5] Thus, the generational portion of my argument here is necessarily prospective. The evidence presented here on the Bush administration, as well as debates within Congress over the lessons of September 11, is, I argue, suggestive that a generational shift may be in the offing and that, therefore, it is worth exploring what a continued application of these lessons could mean for the future of American foreign policy. This is the purpose of the final section before the conclusion, which looks at America's earlier attempts to apply the lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor during the Cold War to explore how the lessons of September 11 might similarly inform and, more worrisomely, could potentially misinform American policymakers if applied indiscriminately.

Historical Analogies and the American Pendulum

When faced with foreign policy problems, decisionmakers often turn to historical analogies for guidance.[6] Historical analogizing consists of using a

[5] On the distinctions between individual, organizational, governmental, and generational learning, see Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," *International Organization* 48 (Spring 1994): 287–289, 303–304.

[6] Ernest May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 217–282; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, *Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1986); Christopher Hemmer, *Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979-1987* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000); Jeffrey Record, *Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002); Alex

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previous political event to help interpret a new situation. Whether others judge the lessons policymakers derive from historical events to be accurate or inaccurate, perceptive or superficial, applicable or not applicable is irrelevant for understanding their behavior. If policymakers hold certain lessons to be applicable, it will affect their foreign policy behavior regardless of what anyone else sees to be the insightfulness or shallowness of those lessons.[7] A policymaker who interprets a challenge from abroad as similar to the one posed by Hitler in the 1930s is far more likely to favor an activist policy than one who interprets a challenge from abroad as similar to the one posed by Vietnam in the 1960s.

In looking at the broad sweep of U.S. foreign policy, many analysts have characterized America's approach to the world as susceptible to dramatic shifts, with policies alternating between extremes, like the swing of a pendulum. The terminology used to describe these extremes varies. Some speak of an alternation between realism and idealism, or isolationism and internationalism, or more recently, America as the internally focused promised land versus America as the externally focused crusader state.[8] While these distinctions highlight different facets of American foreign policy, they all center around one core concern: how actively engaged does the United States need to be in shaping events overseas? America's answer to this question has tended to be

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Roberto Hybel, *How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990); James Goldgeier, *Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Michael Fry, ed., *History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians* (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1991); Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); and William Jarosz and Joseph Nye, "The Shadow of the Past: Learning From History in National Security Decision Making" in Philip Tetlock, Charles Tilly, Robert Jervis, Jo L. Husbands, and Paul C. Stern, eds., *Behavior, Society and International Conflict*, vol. 3 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 126–189.

[7] For example, historians and political scientists have long questioned how much the purported lessons of Munich are based on an accurate reading of events leading up to World War II. For two recent examples, see Jeffrey Record, *The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007); Daryl G. Press, "The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During the 'Appeasement' Crises of the 1930s," *International Security* (Winter 2004/5): 136–169. For a general argument on separating issues of learning from any accuracy criterion, see Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy," 291–294.

[8] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 29–55; Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), 190–208; Dexter Perkins, *The American Approach to Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 135–155; Thomas M. Magstadt, *An Empire If You Can Keep It: Power and Principle in American Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004); Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with The World Since 1776* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1997); H.W. Brands, *What America Owes The World: The Struggle for the Soul of American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed The World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001).

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cyclical, with disappointment over the results of one approach leading the pendulum to swing toward its opposite.

Michael Roskin's contribution was to link these pendulum swings in U.S. foreign policy with salient historical events that shaped the thinking of an entire generation of leaders. For example, the rush to war in 1914 and the horrific results of World War I led the next generation of policymakers to give diplomacy more time to work in future crises. This determination was in part responsible for the attempts at appeasement prior to World War II. The failure of appeasement then swung the pendulum back toward activism and predisposed the next generation of leaders to see all challengers as potential Hitlers that needed to be confronted immediately. In 1974, Roskin foresaw a passing of the torch from the Munich generation to a Vietnam generation. For this Vietnam cohort, new Hitlers were not the major thing to worry about; that is what, in part, got the United States into its difficulties in Vietnam. Instead, what the United States needed to worry about was overextension, quagmires, and the danger of getting pulled into peripheral conflicts.[9] The subsequent decades largely confirmed Roskin's predictions regarding the impact that the lessons of Vietnam would have on American foreign policy.[10] The central insight of Roskin and other discussions of generational learning[11] does not depend on any one-to-one correlation between birth year and policy preferences. Instead, the central insight of this literature focuses on the overall impact that dramatic events can have in shaping how policymakers think about the problems they confront, and thus the policies they should pursue.

The lessons of Vietnam are now being challenged by lessons drawn from September 11. Moreover, rather than representing a completely new set of historical lessons, the lessons of September 11 being drawn by current American policymakers are remarkably similar to the lessons their counterparts drew from Pearl Harbor and the failure of appeasement in the 1930s. Similarly, critics of current American foreign policy have warned that events in Iraq today could potentially lead the United States into a new Vietnam. Thus, while the names may have changed (from the lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor to the lessons of September 11 and from the lessons of Vietnam to the lessons of Iraq), the core of current debates regarding American interventions overseas is remarkably similar to earlier debates during the Cold War.

[9] Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor To Vietnam," especially 576–580.

[10] Record, *Making War, Thinking History*, 79–128.

[11] Richard Ned Lebow, "Generational Learning and Conflict Management," *International Journal* 40 (Autumn 1985): 555–585; Jervis, *Perception and Misperception*, 249–271; Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, "Does Where You Stand Depend on When You Were Born? The Impact of Generation and Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy Beliefs," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 44 (Spring 1980): 1–22; and Howard Schuman and Cheryl Reiger, "Historical Analogies, Generational Effects and Attitudes toward War," *American Sociological Review* 57 (June 1992): 315–326.

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The Lessons of September 11 and the Decision to Invade Iraq

In an apt image, Josef Joffe likened the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 to a lightning bolt rather than an earthquake. The attacks did not radically reshape the contours of international politics, but instead shined a bright but fleeting light on the already-existing landscape.[12] September 11 ushered in an ideational change in American foreign policy rather than a structural change. The attacks did not change the global balance of power, but they did bring about unexpected shifts in American foreign policy.[13] This section attempts to document the lessons that American foreign policymakers drew from that sudden bolt and how it has impacted the course of American foreign policy, especially the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003.

In examining the lessons that President Bush and others in his administration have gleaned from the events of September 11, two recurring themes come to the fore. The first is the increased threat of devastating surprise attacks—of potential new Pearl Harbors with weapons of mass destruction. This increased sense of threat has pushed the administration toward a universal war on terror. As President Bush put it, "Here's what I took away from September the 11th, 2001—that any time a President sees a gathering threat to the United States, we must deal with it. We can't pick or choose like we used to .... In the old days oceans protected us from harm's way, and a President could stand back and say, well, maybe this gathering threat is an issue, maybe it's not. After September the 11th that complacency ... is no longer relevant."[14]

The second theme is the need to counter threats actively, to go on the offense and not rely on defense and deterrence. While increasing domestic security is an important part of the administration's overall war on terror, the attacks on New York and Washington have clearly pushed the Bush administration to favor an overseas offense over homeland defense. In short, according to the President, "The best way to secure America is to get the enemy before they get us.... I will not forget the lessons of September the 11th."[15]

Both of these lessons helped to push the United States to war against Iraq, the first by greatly increasing the Bush administration's perception of the threat that Saddam Hussein's Iraq posed and the second by offering the policy prescription of taking care of such threats early and decisively.[16] Even in the

[12] Josef Joffe, "Of Hubs, Spokes, and Public Goods," *The National Interest* 69 (Fall 2002), 17–20.

[13] Stephen Walt, "Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Security* 26 (Winter 2001/2002), 56–78.

[14] George W. Bush, press conference, Washington DC, 15 December 2003.

[15] George W. Bush, "President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld Discuss Progress in Iraq: Remarks in Press Availability," Crawford, Texas, 8 August 2003.

[16] In Jack Levy's terms, the Bush administration engaged in both diagnostic learning (increased perception of threat) and causal learning (act decisively now to ward off future challenges). "Levy, Learning and Foreign Policy," 285.

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absence of any direct link between Iraq and the September 11 attacks, those attacks moved Saddam Hussein's regime from being a second-tier irritant to be contained with sanctions and no-fly zones to being an immediate danger that had to be removed by military force.[17] Prior to September 11, Condoleezza Rice argued that there need be no sense of panic about states like Iraq and that even if Baghdad were to acquire weapons of mass destruction, America's policy should be one of deterrence and defense.[18] That was no longer the case after September 11. In explaining his case for a preemptive (more properly, preventive) war against Iraq, President Bush asked, "After 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to confront it now?" His answer was that because "we've experienced the horrors of September the 11th.... Before that tragic date we had only hints of al-Qaeda's plans and designs. Today in Iraq, we see a threat whose outlines are more clearly defined, and whose consequences could be far more deadly."[19] Prior to September 11, the Bush administration was thinking about how sanctions could be better crafted to contain Iraq, but after September 11, according to the President, "the doctrine of containment just doesn't hold any water."[20]

Seeing the damage done by a group of hijackers armed primarily with box-cutters, and extrapolating from that what other enemies of the United States could do with more-advanced weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, the President's perception of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein increased markedly after September 11. "Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other planes—this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that day never comes."[21] Post-mortems conducted in both the United States and Great Britain regarding the failure to find the expected large arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq have stressed that the raw intelligence produced on Iraq did not change after September 11, but estimates of how threatening that intelligence was did change. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, "What has changed is not the pace of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs, but our tolerance of them post 11 September."[22]

[17] See Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 3–5, 12–16, 27, 421; and Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 197, 200.

[18] Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000): 45–62.

[19] George W. Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, Remarks by the President on Iraq," Cincinnati, OH, 7 October 2002.

[20] George W. Bush, "President Bush Meets with Prime Minister Blair," Washington DC, 31 January 2003.

[21] George W. Bush, "President Delivers 'State of the Union,'" Washington DC, 28 January 2003.

[22] The Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell, *Review of the Intelligence on WMD: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (The Butler Report)* (London: The Stationery Office, 2004), 70,

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Given the similarities between the lessons President Bush has derived from September 11 and the lessons some of his predecessors derived from the failure of appeasement against Germany and Japan's surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, it is not surprising that Bush has drawn attention to the parallels. Indeed, his diary entry on September 11 asserts, "The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today."[23] Indeed, one of the recurring images in the President's rhetoric on terrorism and Iraq is to equate America's current enemies with the enemies of World War II and the Cold War.[24]

The imperative for America today, according to the President, is to avoid the mistakes that France, Britain, and the United States made in the 1930s by failing "to recognize, much less confront the aggressive evil in plain sight."[25] If al Qaeda or Saddam Hussein's Iraq are the equivalent of imperial Japan or Nazi Germany, President Bush is determined to play the role of Winston Churchill, a bust of whom he keeps in the Oval Office.[26] Who is Neville Chamberlain in this schema? They are President Bush's predecessors in office, who, under the caution induced by the failure in Vietnam, were hesitant to use force abroad. As the President put it, "For the generation leading up to September 11th, 2001, terrorists and their radical allies attacked innocent people in the Middle East and beyond without facing a sustained and serious response. The terrorists became convinced that free nations were decadent and weak. And they grew bolder."[27]

National Security Advisor and now Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has drawn a similar set of lessons from the attacks of September 11.[28] In discussing the lessons of September 11, Rice stresses five points, all of which indicate an increased perception of threat and the conviction that these threats must be confronted aggressively and overseas. First, Rice argues that the attacks demonstrate the acute vulnerability of the United States. Her second

34–35, 63, 105, accessed at http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/report.pdf, 5 April 2007. For the U.S. side, see U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq*, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 2004, 31, 363.

[23] Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 24.

[24] George W. Bush, "President Pays Tribute at Pentagon Memorial," Arlington, VA, 11 October 2001; George W. Bush, "President: We're Fighting To Win—And Win We Will, Remarks By the President on the USS Enterprise on Pearl Harbor Day," Norfolk, VA, 7 December 2001; George W. Bush, "President Speaks on War Effort to Citadel Cadets," Charleston, SC, 11 December 2001; George W. Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point," West Point, NY, 1 June 2002; and Bush, "President Delivers 'State of the Union.'"

[25] George W. Bush, "President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy," London, 19 November 2003.

[26] George W. Bush, "President Bush Discusses Importance of Democracy in Middle East, Remarks By the President on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror," Library of Congress, 4 February 2004. See also James Mann, *Rise of The Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004), 294, 300.

[27] George W. Bush, "President Addresses the Nation," Washington, DC, 7 September 2003.

[28] See for example, Condoleezza Rice, "Dr. Condoleezza Rice Speaks at Los Angeles Town Hall," Los Angeles, CA, 12 June 2003. Rice's statements are also available at www.whitehouse.gov, accessed 10 February 2004.

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and third points are that while the attacks show the need to increase America's homeland defense efforts, no matter how much emphasis the United States puts on homeland security, protection will require activism abroad, because "the best defense is a good offense." Fourth, Rice argues that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents a grave threat to the United States, and fifth, that the United States needs allies and coalition partners to execute the war on terror.[29] In explaining why the United States needed to go after Saddam Hussein, Rice gave perhaps the most succinct statement of the lessons of September 11: "Take care of threats early."[30]

The similarity between this and the lessons of Munich and Pearl Harbor is obvious to Rice, who also makes the comparison explicit. For Rice, September 11 is this generation's Pearl Harbor and it is time that the current crop of America's leaders act more like the post-World War II generation and not like the post-Vietnam generation. As Rice put it, "September 11th reintroduced America to a part of itself that some had forgotten or that some thought we no longer had. We have been reminded that defending freedom was not just the work of the greatest generation, but is the work of every generation."[31] What needs to be forgotten now, according to Rice, is the Vietnam-induced caution in American foreign policy, which only emboldened the terrorists.[32]

Turning from the White House to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon, one sees similar conclusions being drawn. When one senator asked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld why the United States had to go to war with Iraq now, Rumsfeld's response was, "What's different is 3,000 people were killed, I suggest that any who insist on perfect evidence are back in the 20th Century and still thinking in pre-9/11 terms."[33] To be more precise, Rumsfeld has nothing against twentieth-century thinking as long as you have the right decade; the 1930s and the 1970s are out, but the 1940s and 1950s are back. Facing early criticism that the war in Afghanistan was going too slowly, Rumsfeld offered his version of historical perspective, and all his examples came from World War II. When pressed further, he added the Cold War, Korea, and Desert Storm to the list, clearly passing over Vietnam.[34] Indeed,

[29] See Condoleezza Rice, "National Security Advisor Speaks at Texas A&M," 8 April 2002; and Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice on Terrorism and Foreign Policy," 29 April 2002.

[30] Bob Woodward, *Bush At War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 350.

[31] Rice, "National Security Advisor Rice Speaks"; Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, International Institute For Strategic Studies," London, 26 June 2003; Condoleezza Rice, "Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq in Chicago," 8 October 2003.

[32] Condoleezza Rice, "National Security Advisor Dr. Rice, remarks to National Legal Center," 31 October 2003.

[33] John Newhouse, *Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 47.

[34] "DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers," 1 November 2001. This and all Department of Defense statements are available at www.defenselink.mil. Accessed 13 February 2004.

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Rumsfeld is positively scornful of those who suggest the possible relevance of America's Vietnam experience for policy today.

Given Rumsfeld's age, it is not surprising that World War II references should be prevalent in his statements. For the Secretary of Defense, failure to confront Saddam Hussein would be the equivalent of the League of Nations' failures to respond to the fascist challengers in the 1930s. To avoid a similar outcome today, America has to actively confront its enemies. As Rumsfeld asked:

> One wonders looking back on history, what might have happened if the world heeded Winston Churchill's warnings in the 1930s—if, instead of ignoring the growing evidence, free nations had united, and formed a coalition to intervene and stop Hitler.... Consider the lives that could have been saved if the world had faced up to the mounting evidence and the compelling logic of the case Churchill presented, instead of waiting for perfect evidence of his capabilities and intentions in the form of 25 million dead human beings. The historical record of appeasement is a sorry one. And in an age when terrorists and dictators are seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass murder, we need to consider the lessons of history. We can look to our experience on September 11th.[35]

Rumsfeld's then-deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, offered four lessons from the events of September 11 that also stressed the twin themes of American vulnerability to surprise attacks and the need for an activist foreign policy. The first lesson is that surprise is to be expected, the second is that America is vulnerable, the third is that America's enemy has changed from the Soviet Union to rogue states and terrorist groups, and finally, that even if America's foes have changed, they have the same goal of the tyrants America confronted in the past, which is to frighten the United States into isolationism.[36] For Wolfowitz, the attacks of September 11 made war against Iraq "a war of necessity, not a war of choice." Wolfowitz also draws the connection between September 11 and the lessons of World War II. "We learned in the last century that democracies cannot live peacefully and undisturbed in a world where evil people control whole nations and seek to expand their bloody rule. We may have forgotten the lesson in the euphoria over the end of the Cold War. The attacks of September 11th were a shocking wake-up call."[37]

The lessons of September 11, however, probably had the least impact on the thinking of people like Wolfowitz and other so-called neoconservatives in the Bush administration because many of those lessons are consistent with what the neoconservatives have been saying for years with regard to U.S.

[35] Senate Armed Services Committee, *Testimony on Iraq (as prepared)*, 108th Cong., 1st sess. 2003.

[36] Prepared Statement for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, "Building a Military for the 21st Century," 3 and 4 October 2001.

[37] Paul Wolfowitz, "Conference on Iraqi Reconstruction, Mercatus Center, George Mason University," 4 November 2003. See also Paul Wolfowitz, "Statements to the Munich Conference on European Security Policy, as Prepared," 2 February 2002; and Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 426.

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foreign policy in general and Iraq in particular. Well before September 11, the neoconservatives had decried the Vietnam-induced caution in U.S. foreign policy and clearly preferred World War II analogies.[38] Thus, September 11 served more to confirm what the neoconservatives already believed, rather than to change their thinking. What September 11 did offer the neoconservatives was a political opportunity to more forcefully push their preexisting agenda. The lessons of September 11 made the rest of the administration, particularly the President, more open to many parts of the neoconservative agenda.[39]

Strikingly, even the domino theory has made a comeback in the post-September 11 world, with the deputy director of the policy planning staff arguing that "now we understand that a failed state in Central Asia, mistreatment of women under a perverse interpretation of Islam, the curriculum in religious schools in Indonesia, drug trafficking in the Andes, and a virus in the bloodstream of millions of Africans can set in place a string of dominos that, once set toppling, can touch our lives here in America in the most immediate ways imaginable."[40] Concerns regarding the lessons of Vietnam were now passé. As Richard Haass, then the director of the policy planning staff phrased it, prior to September 11, America "still lived with the messy 'lessons' of Vietnam, Somalia and Bosnia.... That changed on the morning of September 11th."[41]

The impact of the lessons of September 11 can also be seen in the Bush administration's *National Security Strategy* (NSS).[42] Seeking to prevent a potential September 11 with weapons of mass destruction, the administration identifies the gravest threat to the United States as the "crossroads of radicalism and technology." Also consistent with the lessons of September 11, the NSS calls for a proactive and universal response by the United States. It calls for the United States to actively spread its values overseas, it challenges the military to build "defenses beyond challenge," and, most famously, it

[38] Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, xv, 27, 81–83, 190–192, 294, 300; Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and The Global Order* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11, 30–31, 36, 52, 56.

[39] See Robert Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 118 (Fall 2003): 365–388; Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order," *The New Yorker,* 1 April 2002, 42–48; Elizabeth Drew, "The Neocons in Power," *New York Review of Books,* 12 June 2003; Joshua Muravchik, "The Neo-Conservative Cabal," *Commentary* 116 (September 2003): 26–33; and Max Boot, "Think Again: Neocons," *Foreign Policy* 140 (January/February 2004): 20–28.

[40] Donald K. Steinberg, "Foreign Policy Post-September 11: Learning the Right Lessons," 27 February 2003, accessed at http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/18762.htm, 12 February 2004.

[41] Richard Haass, "From Reluctant to Resolute: American Foreign Policy after September 11th, Remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations," 26 June 2002, accessed at http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/11445.htm, 12 February 2004.

[42] The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, accessed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, 5 April 2007.

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openly discusses the possibility of pre-empting (again, more properly, preventing) threats before they arise. Perhaps the most ambitious statement in the NSS comes from the President's speech at the National Cathedral during the memorial service for the victims of September 11, in which the President argued that "our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil."[43] Even Woodrow Wilson, who was in attendance that day, as his body is interred at the National Cathedral, must have marveled at the boldness of that agenda. An administration that had criticized its predecessor for having an "overly broad definition of America's national interest" and had argued that value-based interventions should be "exceedingly rare" had clearly been changed by the attacks of September 11.[44]

Alternative Explanations

To further explore the argument regarding the importance of the lessons of September 11 in the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq, the purpose of this section is to explore two sets of alternative explanations for America's decision and their relationship to the analogical explanation offered here. The first set of explanations focuses on America's international position. The second set of explanations focuses on American domestic politics and the preexisting ideological agenda of neoconservatives in the Bush White House. What ties these latter two together is that both see references to the lessons of September 11 as mere propaganda designed to obscure other motives that members of the administration had in advocating an invasion of Iraq. While unipolarity and American domestic politics do provide important pieces of the puzzle, the argument of this section is that neither of these factors would have resulted in an invasion of Iraq had it not been for the lessons drawn from September 11.

Unipolarity

One possible argument is that America's actions can be explained solely by its position as the unipolar power. A realist could argue that America's interests expanded in line with its power, and in invading Iraq, the Bush administration was simply acting as a hegemon would be expected to by eliminating a long-standing irritant. The central problem with such an argument, however, is that it is an argument about opportunity, not motive. Indeed, predicting the specific behavior of the American unipole is likely to be a particularly difficult task for realists, because a hegemonic state faces few

[43] White House, *National Security Strategy*, v, 5, 13–16, 29.
[44] Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," 53–54.

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international constraints and has a greater ability to ignore or attempt to overcome those that do exist.[45]

After Charles Krauthammer popularized the phrase *the unipolar moment*,[46] debates quickly ensued regarding what unipolarity meant, how long it could be expected to last, and what impact it might have on U.S. foreign policy.[47] Being a lone superpower means not having to worry that much about how other states may respond to your actions. This gives the United States more latitude in its foreign policy than it had under bipolarity or would have in a multipolar system. As a result of having a larger menu to choose from, however, predicting the specific choices the United States will make becomes more difficult. Unipolarity enables the United States to do more things, but has little impact on determining what things the United States will do.

The difficulties inherent in attempting to predict the behavior of the United States from its status as the world's preeminent power are evident in a number of recent attempts by realists to do so. For example, consider John Mearsheimer's offensive realism, which argues that anarchy offers states powerful incentives for expansion and that "survival mandates aggressive behavior." Given this, is America's decision to invade Iraq consistent with offensive realism? Looking at the full logic of Mearsheimer's argument, the answer is no. As a result of what he calls "the stopping power of water," Mearsheimer contends that global hegemony is beyond the capability of any state and that the best a state can hope for is to be a regional hegemon while preventing other regions from having a hegemon. Since this, he maintains, is the position of the United States today, an activist policy is no longer needed or desirable. Instead, Mearsheimer concludes that the United States should adopt a policy of disengagement and

[45] Shibley Telhami, "Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism, and Foreign Policy," *Security Studies* 11 (Spring 2002): 166–170.

[46] Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1990/1991): 23–33; see also Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," *The National Interest* 70 (Winter 2002/2003): 5–17.

[47] See Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why The World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 35–40; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (March/April 1999): 35–49; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American Primacy In Perspective," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (July/August 2002): 20–33; Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Eagle Has Crash Landed," *Foreign Policy* 131 (July/August 2002): 60–68; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17 (Spring 1993): 5–51; Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the 21st Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 29, 61–64; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *International Security* 24 (Summer 1999): 5–41; Charles L. Glaser, "Structural Realism in a More Complex World," *Review of International Studies* 29 (July 2003): 403–414; G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security* 28 (Summer 2003): 5–46; Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004); G. John Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (September 2003): 533–550.

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only insert itself into regional balances overseas if a potential regional hegemon arises that can only be stopped with U.S. assistance.[48]

Offering a different reading, Christopher Layne argues that offensive realism suggests that hegemons "must expand their power constantly. If they do not, they risk being knocked off their hegemonic perch by a rival."[49] While the American invasion of Iraq could be argued to be consistent with this form of offensive realism, Layne rejects the argument that America's international activism is being driven by these structural incentives. Instead, Layne believes that the United States, as a geographically insular power, would be wise to follow a strategy of offshore balancing. Structural incentives, as Layne reads them, point against any attempt to pursue primacy. "For the United States the logic of offshore balancing should trump the logic of offensive realism. The big question is why it has not."[50] To answer this question, Layne moves beyond structure and appeals to America's liberal ideology as the prime source of its behavior.[51]

Considering other realist approaches, Michael Mastanduno examines balance-of-power theory associated with the work of Kenneth Waltz and balance-of-threat theory associated with Stephen Walt and derives a set of predictions from each regarding America's current foreign policy choices.[52] None of the arguments he derives, however, can explain the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. In one sense, the very fact that these different realist approaches make competing predictions is evidence that international structural constraints are ambiguous and subject to different plausible interpretations.

With regard to balance-of-power theory, Mastanduno argues that unipolarity means that the United States will face fewer international constraints. While this follows logically from the definition of unipolarity, it offers little in the way of positive predictions regarding U.S. behavior. Indeed, Mastanduno uses what he characterizes as the haphazard and episodic nature of U.S. policy toward interventions overseas as evidence in favor of this prediction.[53] This is an argument about structural opportunities, not which opportunities the United States will pursue and which it will defer.

[48] John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 10–11, 21, 41–42, 360–402; and John Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," *Foreign Affairs* 80 (September/October 2001): 46–61.

[49] Christopher Layne, "The 'Poster Child for Offensive Realism': America as a Global Hegemon," *Security Studies* 12 (Winter 2002/3): 120–164.

[50] Layne, "Poster Child," 121, 164. See also Christopher Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," *International Security* 22 (Summer 1997): 86–124; and Christopher Layne,"Offshore Balancing Revisited, *The Washington Quarterly* 25 (Spring 2002): 233–248.

[51] Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 118–133, 159–192.

[52] Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving The Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21 (Spring 1997): 49–88.

[53] Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment," 57.

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With regard to balance-of-threat theory, Mastanduno argues that it predicts the United States will attempt to preserve unipolarity by working multilaterally with other status quo states, by reassuring undecided states that the United States is not a threat, and by containing states with revisionist aims. While Iraq could be argued to be a state with revisionist aims, the Bush administration explicitly rejected containment, and few would argue that the administration's actions were designed to be multilateral or reassuring to other states. Moreover, in offering these predictions, Mastanduno has had to move beyond structure and bring in distinctions with regard to state motives. While it could be argued that as the preeminent state in the system, the United States is likely to be a status quo power, this is not inevitable. It is also possible that the state at the top of the hierarchy would like to take advantage of its position by remaking the world in its image. One need only consider the calls for the United States to radically reshape the Middle East in a more democratic direction to see the possibility of the preeminent power in the system having far-reaching revisionist aims.[54] Indeed, Mastanduno explicitly warns against the danger of the arrogance of power and the temptation for the hegemon to dictate to and impose its values on others.[55] This warning is indicative of a final reason to conclude that the American decision to invade Iraq was not based solely on realist considerations regarding the international balance of power, which is that it was the realists themselves who were among the most outspoken opponents of the war, something that would not be expected if the United States were simply responding directly to the incentives of the international system. Even if Iraq had developed weapons of mass destruction in a bid for regional influence, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argued, the best policy for the United States would be containment and deterrence, not invasion.[56]

Kenneth Waltz probably captured best the most that can be said with regard to how unipolarity is likely to impact the behavior of the United States. "Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of states. A state that is stronger than any other can decide for itself whether to conform to structural pressures and whether to avail itself of the opportunities that structural change offers."[57] While the structure of the international system can explain the opportunity America had to invade Iraq and is thus part of the explanation for the invasion, it does not provide a motive. That motive, as argued above, was provided by the lessons the Bush administration drew from

[54] Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 59–60.

[55] Mastanduno, "Preserving The Unipolar Moment," 88.

[56] See John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy* 134 (January/February 2003): 51–59. See also "War with Iraq is Not in America's National Interest," *New York Times*, 26 September 2002. (This ad was also signed by a number of scholars who would not consider themselves realists.)

[57] Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25 (Summer 2000): 24.

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September 11. The international distribution of power did not fundamentally change between 10 September and 12 September 2001. Nor did the objective threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Instead, what changed was America's perception of that threat and of the best way of responding to it, once that threat was viewed through the prism of September 11.

Domestic Politics, the Neoconservative Agenda, and September 11 as Propaganda

Another potential explanation for the Bush administration's decision to attack Iraq focuses on the domestic incentives for the invasion rather than the international ones. Here the argument is that President Bush launched the war in Iraq hoping to bolster his own political prospects or those of the Republican Party by creating a crisis in Iraq that could lead to a rallying effect behind the President or simply to focus attention on an issue (security) upon which the electorate tends to trust the Republicans more than the Democrats.[58] Another potential explanation is that the decision to invade Iraq flowed directly from the long-standing ideological agenda of some in the White House and would have been arrived at with or without September 11.[59]

What both these explanations share is a belief that the frequent invocations of the lessons of September 11 by the administration were made purely for propaganda purposes to sell a policy that had been decided upon for other reasons. For example, Stefan Harper and Jonathan Clarke argue that the linkage of Iraq to September 11 was a "great conjuring trick" that was used as part of the administration's discursive strategy to persuade the public to accept a war in Iraq.[60] In this view, it was not the lessons of September 11 that

[58] For general arguments regarding the diversionary theory of war, see Jacks S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique" in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston, MA: Unwin-Hyman, 1989): 259–288; and Christopher Gelpi "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (April 1997): 255–282. For the case of Iraq, in particular, see Dan Plesch, "Weapons of Mass Distraction," *Observer Worldview*, 29 September 2002, accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,801257,00.html, 1 May 2007; see also Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the American Republic* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 226–237; and Roger Burbach and Jim Tarbell, *Imperial Overstretch: George W. Bush and the Hubris of Empire* (London, UK: Zed Books, 2004), 3, 15–16, 149–151.

[59] See Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 4, 155–156, 183, 206–231; and Ron Suskind, *The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 70–87, 96–97, 129, 187–188, 204, 258, 278–280, 288, 305–307, 324–325.

[60] Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 138–139, 183, 192, 202, 206–231, 306, 325–326. See also Burbach and Tarbell, *Imperial Overstretch*, 125–163; James Bamford, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 253–269, 283–331, 333–338, 367–377; John Prados, *Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War* (New York: The New Press, 2004); and Christopher Scheer, Robert Scheer, and Lakshmi Chaudhry, *The Five Biggest Lies Bush Told Us about Iraq* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004). For views that

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convinced the Bush administration to commit the United States to war; instead, it was the Bush administration that used the lessons of September 11 to convince America to go to war, a war that it wanted for other reasons.

These alternative explanations point to a perennial difficulty in attempting to establish the impact that the lessons of history have on policy decisions. Do policymakers use the lessons of history to analyze the current situation and decide which policy they want to follow or do they use them merely as rhetorical devices to justify the policies they have already chosen? This section puts forward five main reasons for believing that the Bush administration used the lessons of September 11 for analysis and not just for public argument. This is not to deny that the lessons of September 11 were used to build public support for the war; instead, the argument is that in addition to these advocacy purposes, the Bush administration also used the analogy for analytical purposes, to figure out what threats they faced and what they should do about them.

First, the argument that policymakers use analogies purely for propaganda purposes leads to a logical contradiction. For the lessons of history to be effective rhetorical devices, they must influence policy preferences. If they did not, they would be useless as propaganda tools and there would be no point in invoking them. Ironically, the very argument that historical analogies are mere justifications used to drum up support implicitly assumes the point that is ostensibly being criticized, that analogies can influence policy preferences. To dismiss the linkage between the lessons of September 11 and the decision to invade Iraq as merely a neoconservative "conjuring trick" is to argue that historical analogies are irrelevant in determining the policy position of some people (neoconservatives), but important for determining the policy position of others (those in and out of the administration who were fooled by this rhetorical trickery). To dismiss discussion of the lessons of September 11 as only rhetorical garb to cloak the administration's domestic interests leads to a similar inconsistency: analogies influence the policy position of some people, but not of others. Instead, a more consistent position is to argue that historical analogies can influence the policy preferences of all decisionmakers and that policymakers use these analogies for both purposes, to analyze and to advocate.

This is not meant to imply that the presence of neoconservatives within the Bush administration was irrelevant to the decision to go to war against Iraq, only that the lessons of September 11 are also a necessary part of the explanation. As Jack Levy argues, the impact that different ideas have on foreign

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stress misleading intelligence without accusing the administration of lying, see Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security* 29 (Summer 2004): 5–48; and Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, George Perkovich, and Alexis Orton, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq: Evidence and Implications," *Proliferation Brief* 7 (Washington DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).

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policy depends on both political and intellectual factors.[61] Indeed, the combination of a President who was relatively inexperienced in foreign policy (as he put it during his first presidential campaign, "I am not going to play like a person who's spent hours involved with foreign policy"[62]) and the presence of strong proponents within the administration for the preexisting agenda of the neoconservatives undoubtedly helped to push the administration to a largely unilateral war against Iraq. The efforts by the neoconservatives to launch a war against Iraq, however, would not have gone very far had not the lessons of September 11 predisposed the rest of the administration, and the President in particular, toward accepting their arguments. Indeed, the same is true with regard to the administration's public relations campaign in support of the war. While their efforts undoubtedly had some impact on shaping public views, in many ways, the events of September 11 helped ensure that they were pushing on an open door.[63]

To better understand the relationship between these variables, consider the not-implausible counterfactual[64] that an Al Gore administration had occupied the White House during the attacks of September 11. While it is likely that a Gore administration would have pursued a war against Afghanistan and would even have launched a wider campaign against terrorism, it is very unlikely that a Gore administration would have launched a war against Iraq in 2003. Indeed, Gore was openly critical of the largely unilateral and military-focused approach taken by the Bush administration, arguing that it was needlessly increasing the costs the United States would have to pay in reconstructing Iraq.[65] What this counterfactual usefully points out is that historical analogies do not end all foreign policy debates; instead, they help shape those debates and help to determine who wins them. For example, both Al Gore and 2004 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry largely accepted the conclusion that the Hussein regime in Iraq was a threat that needed to be removed and that greater exertions by the United States in that direction were called for. Their criticisms, therefore, focused not on ends, but on the administration's unilateral and military-focused means. In a post-September 11 environment of height-

[61] Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy," 300.

[62] Quoted in Hendrick Hertzberg, "Manifesto," *The New Yorker*, 14 and 21 October 2002, 63.

[63] See Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, "Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection and the Bush Administration's Rhetoric," *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (September 2005): 535–537; Jon Western "The War Over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public," *Security Studies* 14 (January–March 2005): 99–130; Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation," 5–48, as well as the response by Ronald R. Krebs and the author's reply in *International Security* 29 (Spring 2005): 196–207.

[64] On the use of counterfactuals, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[65] See Albert Gore, speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, 23 September 2002, accessed at http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-09gore-speech.html, 20 March 2006.

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ened threat perceptions, however, their call for more-patient multilateral diplomacy was fighting an uphill and ultimately unsuccessful battle. In essence, September 11 helped the neoconservatives to win the debate within the administration and the administration to win the debate with the public.

Second, one way to demonstrate that policymakers use the lessons of history to determine and not just to sell their policies is to look for consistency between the public and private record. An analogy that is used often in public but never in private is most likely a tool of propaganda, not analysis. Conversely, an analogy that appears often in internal debates is likely to be a tool of analysis and not just public window dressing.[66] Even given the recency of events covered in this article, some insider accounts of the administration's deliberations have already appeared. These accounts support the argument that the lessons of September 11 shaped the administration's decision to go to war with Iraq, as they stress how much of an impact the events of September 11 had on the thinking of the Bush administration, especially that of the President.[67] While the unavailability of a complete archival record necessarily makes this conclusion a preliminary one, the information that is currently available supports the conclusion that the lessons of September 11 helped to determine administration policy, not just to sell it.

Third, prior to the war, it was by no means clear that a war in Iraq in March of 2003 would advance the President's domestic interests. If the purpose was to help the President's reelection prospects, why launch what was expected to be a short war twenty months prior to the election, virtually guaranteeing that when those elections came, U.S. forces would be deeply enmeshed in less-popular occupation duties? Just as the Gulf War of 1990–1991 did not secure his father's reelection, even though it was seen as a great success at the time, why would we expect George W. Bush's administration to see taking on a far more challenging mission in Iraq as a ticket to domestic success? If weapons of mass destruction had been used to cause mass casualties, if American troops had become bogged down in a bloody urban campaign, or if, as in fact did happen, the United States discovered that the costs of occupation both in terms of life and treasure were far more than the administration expected, the war in Iraq might have proven more of a domestic handicap than an asset. Had the administration viewed the possibility of war with Iraq as creating the danger of

[66] Khong, *Analogies at War*, 64–68.

[67] See Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 3–5, 12, 24, 27, 410, 421, 426, 438–439; Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: The Free Press, 2004), 24, 30–32; Franks, *American Soldier*, 246, 308, 315, 355–356, 373–374, 537–564; David L. Phillips, *Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2005), 6, 13, 15, 56, 159; Bill Sammon, *Fighting Back: The War On Terrorism from Inside the Bush White House* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2002), 5–8; U.S. Senate, "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq," 31, 363; Suskind, *The Price of Loyalty*, 70–76, 85–87, 184–188. Suskind notes that policy toward Iraq changes only after September 11.

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"another Vietnam" rather than potentially avoiding "another September 11," their domestic as well as their international calculations would have been far different.

Fourth, although an analysis of the administration's entire foreign policy is beyond the scope of this article, there is evidence that the lessons of September 11 are affecting American foreign policy beyond the specific case of Iraq. This more widespread impact supports the argument that the September 11 analogy represents an important ideational shift in American foreign policy and is not merely a rhetorical tool that was used to sell a particular war. The invasion of Afghanistan, the missile strike against suspected terrorists in Yemen, as well as more-hard-line policies toward countries like Syria, Iran, and North Korea, are all areas of American foreign policy that have been impacted by September 11 and the lessons drawn from it.

Consider, for example, U.S. policy toward the other members of the "axis of evil," North Korea and Iran. While a full comparison of U.S. policies toward Baghdad, Pyongyang, and Tehran is not possible here, a few brief comments are in order. Of the three members of the axis of evil, the Bush administration clearly opted to deal with Iraq first. This decision was probably driven by a number of considerations: invading Iraq was militarily less risky than an invasion of North Korea or Iran; a large number of United Nations Security Council Resolutions had already been passed against Baghdad; under Saddam Hussein, Iraq had twice invaded its neighbors; and Iraq had used weapons of mass destruction in the past.[68] However, while neither Iran nor North Korea has yet become a target for U.S. military-imposed regime change, U.S. policy toward both of these nations has changed in ways consistent with the lessons of September 11.[69]

As argued above, the lessons of September 11 affected U.S. policy toward Iraq by greatly increasing the Bush administration's perception of the threat that Saddam Hussein's Iraq posed and by offering the policy prescription of

[68] For administration statements regarding why Iraq needed to be dealt with before the other members of the axis, see, George W. Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, Remarks by the President on Iraq," Cincinnati, OH, 7 October 2002; Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld," Atlanta, GA, 27 September 2002; and interview with Condoleezza Rice, in Stan Crock, "You Cannot Afford to Let Dangers Gather," *Business Week,* 13 September 2004, 40. See also Richard N. Haass, "Regime Change and Its Limits," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (July/August 2005): 70–73; and Mahmood Monshipouri, "U.S. Policy toward Iran in Post-war Iraq: Antagonism or Engagement?" *The Muslim World* 94 (October 2004), 576.

[69] On the impact of September 11 on U.S. policy toward North Korea, see Robert E. Hunter, "After 9/11: US Policy in Northeast Asia," *Asia-Pacific Review* 10 (May 2003): 1–19; Victor D. Cha, "Korea's Place in the Axis," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (May/June 2002): 79–92; and Jihwan Hwang, "Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy toward North Korea: The Clinton and Bush Administrations in Comparative Perspective," *World Affairs* 167 (Summer 2004): 25–27. On Iran, see Monshipouri, "U.S. Policy toward Iran in Post-war Iraq," 565–586. For a contrary view, see Kenneth Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America* (New York: Random House, 2004), 343–374.

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taking care of such threats with offensive actions rather than relying on defense and deterrence. These two facets of the September 11 analogy have also been in evidence with regard to U.S. policy toward Tehran and Pyongyang. In examining the Bush administration's assessment of the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program, one analyst concluded, "Relying on sketchy data, the Bush administration presented a worst-case scenario as an incontrovertible truth and distorted its intelligence on North Korea (much as it did on Iraq), seriously exaggerating the danger."[70] With regard to going on the offense to counter challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in rogue states, as Richard Haass has recently argued, "The Bush administration has consistently shown that it would rather resolve all of these challenges through regime change in Tehran and Pyongyang."[71] How much more aggressively the United States pursues regime change in Iran and North Korea, including the possibility of using military force, will depend both on whether there are more-significant terrorist attacks against the United States, especially those involving weapons of mass destruction, and of course on the outcome in Iraq.[72]

A final reason for not dismissing the administration's invocation of the lessons of September 11 as mere rhetoric designed to support the neoconservative political agenda or the President's domestic political agenda is the extent to which other political elites who did not share those agendas also invoked the lessons of September 11 to explain their support for a war against Iraq. For example, congressional debates over the war in Iraq are replete with discussions of the lessons of September 11. Since many of these invocations are from members who are neither neoconservatives nor Republicans, it is hard to dismiss such statements as part of a neoconservative conjuring trick or a plan to shore up Republican electoral prospects. Agreement on the lessons of September 11 across the political aisle indicates that those lessons can have a broader generational-type effect on American foreign policy and are not simply the product of the short-term political machinations of a single administration.

On 11 October 2002, the Senate voted 77-23 in favor of authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. The debate prior to the passage of that resolution is permeated with discussions of the lessons of September 11, and the senators

[70] Selig S. Harrison, "Did North Korea Cheat?" *Foreign Affairs* 84 (January/February 2005): 99–100.

[71] Haass, "Regime Change and Its Limits," 66–67.

[72] For arguments that North Korea and Iran might be the next targets for a U.S. invasion, see Bruce Cumings "Rising Danger in Korea," *Nation* 24 (March 2003): 5–6; and Bryan Bender, "Iran: The Axis, Part III," *National Journal,* 15 February 2003, 6–11. For an argument that the outcome in Iraq has already put the brakes on a more aggressive policy toward Iran and North Korea, see Robert S. Litwak, "Non-Proliferation and the Dilemmas of Regime Change," *Survival* 45 (Winter 2003/04): 7–32.

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supporting the resolution draw lessons virtually identical to those within the administration. There is talk of how the world has changed since the attacks, worries that America is now increasingly vulnerable because geography no longer protects the United States from distant threats, arguments that the United States needs to be proactive in responding to such threats, recriminations that the United States responded too meekly to earlier terrorist challenges, and many linkages drawn between these lessons and the lessons of World War II.[73] For example, Senator Joseph Lieberman, then one of the strongest supporters of action against Iraq in the Democratic Party, argued that the events of September 11 had a "profound effect" on him and that just as the United States should have dealt with al Qaeda more forcefully prior to September 11, he thought that the United States should act more forcefully against Iraq.[74] Evan Bayh (D-IN), in his short remarks in support of the resolution, referred explicitly to the lessons of September 11 four separate times.[75] The Democratic Party's 2004 presidential candidate, John Kerry, supported the resolution and argued that "the most legitimate justification for war" was that "in the post-September 11 world the unrestrained threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein is unacceptable."[76]

The debate in the House was much the same.[77] For example, after expressing certain doubts about a potential war with Iraq, New York Democrat Eliot Engel ultimately decided that he would support the use-of-force resolution because "what is most important and what is the bottom line for me is that as a New Yorker, after September 11th, the equation changed."[78] Adam Schiff, a Democrat from California, similarly explained that he was supporting

[73] The following references are taken from the *Congressional Record*, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 148: On the Republican side, see the statements by Senators Bunning (S9934–S9935), Voinovich (S9944), Warner (S9947–S9950, S10237, S10066, S10073), Kyl (S10017–S10018), Stevens (S1022), Hatch (S10025–10026), Craig (S10071), Gregg (S10079–S10080), Brownback (S10092–10093), Burns (S10096), Nickles (S10102), Hutchison (S10149–S10150), Grassley (S10154–S10155), McCain (S10170, S10249, S10274), Roberts (S10181), Hutchinson (S10202), Thompson (S10204), DeWine (S10298), Specter (S10303), Ensign (S10312–S10314), Smith (NH) (S10317), Shelby (S10323), McConnell (S10328), Santorum (S10332), and Murkowski (S10332–S10333). On the Democratic side, in addition to the statements quoted below, see the statements by Senators Graham, who advocated a stronger resolution than the one eventually passed, (S9968–S9969, S10314–10315), Lieberman (S10064, S10073), Nelson (S10100), Clinton (S10289–S10290), Kohl (S10301), Schumer (S10302), Rockefeller (S10307–S10308), Dorgan (S10324), and Harkin (S10327).

[74] Ibid., S10105.

[75] Ibid., S10067–10069.

[76] Ibid., S10171–S10174.

[77] Given the size of the House and the frequency of the invocations of the lessons of September 11 in its debates, rather than fill pages of notes with individual references, I would refer the reader to the entire debate and the representative examples offered below. See the *Congressional Record*, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 148: H7178–H7186, H7189–H7247, H7268–H7301, H7309–H7345, H7375–H7410, H7413–H7442, H7706–H7735, and H7739–H7799.

[78] Ibid., H7215.

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the resolution because "on September 10, the danger from terrorists was imminent, and we took no action. On September 11 we were devastated. Now it will forever be September 12."[79] Minority Leader Richard Gephardt, who co-sponsored the resolution in the House, explained, "September 11 has made all the difference."[80] Links were also drawn to the similar lessons of World War II, such as the argument by Tom Lantos (D-CA) that "just as the leaders and diplomats who appeased Hitler at Munich in 1938 stand humiliated before history, so will we if we appease Saddam Hussein today."[81]

Advocates of the September 11 analogy and its relevance to a potential war in Iraq did not have the field to themselves in these congressional debates. Again, even analogies with generational-type effects do not uniformly determine the policy positions of all decisionmakers, they just help to shape the context within which foreign policy debates are conducted. Some of the opponents of the resolution questioned the applicability of the September 11 analogy to the situation in Iraq, and others suggested that America's failures in Vietnam might be the more appropriate analogy.[82] Such suggestions often elicited sharp responses. For example, when Representative Jim McDermott (D-WA) suggested that the House adjourn to visit the Vietnam Memorial, Representative Heather Wilson (R-NM) immediately countered by suggesting that the Holocaust Museum be remembered as well.[83] To those who had concerns that a war in Iraq could lead to another Vietnam-like quagmire, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) asked, "Are they more concerned about a war that took place over 30 years ago, or the tragic events that took place on September 11?"[84] Judging by the frequency of its usage in the debates and the final vote tallies (the House also passed the use-of-force resolution by a more than 2-1 margin with a vote of 296-133), more of the senator's congressional colleagues were worried about another September 11 than about another Vietnam.

Potential Perils of the Lessons of September 11

Part of the reason for the cyclical nature of the influence of historical lessons that stress the danger of sudden aggression and the need for an activist foreign policy (Pearl Harbor, Munich, and September 11) versus historical lessons that

[79] Ibid., H7290.

[80] Ibid., H7778.

[81] Ibid., H7195.

[82] For the most thoughtful challenge to the argument linking the attacks of 11 September to the need to go to war against Iraq, see the comments of Wisconsin Senate Democrat Russell Feingold, *Congressional Record*, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., vol. 148: S10147–S10149. For references to Vietnam, see H7276, H7319, H7395–H7396, H7425, and H7744.

[83] Ibid., H7276 and H7282.

[84] Ibid., S10216.

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stress the limits of power and the dangers of quagmires (World War I and Vietnam) is that both sets of lessons have enduring value. Policymakers are right to worry about surprise attacks and that aggression unanswered can lead to more-dangerous challenges. Policymakers are also right to worry about overstretch and being sucked into protracted and peripheral contests. Similar lessons would be unlikely to recur unless there was some utility in them. The rise and fall of these historical lessons also suggests, however, that they can lead policymakers astray if they are applied uncritically, without a proper appreciation of their limits and of the potentially dangerous tendencies their underlying assumptions could encourage. As Stanley Hoffman put it, "When we invoke Munich in order to exorcise appeasement anywhere, we forget that Munich itself was the product of a disastrous example of analogical thinking."[85] In part, it is because the World War I analogy was over-applied that Munich resulted, it is because the Munich analogy was over-applied that Vietnam resulted, and it is because the lessons of Vietnam were over-applied that September 11 resulted. Since the lessons of September 11 are taking a more prominent role in U.S. foreign policy, the purpose of this section is to explore the limitations of these lessons and the potential dangers for American foreign policy that could result from an over-application of these lessons.

As the lessons of September 11 are similar to the lessons of Pearl Harbor and Munich, and since a large literature already exists regarding how the World War II analogies were applied and misapplied by American foreign policymakers during the Cold War, this section looks at America's attempts to apply those lessons in order to better understand how attempts to apply the similar lessons of September 11 could potentially lead to future difficulties in American foreign policy. Thus, this section is more retrospective and prospective than current. This analysis stresses five potential pitfalls lurking within the September 11 analogy. These are the dangers of letting threats determine interests, treating enemies as a monolith, favoring immediate action over long-term strategy, preferring universal solutions to particular problems, and escalating credibility spirals. Each of these contributes to the central danger of an over-application of the September 11 analogy, which is one of strategic overreach. The hope is that in pointing out these potential dangers, some of the pitfalls associated with the World War II analogies can be avoided in America's future attempts to apply the similar lessons of September 11.

Letting Threats Determine Interests

Before figuring out what threats exist and are imminent, a state has to first answer the question of a threat to what? What are a state's irreducible interests

[85] Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles*, 137.

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and what is required to secure those interests? A state's determination of its interests, therefore, should come prior to a state's assessment of the threats it faces. One of the dangerous aspects of the Munich and the September 11 analogies, however, is that if over-applied, they can reverse that logical sequence and allow threats to determine interests. If a challenge unanswered is merely an invitation for additional and more serious challenges down the road, then every challenge must be answered, even if the political stakes in the immediate crisis are low. By assuming that one is facing an implacable threat whose resources and ambitions expand with each success, the mere fact that an object is threatened is enough to make protecting that object an important interest, regardless of how insignificant that object may be in itself. To give a concrete example, consider the U.S. decision to intervene in the Korean War. After publicly implying that it would not fight for Korea—and privately planning not to do so—the United States did decide to fight when North Korean forces attacked the South. Why? Not because Korea was important in and of itself. Instead, in the developing context of the Cold War in Asia, and interpreting any attack as a challenge similar to the one posed by Hitler in the 1930s, Korea became vastly more important to the United States after it was attacked. In this way, to a large extent, America let threats determine its interests.[86]

This should be an especially important worry in the future, given a task as broad as a global war on terror. The danger to be on the lookout for is allowing the terrorists to determine and expand America's conception of its interests simply by what they choose to threaten. As many have pointed out, terrorism is simply a tactic and "choosing one's enemies on the basis of their tactics alone has little to recommend it."[87] Just as not all third-world nationalist movements may have presented a threat to the United States during the Cold War, not all terrorists may pose a threat to the United States today. There is no doubt that al Qaeda represents a threat, but is the same true of Basque separatists, the Tamil Tigers, or the Real IRA? In prosecuting the war on terror, the United States needs to make clear distinctions between groups that have political agendas that threaten the United States and those that do not. The lessons of September 11, however, like the lessons of Munich before them, can blur that crucial distinction by encouraging policymakers to conclude that any use of terrorism is necessarily a threat to U.S. interests.

The Bush administration has, in part, recognized the importance of such distinctions. For example, its *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism* distinguishes between groups that operate purely on a national level, those that

[86] See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1982), 89–126 (especially page 98); and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 144–157.

[87] Greenville Byford, "The Wrong War," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (July–August 2002): 34.

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operate on a regional level, and those that operate on a global level.[88] The experience with the Munich analogy during the Cold War suggests, however, the difficulty of maintaining such distinctions, especially in the face of universalizing rhetoric. The lessons of September 11 could lead to a conclusion similar to the contention of National Security Council Report 68 that "a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere."[89] Indeed, the *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism* approaches such a conclusion in its argument that the smaller, state-level terrorist groups "may expand geographically if their ambitions and capabilities are allowed to grow unchecked."[90] Just as during the Cold War it might not have been in America's interest to defend everyone claiming that they were threatened by communist subversion, it might not be in America's interests today to defend everyone claiming to face the threat of terrorism.

Treating Enemies as a Monolith

A second potentially dangerous aspect of the Munich and September 11 analogies is their tendency to minimize differences between enemies. The Munich analogy makes no distinctions between German, Italian, or Japanese aggression; instead, it merges all three into one totalitarian axis. During the Cold War, this encouraged American policymakers to treat communism as a monolithic threat, which minimized the chances of exploiting fissures between communist states and drove those states closer together.

The same danger exists in the September 11 analogy. When the Bush administration speaks about America's enemies today, it puts forward an extensive list of terrorist groups, rogue states, failed states, and proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.[91] To be sure, each of these groups does represent a threat to the United States that must be addressed. It is important, however, not to over-apply the September 11 analogy and treat each of these groups and individual members of these groups as identical threats. Just as Ho Chi Minh was no new Hitler, not all terrorists and rogue states are necessarily new al Qaedas.

Consider the differences between terrorist groups and rogue states. While certain terrorist organizations may be undeterrable, rogue states are not, which makes the former a far more dangerous threat than the latter. Similarly,

[88] The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, February 2003, 8, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf, 5 April 2007.

[89] *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950*, vol. 1 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 240.

[90] *National Strategy For Combating Terrorism*, 8.

[91] See Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), 13–19; and Jeffrey Record, "Threat Confusion and Its Penalties," *Survival* 46 (Summer 2004): 51–72.

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failed states and proliferators represent a threat primarily to the extent that they enable potentially nondeterrable terrorist groups to target the United States. Strategic choice entails setting priorities, not conflating them. Just as the United States adopted a Germany-first strategy in World War II, similar choices need to be made in the war on terror. Also, just as the United States had to ally with a totalitarian Soviet Union to defeat Nazi Germany, the United States still has to consider such alliances of convenience today rather than pushing America's enemies together by treating them as a monolith.

Again, in some ways, the Bush administration has recognized the need for such distinctions. When Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told President Bush that the United States faces a sixty-country problem, the President's response was, "Let's pick them off one at a time."[92] Similarly, the administration has recognized the need to work with states such as Syria in the campaign against al Qaeda, even though Syria still maintains its connections with Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups. The September 11 analogy, if over-applied, however, can make distinctions like these harder and harder to stick by if all terrorist groups, rogue states, failed states, and weapons of mass destruction proliferators are seen as potential al Qaedas. If those distinctions are lost, however, America will be in danger of losing its focus on the most dangerous threats and potentially making enemies of groups or states that America will need in prosecuting the campaign against those most serious threats.

Favoring Immediate Action over Long-term Strategy

One of the central lessons contained in both the Pearl Harbor and the Munich analogies is the need to confront threats immediately. The Pearl Harbor analogy warns against the danger of sudden attacks, and the logic of the Munich analogy suggests that if challenges go unpunished, foes will just become stronger and more ambitious. These lessons can lead policymakers astray, however, if applied in situations where a challenger does not have a political agenda that threatens the interests of a particular country or if a challenge, in the long term, will not add up to an appreciable difference in the balance of power. Vietnam is probably the best example of this during the Cold War. It is not clear that Ho Chi Minh's largely nationalist agenda threatened the United States or that a communist Vietnam would have represented an increase in power for the Soviet Union.

The September 11 analogy's stress on the importance of confronting threats early contains the same potential to push the United States to confront threats that may not exist. The failure to find evidence for an extensive and growing Iraqi arsenal of weapons of mass destruction is a good example of how

[92] Woodward, *Bush at War*, 33.

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the lessons of September 11 have already pushed the United States into action based on an inflated threat assessment. Indeed, according to George Tenet, one of the reasons that the U.S. intelligence community overstated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq was its failure to provide adequate warning before September 11.[93] The administration did not cynically use the September 11 analogy to intentionally mislead the American people about the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program; instead, by over-applying the September 11 analogy, the Bush administration deceived itself.

In the war on terror, the tension between the need to act in the short term and the need to plan for the long term can be seen in the Bush administration's dual convictions that time is not on America's side, but history is. The administration is adamant that America's enemies need to be confronted immediately and that delay only increases the danger, while at the same time, it is also convinced that in the long term, American ideals and values will be vindicated and that terrorists and their supporters will end up "in history's unmarked graves of discarded lies."[94] These two convictions pull in different directions. The first encourages a sense of panic and the need to focus on short-term responses, while the second encourages a sense of confidence and the need to focus on long-term strengths. For example, one of the key supports for George Kennan's strategy of containment during the Cold War was his conviction that there was no need to attack the Soviet Union directly, because in the long term, the system would collapse under its own weight.

The need to balance between the short and the long term is a perpetual problem that has no single solution. What the experience of the Cold War suggests, however, is that an over-application of the lessons of World War II encouraged short-term actions and potentially unnecessary overreactions. To prevent American policymakers from similarly misusing the lessons of September 11, it would be wise to heed the advice Kennan gave at the outset of the Cold War, that ultimately it is the task of the United States to

> create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has the spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic.[95]

By simply replacing "Russian Communism" in that last sentence with "al Qaeda" or the name of any terrorist organization that threatens the

[93] Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 438–439.

[94] George W. Bush, "Address to A Joint Session of Congress and the American People," 20 September 2001.

[95] Mr. X (George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947), 566–582.

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United States, you will have an excellent description of America's task in the war on terror.

Preferring Universal Solutions to Particular Problems

One of the reasons that policymakers turn to analogies is to seek policy prescriptions.[96] If any analogy, whether to Pearl Harbor, to Munich, to Vietnam, or to September 11, becomes predominant in the thinking of a nation's foreign policy decisionmakers, it raises the potential danger of offering those policymakers a universal solution to what are invariably particular problems. In thinking about the war on terrorism, the United States must guard against mistakenly concluding that the lessons of September 11 hold the solutions to all terrorist threats.

For example, consider America's counterinsurgency policies during the Cold War. One of the problems with the U.S. response to guerrilla war was the assumption that all insurgencies stemmed from similar causes and were, therefore, susceptible to similar solutions. Seeing insurgency merely as a communist tactic, what the United States sought was a counter-tactic.[97] Since terrorism is also a tactic, the danger today is that the United States will simply seek a universal counter-tactic, seeing all terrorists as motivated by the same goals that drove al Qaeda and as susceptible to the same pressures.

The danger is less that the September 11 analogy will encourage the United States to ignore the root causes of terrorism and more that it will cause the United States to find only one root cause. What motivates a terrorist group in Afghanistan is likely to be far different from what motivates a terrorist group in Indonesia, Europe, or the United States. Any counterterrorism policy that ignores the local circumstances that give rise to particular terrorist groups is bound to fail.[98] Unfortunately, it is universal solutions that dominant analogies like September 11 encourage.

Escalating Credibility Spirals

At the heart of both the Munich and September 11 analogies are concerns about credibility: do other actors believe that a state has the capability and the will to defend itself? In the Munich analogy, the failure of the democracies to stand up to Germany early enough encouraged further aggression. In the September 11 analogy, America's failure to respond decisively to

[96] Khong, *Analogies at War*, 10, 20–21.

[97] D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 104–132.

[98] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 31–59.

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earlier attacks encouraged the terrorists to escalate. While there is a material side to credibility (does a state have the physical capability to respond?), it is the will side that takes center stage in both the lessons of Munich and the lessons of September 11. If you fail to respond to small challenges, others will conclude that you lack the will to do so and will be further emboldened to act.

Although a state's credibility can be an important asset to protect, there is a danger that concerns about credibility and commitment can feed on themselves. As U.S. policymakers discovered during the Cold War, "diplomatic commerce in the coin of credibility was inherently inflationary."[99] Again, Vietnam presents the paradigmatic case. It was only because the United States made a commitment to South Vietnam that it was vulnerable in South Vietnam. Further, the more the United States invested to protect its credibility in Vietnam, the more its credibility was on the line.[100] Indeed, it was precisely the power of concerns about credibility to ensnare a great power in a quagmire that led to the rise of the Vietnam analogy in the first place.

As Roskin phrased it, both the Vietnam and the Munich analogies have "a built-in self-destruct mechanism" if over-applied.[101] It is the possibility of escalating credibility spirals that is the most likely self-destruct mechanism for the September 11 analogy. America's commitment to the reconstruction of Iraq and the building of a democracy in Baghdad has already stirred a debate between those looking to cut America's losses versus those dedicated to staying the course. Avoiding a credibility sinkhole in Iraq or anywhere else should be a principal worry of current American foreign policymakers, even if it means paying heed to the lessons of Vietnam that, at times, positions may need to be abandoned and goals made more modest if they prove to be untenable.

Taken together, these five perils all raise the risk of strategic overstretch. Combining the limited international checks that a unipolar system imposes on the United States with a September 11–driven activist foreign policy can provide the perfect recipe for overextension. This is not meant to imply that the United States does not have security interests that may require an engaged foreign policy. Instead, just as Thucydides warned the Athenians against assuming that their strength was equal to all of their hopes,[102] today America must not similarly assume that its strength will be equal to all of its September 11–inspired fears.

[99] Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1900* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 190.

[100] For Vietnam, see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 237–273; for the wider Cold War context, see Robert H. Johnson, *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), especially 89, 141–146.

[101] Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam," 576.

[102] *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner (New York: Penguin Books, 1972), 303 (Book IV: 65).

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Conclusion

The long-term impact, both positive and negative, that the lessons of September 11 will have on future American foreign policy remains to be determined. Much will depend on the course of events, especially with regard to whether there are any more mass casualty terrorist attacks as well as the results of America's war in Iraq. September 11 has so far, fortunately, been a singular event. Although there were terrorist attacks before and after that date, none of these were on such a large scale. Should September 11 prove to be an anomaly, or a statistical outlier,[103] it is possible that the impact of its lessons on American foreign policy could fade. Similarly, if America's state-building efforts in Iraq fail or become exorbitantly costly, the impact of the lessons of September 11 could ebb. Indeed, a costly failure in Iraq could complete another analogical cycle, as critics of the invasion are increasingly likely to see difficulties in Iraq as indicative of a new Vietnam and of having delivered a deathblow to many of the strategic tenets associated with the lessons of September 11.[104]

On the other hand, if the United States succeeds in Iraq or even simply muddles through, and more importantly, if another mass terror attack hits the United States, the September 11 analogy can be expected to grow in influence and further impact U.S. policy. The reelection of President Bush and subsequent cabinet changes have also reinforced the hold that adherents to the lessons of September 11 have on power. The ongoing debate over whether the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq was strategically wise or foolish is a sign that today neither the September 11/Munich analogies nor the Iraq/Vietnam analogies are going unchallenged. The coming years are likely to see continued struggles between the advocates of these different analogies for control over American foreign policy. If that debate is able to temper the extremes associated with the over-application of either of these sets of lessons, then America and the world will benefit.

The future direction of global politics will depend a great deal on how well the United States conducts itself as the world's preeminent power. To allow the United States to fulfill its role effectively, American policymakers must be able to heed the wisdom that does lie in the lessons drawn from September 11, while also recognizing their limitations and the dangers inherent in

[103] John Mueller, "Harbinger or Aberration? A 9/11 Provocation," *The National Interest* 69 (Fall 2002): 45–50.

[104] Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terrill, *Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities and Insights* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004); G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Neo-Conservative Movement," *Survival* 49 (Spring 2004): 7–22; Moisés Naím, "Casualties of War: The Ideas That Died in Iraq," *Foreign Policy* 144 (September/October 2004): 95–96; and Francis Fukuyama, "The Neoconservative Moment," *The National Interest* 76 (Summer 2004): 57–58. For a more optimistic appraisal of the U.S. experience in Vietnam and U.S. prospects in Iraq, see Melvin R. Laird, "Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (November/December 2005): 22–43.

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their over-application. If history need not be destiny, then certainly the lessons of history need not be destiny. If the United States is to navigate the international balance of power effectively, it must first balance the American pendulum and prevent the lessons of September 11 from leading to a hyperactive and ultimately counterproductive foreign policy.*

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Of Paradise, Power, and Pachyderms

MIROSLAV NINCIC
MONTI NARAYAN DATTA

Although global consensus on some key political principles (democracy and respect for human rights, for example) seems greater now than ever before, political conflicts fester where they might least be expected. The U.S.-led war in Iraq highlighted a blistering divide over the unilateral use of force, generating claims of anti-Americanism and talk of a fundamental transatlantic rift. Although transatlantic differences have been encountered in the past (for example, the 1956 Suez crisis, President John F. Kennedy's handling of the Berlin crisis, the value of theater nuclear weapons, contributions to the costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], etc.), rifts have appeared especially acrimonious in recent years. American neoconservatives have most confidently trumpeted an apparent crumbling of the West as a coherent moral community and solid geopolitical axis. In the realm of foreign affairs, it is often claimed that Americans stand for a boldness that accepts the value of force in the pursuit of ideals, while Europeans prefer a limp-wristed and ultimately counterproductive commitment to diplomacy and consensual multilateralism. For instance, Henry Kissinger observes, "The early crises within the Alliance were generally in the nature of family disputes, having to do with differing interpretations of the requirements of an agreed common security. Today the very definition of common security and, indeed, of common purpose is being questioned."[1] In his much-quoted book, *Of Paradise and Power*, Robert Kagan warns, "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world."[2] In the view of Harvard's Daniel Pipes, "The

[1] Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 33.
[2] Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 1.

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1990s should be seen as but a temporary interlude between eras of cosmic competition. And America's allies in the last round (against the Soviet Union) are shaping up as competitors in the new one."[3]

Seen from this neoconservative perspective, the resilient "I can" individualism of America bristles against the stodgy, bureaucratic, and paternalistic ethos of European society, while the United States understands the necessity for force in an often-threatening international system. For Robert Kagan, the U.S. stance is laudable "in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might." Kagan sees little to commend in Europe's delusive belief in a "postmodern paradise," a "world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation," finding more to praise in a view that accepts the value of power and the need for military strength in an essentially anarchic world.[4] As Oxford's Timothy Garton Ash dismissively describes the argument, European "values and spines have dissolved in a lukewarm bath of multilateral, transnational, secular, and postmodern fudge.... Americans, by contrast, are strong, principled defenders of freedom, standing tall in patriotic service of the world's last truly sovereign nation state."[5] Whereas America prizes innovation, daring, and individual responsibility, Europe encourages craven resignation in the face of global threats.

At the same time, from the European side of the Atlantic, the cooperative ethos of European society is often contrasted to the self-seeking materialism of the United States. Relatively egalitarian European values are seen to clash with those of a society apparently insensitive to disparities of opportunity and experiencing an ever-increasing gap between "haves" and "have-nots," most recently exemplified, in many European eyes, by the U.S. government's seemingly anemic efforts to help its poor surmount the ravages of Hurricane Katrina. Whereas Europeans universally condemn capital punishment, Americans cling to the death penalty. Most importantly for present purposes, Europeans appear far more committed to multilateral diplomacy and positive incentives when dealing with foreign adversaries.

Thus, in the view of many observers, a fundamental cleavage in social and political values makes a transatlantic rift inevitable in a post-Cold War context. If this is the case, as Kagan and others imply, the implications for the U.S. position in world politics are profound. It suggests that on major international issues, the United States cannot count on its traditional allies' implicit support. Consequences extend to the general pattern of global affiliations, since on an

[3] Daniel Pipes, "Europe vs. America," *New York Post*, 14 January 2003, 18.

[4] Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 3.

[5] Timothy Garton Ash, "The New Anti-Europeanism in America" in Tod Lindberg, ed., *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 122.

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international scale, evidence suggests that European values and positions draw more enthusiasm than those embraced by the United States. A recent survey of the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), for instance, found that in twenty of the twenty-three countries polled, a majority or plurality wanted Europe to become more influential in world affairs than the United States. In twenty-two of the countries surveyed in the PIPA study, respondents saw Europe as having a positive international influence; the United States, by contrast, was the country (just ahead of Russia) whose influence most considered negative.[6] The wider the gap between the policy preferences of the United States and Europe, the greater the implications of reservations that U.S. positions often appear to evoke—since, where American preferences differ from those of major European nations, it is the latter that enjoy firmer backing. For the West as a whole, the chasm would bode ill for its ability to pursue what, differences aside, remain important shared priorities, from the war on terror to maintaining the foundations of free international trade.

Reconceiving the Gap

As interpreted above, however, the transatlantic rift is misconceived; a more appropriate framing should bring it into clearer focus, providing a more accurate description of its structure and a better sense of its political implications. Kagan's view wrongly interprets the cleavage as one pitting American principles against those of its Western allies; instead, the evidence suggests that the gap should be recast as one flowing from a divide within American politics, mirroring the clash between the political subcultures of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party—of the "blue" and "red" states. The fact that the rift involves a segmental, not national, political culture drives us away from considering international politics as the business of competing but unitary national interests embodied in states, nudging us, instead, toward a conception of the "national" interest as the resultant of various political subcultures whose contours are not necessarily coextensive with the state.[7]

There is much evidence that on many issues, national preferences within the United States no longer trace a bell-shaped curve, but one which, when viewed through the prism of intensity of feeling, exhibits increasingly bipolar political leanings. Party affiliation is generally acquired early in adulthood and is not easily shed,[8] and although political parties have played a declining

[6] Program on International Policy Attitudes, *23-Nation Poll: Who Will Lead the World?* April 2005, accessed at http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/EvalWorldPowers/LeadWorld_Apr05/LeadWorld_Apr05_rpt.pdf.

[7] The concept "national interest" is analyzed in Miroslav Nincic, "The National Interest and Its Interpretation," *Review of Politics* 61 (Winter 1999): 29–56.

[8] Studies of grade school children have revealed that in most cases, partisan preferences are acquired by the fourth grade. Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965), 81.

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operational role in U.S. political life, party identification has not.[9] On the one hand, more Americans are independents now than a few decades ago; on the other hand, the ideational gap between Republicans and Democrats is starker now than it once was. Although the two parties are not undifferentiated entities, their ideological centers of gravity are differently located, and the distance between the two has increased.

Recently, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press computed composite attitude scales on twenty-four questions concerning political and policy issues and seventeen questions involving social and personal attitudes.[10] An examination of the two trends since 1987 indicates that the partisan gap has widened during this period, and is even greater for political and policy positions than for social and personal attitudes (Figure 1).[11]

The gap has increased with regard to international policy, as well. The partisan divide on foreign affairs, frozen during the coldest years of the Cold War, began to thaw in the post-Vietnam years. As political scientist Ole Holsti points out, "For two decades, spanning the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations ... whatever differences divided the American public on foreign policy issues rarely fell along a cleavage defined by partisan loyalties."[12] By the 1980s, partisan divisions began to crystallize and encompass a broader range of domestic and international issues.[13] With regard to foreign policy, polarization was first exhibited among the nation's political elites, defining voting patterns within the U.S. Congress.[14] Over time, the division has come to permeate the body politic, in a way conveyed since the 2000 election by the country's division into Republican-voting and Democratic-voting states.

This gulf seems also to be widening with regard to preferred tools of U.S. foreign policy. On several occasions, Gallup has asked its respondents whether war is an "outmoded" or "sometimes necessary" way of settling differences between nations. Similarly, Pew has solicited reactions to the statement that military strength is the "best way to ensure peace."[15] Figure 2 indicates a

[9] John W. Bigby, *Politics, Parties, and Elections in America* (Belmont, CA: Thomas Wadsworth, 2003), 24–62.

[10] Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, *Evenly Divided and Increasingly Polarized* (Washington DC: 2003), 2–3.

[11] The political and policy attitudes scale is a composite of responses to twenty-four questions. The social and personal attitudes scale is a composite of responses to seventeen questions. For details, see Pew Research Center, *Evenly Divided*, 78–82.

[12] Ole Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 133.

[13] Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M. Carsey, "Party Polarization and Conflict Extension in the American Electorate," *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (October 2002): 286–303.

[14] James M. Lindsay, "The New Partisanship: The Changed Politics of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Agenda* 5 (September 2000): 1–15.

[15] The exact wording for the "war" question is "Is war an outmoded way of settling differences between nations, or is it sometimes necessary?" The exact wording for the "military strength"

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FIGURE 1
Partisan Gaps in Beliefs and Attitudes



Source: "The 2004 Political Landscape: Evenly Divided and Increasingly Polarized," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 5 November 2003, accessed at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=196.

widening gulf between Republican and Democratic beliefs regarding the virtues of military force. In a parallel fashion, and as shown in Figure 3, with the percentage agreeing that "Diplomacy is the best to way to ensure peace,"[16] Democrats seem increasingly more inclined than Republicans to favor a negotiated approach to foreign problems. The evidence of an expanding political breach along partisan lines is as difficult to ignore in the domain of foreign affairs as it is in the area of domestic policy.

The fact that the partisan gap has widened along the very dimensions that are thought to define the U.S.–European divide stirs suspicions that the latter

question is "Do you agree/disagree with the following: The best way to ensure peace is through military strength."

[16] This is the exact wording used in the survey.

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FIGURE 2
The Desirability of War and Military Strength



Source: "The 2004 Political Landscape: Evenly Divided and Increasingly Polarized," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 5 November 2003, accessed at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=196.

may reflect, more than anything else, European differences with Republicans rather than with Americans more generally, and that an American political subculture has pried apart the worldviews that define the two sides of the Atlantic.[17] This implies a double divide: one separating European democracies from the United States, the other pitting Republicans against non-Republicans (Democrats and, to a lesser extent, independents) within the United States. We designate this first difference as the "Atlantic Gap," this second difference as the "Party Gap." The matter bearing most powerfully on the worlds of paradise and power is how this double divide applies to military force, to the circumstances and manner of its use.

Analytically, the problem is that there is some overlap between these two gaps. On the one hand, many Americans think more highly of military force than do many Europeans. On the other hand, most Democrats (and independents) tend to be less supportive of force than are Republicans.[18] The question, then, is which of these two cleavages—the Atlantic Gap or the Party Gap—is dominant? If it is the Atlantic Gap, then differences between Republicans and other Americans would seem slight compared to those separating

[17] There is a better awareness of this on the European side. See especially Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, "Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The Double Divide in US-European Relations," German Marshall Fund of the United States, August 2004.

[18] Pew Research Center, *Evenly Divided*, 27.

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FIGURE 3
Partisanship and Diplomacy



Source: "Politics and Values in a 51%-48% Nation: National Security More Linked With Partisan Affiliation," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 24 January 2005, accessed at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/236.pdf.

Americans from Europeans. If, however, the Party Gap dominates, then not only are Republicans divorced from the European political culture, but they are also ideologically separated from the traditional political West, at home as well as abroad. If the Party Gap dominates, then the larger it happens to be, the greater are the likely swings in U.S. policy when either party replaces the other in the corridors of power. If the Atlantic Gap dominates, then the greater it is, the greater will be the tension between the United States and Europe, no matter which U.S. party is in power.

Let us consider that the gap between non-Republicans and Europeans represents the irreducible distance between political values on the two sides of the Atlantic. Any further distance is determined by the gulf separating Republican from non-Republican positions within the United States. The former is our measure of the Atlantic Gap, the latter of the Party Gap. In Figure 4, situation A indicates that on the policy issue concerned, the Party Gap dominates, since the distance between Europeans and non-Republicans is

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FIGURE 4
The Dominant Political Gap



Source: The authors' illustration of the Atlantic Gap versus the Party Gap.

much slighter than that between Republicans and non-Republicans. In situation B, non-Republicans and Republicans are closer to each other than the former are to Europeans; thus, the Atlantic Gap dominates: Republicans simply reflect differences between the United States and Europe.

Atlantic Gap versus Party Gap: The Evidence

We wish to know, then, how the U.S.–European political divide is most accurately characterized. Does it primarily reflect a rift between Western European priorities and those of the American polity writ large, or a gap between the former and one segment of that polity? Robert Kagan maintains, "When it comes to the use of force, most mainstream American Democrats have more in common with Republicans than they do with Europeans."[19] Is this really so? Here, the question requires asking which of the two gaps (Atlantic or Party) is dominant. To this end, we examine surveys conducted in the United States and a number of European nations (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Slovakia) for the German

[19] Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 6.

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Marshall Fund, in their *Transatlantic Trends* studies,[20] which analyze the attitudes of Europeans and Americans with regard to major issues of international security. We consider questions that unambiguously involve judgments on the utility of armed force.[21]

Let us begin with two differences that, as much or more as any other, have defined disagreements between the United States and Western Europe. The first involves the related issues of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the U.S.-led war on terror. While not all European views on the desirability of invading Iraq converged, several governments (France and Germany most vocally) felt that the evidence on alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction did not justify armed intervention without further on-site investigations by multilateral bodies, and that the United States acted in a precipitate manner. Even within those European nations whose governments actively supported military action, a solid majority of public opinion generally opposed it.

Table 1 presents three statements/questions on this issue: was the war in Iraq worth the loss of life, has the war in Iraq increased or decreased the terror threat, and is military action the most appropriate way of fighting terrorism. Responses to these questions shed much light on feelings about how specific applications of force are distributed along the double divide. We find Republicans enormously more supportive of force than non-Republicans, while Europeans are less prepared than either U.S. group to think that the loss of life was justified, less inclined to believe that the Iraq war decreased the terror threat, and less likely to believe that military action is the best way to fight terrorism. On one level, Kagan's paradise–power hypothesis seems supported by the evidence.

Closer inspection reveals how the distance between non-Republicans and Europeans compares to that separating Republicans from the rest of the U.S. political landscape. Here, we witness a gaping chasm: not only are non-Republicans much closer to Europeans than to Republicans on these matters, they are so, in each instance, by some significant multiple. On the individual categories of issues, the Party Gap outstrips the Atlantic Gap in each of the three cases. The average size of the Party Gap (bottom row), is close to four

[20] The Transatlantic Trends 2004 was a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy) with additional support from the Luso-American Foundation (Portugal), Fundacion BBVA (Spain) and the Institute for Public Affairs (Slovakia). The fieldwork was coordinated by TNS Opinion and Social.

[21] The sample sizes for the survey were as follows: The European sample consisted of responses from nine nations, with the following sample sizes: Germany (N = 1,001), France (N = 1,006), Italy (N = 1,002), Netherlands (N = 1,002), Portugal N = 1,003), Spain (N = 1,000), United Kingdom (N = 1,000), Poland (N = 1,000), and Slovakia (N = 1,000). Political party identifier sample sizes were as follows: U.S. Republicans (N = 320), U.S. non-Republicans, comprised of Democrats (N = 320) and independents (N = 250), for an aggregate sample size of N = 570, and UK Conservatives (N = 155).

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TABLE 1

The War in Iraq and the War on Terror

Statement on Iraq/Terror	*UK Conservatives*	*Republicans*	*Non-Republicans*	*Europeans*	*Atlantic Gap*[d]	*Party Gap*[e,*]
Was the war in Iraq worth the loss of life? (% saying yes)[a]	30	77	27	15	12	50
Has the war in Iraq increased/decreased the terror threat? (% saying decreased)[b]	3	51	15	5	10	36
Is military action the most appropriate way of fighting terrorism? (% strongly agreeing)[c]	41	63	31	21	10	32
Mean scores	25	64	24	14	10	40

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

[a]Exact wording: "Do you think that the war in Iraq was worth the loss of life and the other costs of attacking Iraq, or not?"

[b]Exact wording: "According to you, has the military action in Iraq increased the threat of terrorism around the world, decreased the threat of terrorism around the world, or has it had no effect on the threat of terrorism?"

[c]Exact wording: "Do you agree or disagree with the following: Military action to eliminate terrorist organizations is the most appropriate way to fight terrorism."

[d]Difference between non-Republicans and Europeans.

[e]Difference between Republicans and non-Republicans.

*The difference between the two gaps is statistically significant at $p = 0.05$ (Z-score for difference of percentages, one-tailed test).

times that of the Atlantic Gap (in the last row of Table 1). On the matter of Iraq and the war on terror, the evidence seems conclusive.

Table 1 reflects views on the value of military force in two specific instances (Iraq and terror), but it does not address the issue of who should decide on its use. At least as great a rift in transatlantic relations accompanied the U.S. decision to act without UN Security Council authorization. Many Europeans, their governments, and former EU External Affairs Commissioner Christopher Patten have questioned Washington's right to act unilaterally on such matters, the disagreement amounting to a difference on the acceptable prerogatives of unipolarity. For many Europeans, force should be used only when it stems from a collective decision, preferably taken by the sole institution that in international law can sanction military coercion, the Security Council of the United Nations, or, at least, from a decision endorsed by a group of like-minded democracies. For many Americans, the UN encompasses both those whose political values should and should not be respected, making it an unacceptable substitute for the judgment of a politically virtuous state such as their own. In any case, it is an unwieldy and indecisive organization; it cannot be counted on to act forcefully when the need arises. Even NATO or major European allies

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TABLE 2

The Multilateral Imperative

For Future Iraqis, Is the Following Essential?	*UK Conservatives*	*Republicans*	*Non-Republicans*	*Europeans*	*Atlantic Gap*[d]	*Party Gap*[e,*]
UN approval (% saying essential)[a]	85	26	71	82	11	45
NATO approval (% saying essential)[b]	78	32	70	72	2	38
Approval of main European Allies (% saying essential)[c]	80	46	76	80	4	30
Mean scores	81	35	72	78	6	37

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

[a]Exact wording: "If a situation like Iraq a rose in the future, do you think it is essential to secure the approval of the UN before using military force, or don't you think it is essential?"

[b]Exact wording: "If a situation like Iraq arose in the future, do you think it is essential to secure the approval of NATO before using military force, or don't you think it is essential?"

[c]Exact wording: "If a situation like Iraq arose in the future, do you think it is essential to secure the approval of the main European allies before using military force, or don't you think it is essential?"

[d]Difference between non-Republicans and Europeans.

[e]Difference between Republicans and non-Republicans.

*The difference between the two gaps is statistically significant at $p = 0.05$ (Z-score for difference of percentages, one-tailed test).

should not be allowed to substitute their interests and judgment for those of the United States.

Still, these views are not uniformly held within the United States. Public opinion polls generally reflect significant American public support for the United Nations, although not among Republicans. While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has employed the George W. Bush administration's definition of the U.S. national interest as the main measure of the value of the UN and U.S. alliances,[22] Madeleine K. Albright has simply described the UN as the "best bet for addressing the world's major problems."[23] Thus, on the issue of multilateralism, as on the specific desirability of the wars in Iraq and against terror, we must compare the Party Gap to the Atlantic Gap (Table 2).

Europeans, non-Republicans, and Republicans are arrayed on the continuum of support for military multilateralism much as one would expect: Europeans expressing greater support than most Americans, and Republicans voicing far less support than independents and Democrats (less than half the latter's level of support). And here, even more than with regard to Iraq and terror, the Party Gap dwarfs the Atlantic Gap. One is struck by the modest

[22] Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000): 45–62.

[23] Madeleine Albright, "Why the United Nations Is Indispensable," *Foreign Policy* 138 (September/October 2003): 16–26.

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TABLE 3

The Value of Military Force

Statement on the Benefits of Armed Force	*UK Conservatives*	*Republicans*	*Non-Republicans*	*Europeans*	*Atlantic Gap*[c]	*Party Gap*[d]
"The best way to ensure peace is through military strength." (% agreeing strongly)[a]	20	43	23	10	13	20*
"Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice." (% agreeing strongly)[b]	44	66	41	14	27	25
Mean scores	32	55	32	12	20	23*

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

[a]Exact wording.

[b]Exact wording.

[c]Difference between non-Republicans and Europeans.

[d]Difference between Republicans and non-Republicans.

*The difference between the two gaps is statistically significant at $p = 0.05$ (Z-score for difference of percentages, one-tailed test).

distance between Europeans, on one hand, and non-Republicans, on the other hand—especially where an obligation to consult NATO and major European allies is concerned. On each of the three issues, the Party Gap exceeds the Atlantic Gap by a fairly large multiple. When the average size of the gaps (across the three questions) is compared to the Party Gap, the latter emerges as more than *six* times as large. Even with regard to the matter of multilateralism within the UN context, Republicans are more than four times further from non-Republicans than the latter are from Europeans. On the issue of multilateralism, more indeed than with regard to Iraq and the war on terror, Republicans appear disconnected both from other segments of the U.S. polity and from Western Europe.

Both Tables 1 and 2 present opinions elicited on a U.S. resort to force linked to current events. In a sense, this may have amplified the apparent Party Gap, since responses probably reflect not only general policy orientations but also endorsement of the incumbent president. In other words, responses may have been shaped not only by underlying opinions but also by a sense of loyalty or opposition to a president one has voted for or against. Although Americans identifying with either major party take some of their cues from leaders associated with those parties, a portion of their beliefs is held prior to their choice of party, and does not simply echo cues from party leaders. In a quest to determine how far opinions diverge in terms of underlying priorities when account is taken of basic political loyalties, we consider responses to a more general set of questions associated with military force, that is, questions not linked to specific actions taken by the incumbent president. Table 3 provides scores on the percentage of those expressing strong agreement with two

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statements, each of which indicates, in a more abstract sense, the value placed on military force: "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength," and "Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice." Together, they capture approval of armed coercive force as a way of attaining dominant ends of national policy.

Plainly, more Americans than Europeans see virtue in the use of military force, even when they are not Republicans. At the same time, Republicans are much more inclined than non-Republicans to consider war an acceptable means of pursuing elevated ends (the average difference is 23 percent). This is consistent with expectations; but it is noteworthy that even where support of or opposition to a specific president is not a factor, the Party Gap dominates the Atlantic Gap. On both questions, the gap differential is present; even though, on the second question, it just fails statistical significance at the 0.05 level (one-tailed test), the difference averaged across the two questions passes the test. With regard to the general value of military force (as on the issues of Iraq, the war on terror, and multilateralism), Republican views stand remote from those elsewhere in the political world, on either side of the Atlantic.

At this point, it is useful to extend the discussion, asking whether there is, indeed, a broader range of circumstances calling for extreme policy instruments in the Republican view than in other views. While maintaining a focus on matters crucial to the national interest, we shift our gaze slightly, inquiring not about military intervention per se, but about the international circumstances that could call for harsh and decisive U.S. responses (military or other), that is, about different perceptions of major international threats. Are the differences we have seen above also apparent when it comes to identifying perils and challenges? Table 4 displays numbers agreeing that a specific threat is "extremely important."

Differences between Europeans and Americans are arrayed in the expected direction and they are meaningful. Europeans, on average, are less inclined to see threats than non-Republicans, while non-Republicans display less threat anxiety than Republicans, with the exception of the Arab–Israeli conflict.[24] This result is not surprising, in that, for many conservative Republicans, it is not so much the Arab–Israeli conflict that is a threat, but radical Arabs, who threaten both the United States and Israel. For four of the five threat categories, the Party Gap dominates the Atlantic Gap. Thus, perceptions of threats, as well as of military responses, highlight the discrepancy in policy positions separating Republicans not only from Europeans but also from many other Americans: their interpretation of the international system's character differs from that encountered elsewhere in the political West, as do their prescriptions for dealing with it.

[24] The fact that more Europeans and non-Republicans consider the Arab–Israeli conflict an important threat is interesting in light of the role U.S. support of Israel has played in fomenting anti-American terrorism.

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TABLE 4

Major Threats

Is the Following an Extremely Important Threat?[a]	*UK Conservatives*	*Republican*	*Non-Republican*	*European*	*Atlantic Gap*[g]	*Party Gap*[h,*]
Islamic fundamentalism[b]	51	62	42	52	10	20
Immigrants/refugees[c]	37	31	28	22	6	3
International terrorism[d]	76	85	73	71	2	12
Arab-Israeli conflict[e]	41	37	40	40	0	3
Terrorists using WMDs[f]	76	85	74	56	18	11
Mean scores	56	60	51	48	3	9

Source: Transatlantic Trends.

[a]Exact wording: "I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to [Europe (in Europe)/US (in US)] in the next ten years. Please tell me if you think that each one on the list is an extremely important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all."

[b]"Islamic fundamentalism (the most radical stream of Islam.)"

[c]"Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into [Europe/US]."

[d]Exact wording.

[e]"Military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors."

[f]"A terrorist attack on [country] using weapons of mass destruction."

[g]Difference between non-Republicans and Europeans.

[h]Difference between Republicans and non-Republicans.

*The difference between the two gaps is statistically significant at $p = 0.05$, one-tailed test (Z-score for difference of percentages).

Another Perspective

Although the evidence so far suggests, at least on the issues examined, that Republicans are estranged from dominant Western views and priorities, this conclusion may flow from a distorted conception of the political space across which we measure distances, exaggerating the impression of Republican political isolation. In particular, any notion that Europe is an undifferentiated lump of social-democratic sentiment would be misguided, as in most European democracies, center-right and a center-left movements vigorously vie for power. A more appropriate view of the matter might consider that Republicans share much with other movements and organizations located on the conservative end of the ideological scale. If so, it is not so much that Republicans are pitted against the rest of the West, but that they, along with like-minded others, clash with those who are at odds with fundamental conservative values. In other words, the cleavage involves a different level of aggregation: it is not a matter of Republicans versus the West, but of conservatives opposing nonconservative worldviews—conservatives whose thinking generally meshes with the Republican ethos. Differences on the specific issues of national security and military policy are submerged within a common core of shared conservative philosophy linking Republicans to the world of right-of-center movements.

One way of evaluating this proposition is to examine, along the dimensions of opinion considered above, the views associated with another important

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conservative organization, asking whether the distance between it and U.S. Republicans is slighter than its distance from the European mainstream. If so, conservatives, of whom Republicans are a subset, form part of a cohesive international movement on matters of military policy and international security; if not, Republicans are, again, swimming against the common stream.

A suitable organization to consider in this regard is Great Britain's Conservative Party, the party of Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher. Durable emotional attachments link Republicans and Tories, and both, like most of their conservative brethren elsewhere, prefer a restricted state role in economic life, devolution of power to local authorities, a tough stance toward crime, and so forth. Thus, it is possible that on the types of issues examined above, Republicans are very close to British Conservatives (and, by implied extensions, to other right-of-center parties), if not to other Europeans. To evaluate this possibility, the second column of Tables 1–4 displays the percentage of British Conservative Party supporters[25] holding the views expressed by the relevant survey question (column 1, Tables 1–4). We compute an average Conservative score for the opinions captured by each of the four tables, on which basis we can compare the difference, on the one hand, between Republicans and Europeans, and, on the other hand, between Conservatives and Europeans.

Figure 5 juxtaposes, for the issue area captured in the corresponding Table, the Republican–Conservative divide and the Conservative–European gap, allowing for a direct comparison of the magnitude of the two fissures. The evidence is stark: in three of the four cases, British Conservatives are closer to Europeans than they are to U.S. Republicans. On the issues of military responses to Iraq and terror, the Republican–Conservative gap is three-and-a-half times greater than the Conservative–European gap. On multilateralism and the use of force, it is fifteen times as large. On the general value of military force, the difference is more modest; but again, Republicans lie further from Conservatives than the latter do from Europeans overall. Only on the general issue of major international threats is the size of the gaps reversed: although Republicans are more likely to worry about threats than are Conservatives, the distance between the two is modest—slighter, in any case, than that separating Conservatives from Europeans. This, however, is not easy to interpret, as there is not a common dimension of meaning running through all threats (for example, AIDS and terrorism). In each of the first three cases, the difference between the Party Gap and the Atlantic Gap is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed test).

Discussion

The image of a widening gap between the dominant political ethos of Europe and of the United States misleads by misplacing the location of the true rift: the

[25] UK Conservatives were identified by their expressed voting intentions.

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FIGURE 5
Republicans, Conservatives, and Europeans



Source: Transatlantic Trends, accessed at http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends.

gulf does not separate the typical European from the typical American, but the modal European and many Americans from the outlook that has come to characterize U.S. Republicans, giving them the character of outliers within the traditional community of Western democracies.

Parallel to the seemingly widening gulf between American political values and those of most West European democracies, a well-documented partisan polarization now characterizes the United States, implying that the former divide may largely reflect the latter, and that the transatlantic gap does not so much separate national political cultures but, instead, one important political culture within the United States from that of much of the democratic West. The evidence supports that view, since on a clear preponderance of issues, the distance separating Republicans from non-Republicans is greater than the distance separating non-Republicans from Europeans. This applies to the war in Iraq and the war on terror, to the general value of military force, to the issue of multilateralism, and to general perceptions of external threats. There plainly are implications for practical politics, most apparently that, where political power rests firmly in Republican hands, transatlantic rifts emerge that might not otherwise occur. Still, the ultimate implications for relations between traditional allies is not as clear as might be thought; in the longer term, much depends on the actual impact on European policy and thinking that

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Republican-led U.S. policies produce, as well as on the nature of Republican political leadership. Two broad scenarios are conceivable.

The natural expectation is that transatlantic relations should deteriorate under Republican administrations. U.S. stances fan the embers of European anti-Americanism, producing perceptions, on both sides of the Atlantic, that the other side is unreasonable and out of touch, an obstacle to a more secure world. European political authorities cannot ignore public sentiment, while their own preferences could, in any case, disincline them to support the United States. At the same time, neither Europeans nor Americans would ever desire an unbridgeable cleavage, and relations might be marked by a layer of acrimonious distrust over which both sides seek to overlay a coat of civility, conveying that serious differences notwithstanding, jointly held goals are kept squarely in sight. The limitation of this scenario is that where specific and meaningful policy decisions are concerned, the core of distrust often trumps the desired sense of basic comity, implying an inability to act in tandem on such issues as meaningful reconstruction assistance for Iraq, UN reforms, or the problem of global warming. The result is a sometimes frenetic attempt to maintain the appearance of relations that are on an even keel without many meaningful instances of cooperation to back it up. The other side of the coin is that a changing of the guard in Washington DC should encourage attempts to recover lost ground, attempts that may be more or less successful but that in the cycles of shifting power in the United States, produce alternating periods of deteriorating and recovering relations but no enduringly productive experience of common achievement.

A more hopeful though less intuitively apparent scenario can also be envisaged. Here, associated frictions notwithstanding, Republican pressure nudges European policy in the general direction of Washington's preferences. Modest though that movement might be, it remains that on the standard left–right/paradise–power continuum, many Americans are situated somewhere between Europeans and Republicans. This means that European stances could move very close to those of moderate segments of the U.S. polity, a movement nevertheless accompanied by resentment at American pressure during a Republican reign. While the impact on U.S.–European relations would be indeterminate in the short run, prospects could brighten in the longer term because once moderate forces step into office in Washington DC, the residual distance separating them from Europeans may be slight enough to allow genuine and effective cooperation, especially since the new incumbents would not be associated with the previous chapter of perceived U.S. pressure. Much depends on how the balance between Europe's policy change, on one hand, and its annoyance with Washington, on the other hand, plays itself out during the Republican phase. It also depends on how adept a subsequent Democratic administration is at harnessing the improved proximity of policy position across the Atlantic while dispelling residual resentments at the pressures that made the rapprochement possible. Much also depends on the predilections of

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Republican leaders when they are in office. Even during the coldest years of the Cold War, and despite sharp partisan differences within Congress, strong yet moderate leaders, especially Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) in the Senate and Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon in the White House, pursued a foreign policy fashioned around a bipartisan consensus with leading Democrats, without much attempt to gain partisan advantage with core constituencies.[26] This spirit has been less evident in post-Cold War times.

Whatever else may be thought regarding the transatlantic rift, it is pregnant with consequences for America's position in a world where soft power challenges hard power as a source of international influence and where, in turn, soft power assumes a pattern of belief and values with which much of international society can identify. The specific nature of these consequences depends on whether qualms about American values reflect, in fact, responses to those flowing from national political culture or from a subculture whose grip on policy is at times strengthened, at other times loosened.*

[26] For an analysis of the character of Congressional partisan politics during the height of the Cold War, see H. Bradford Westerfield, *Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1958).

*The authors thank Bruce Russett, Phil Everts, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft.

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Presidential Republics and Divided Government: Lawmaking and Executive Politics in the United States and France

RICHARD S. CONLEY

Comparative analytical approaches to the U.S. presidency have been rare. Lamentably, presidential scholars have not yet availed themselves of the significant opportunities for theory building that the comparative study of executive leadership may offer. The relatively sparse, extant literature has focused primarily on presidents and their counterparts in Anglo democracies of the Westminster parliamentary variety, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada.[1] Such comparisons are more easily justified on the basis of linguistic and sociocultural similarities than on structural grounds. The fusion of the executive within the legislature complicates comparisons with legislative bargaining in the United States. Although coalition and minority governments in Westminster-type systems may be conceptualized as a form of "divided government" that may limit executive latitude,[2] split-party control of the executive and legislature—a condition that has occurred six out of every ten years in the post-war era in the United States—is an *impossible outcome* in these systems.

The search for meaningful comparisons and more-direct analogies to presidential–congressional relations in the United States requires the identification of other presidential or semipresidential systems with separated struc-

[1] Colin Campbell, *The U.S. Presidency in Crisis: A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Michael Foley, *The Rise of the British Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993); Patricia Lee Sykes, *Presidents and Prime Ministers: Conviction Politics in the Anglo-American Tradition* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

[2] Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Divided Government: America is Not 'Exceptional,'" *Governance* 4 (October 1991): 250–269.

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tures between the executive and legislature and hence, the possibility of divided-party control of national institutions. The French Fifth Republic (1958–present) operates precisely under such a framework and has withstood three incidences of split-party control between the president and the National Assembly—*cohabitation* in French parlance. Curiously, France has been overlooked as a model for comparison to executive politics in the United States by scholars in all but the field of electoral studies.[3]

What distinguishes the French Fifth Republic from the separated institutional structure in the United States is the existence of a dual executive. The semipresidential or "premier-presidential"[4] constitutional arrangement boasts a president *and* a prime minister with equivalent legitimacy in their respective domains. The president is the "arbiter of republican institutions" and plays the predominant role in foreign affairs. The prime minister heads the government and is responsible for guiding the lawmaking process. A literal interpretation of these key sections of the 1958 Constitution might prompt American observers, quite incorrectly, to characterize the Fifth Republic as a parliamentary-centered regime with a figurehead president.

Indeed, nothing could be further from reality for much of the Fifth Republic. The first president, Charles de Gaulle, used his formal, constitutional powers and informal prerogatives to establish important precedents—including controlling cabinet council agendas and sacking prime ministers at will, despite having no formal authority to do so—to ensure presidential dominance over prime ministers. His four successors—Georges Pompidou, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, François Mitterrand, and Jacques Chirac—followed this exemplar steadfastly to solidify the *Palais Élysée*, the president's Parisian headquarters, as the locus of national policy making. In practice, the prime minister is expendable—a *fusible*, or lightning rod, to deflect criticism away from the Élysée.[5] He serves at the president's pleasure and is his surrogate in the legislature—so long as the president has a majority in the National Assembly.

It is during recent periods of cohabitation that the axiom of presidential dominance of the prime minister has been inverted. Mitterrand (1986–88, 1993–95) and Chirac (1997–2002) confronted a majority party or coalition of parties *opposed to them* in the National Assembly and were forced to appoint prime ministers who were ideological rivals. De Gaulle could have scarcely conceived of such a situation and surely would have resigned had it occurred

[3] Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, *Forecasting Elections* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992); Roy Pierce, *Choosing the Chief: Presidential Elections in France and the United States* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

[4] This term is employed by Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[5] The word *fusible* comes from the French verb *fuser*, which connotes a fuse or circuit-breaker.

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under his watch.[6] But neither Mitterrand nor Chirac chose this option. They appointed an opposition prime minister. The consequences of divided government for these presidents' policy agendas, and for relations between the president and the legislature, were immediate and far-reaching.

Without a veto power and unable to halt the legislative juggernaut of determined opposition majorities, cohabitation presidents utilized select constitutional prerogatives in combination with their institutional position in the bid to outmaneuver the prime minister in the court of public opinion. Returning to their symbolic role of *rassembleur* of the Republic, Mitterrand and Chirac sought to mold public opinion against the incumbent majority through suprapartisan rhetoric aimed at ultimately reversing opposition control of the National Assembly. In this regard, French presidents' strategic behavior is strikingly similar to their American counterparts' management of divided government.

The objective of this article is to take a critical first step in theorizing about how executive–legislative relations play out in similar and different ways when partisan control of national institutions is split in the French and American settings. The article draws distinctions between each executive's constitutional powers and the intersection of those powers with informal prerogatives. By focusing on the ways in which "blame game" politics develops similarly under select circumstances in the two systems,[7] this research paints a more intricate, comparative portrait of presidential behavior in the strategic management of split-party control of national institutions. Particular weight is given to the incentives for presidents in both countries to "go public"[8] and galvanize opposition to the legislative majority through the rhetorical levers of their office. Short comparative case studies emphasize the relative advantage of the president compared to the Speaker of the House (U.S.) or prime minister (France) in the war of words during periods of institutional combat.

The impact of blame game politics on policy outcomes in the two countries depends on the "relative" veto power of the president: whether the power is at most "suspensive" (France) or "substantive" (U.S.). French presidents can only delay legislation or deny a prime minister's request to legislate by decree. Only in the realm of constitutional change do they have the power to halt amendments. The result is that divided government entails much more decisive policy shifts in France compared to the United States. American presidents retain significantly more direct leverage over lawmaking. The veto power enables them to obstruct passage of laws with which they disagree, force com-

[6] Claude-Albert Colliard, "Les pouvoirs du Président de la République en cas de coexistence institutionnelle (mars 1986–mai 1988)," *Revue du droit public* (novembre/décembre 1989): 1565–1605.

[7] Tim Groseclose and Nolan McCarty, "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience," *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (January 2001): 100–120.

[8] Samuell Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership* (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997).

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promise, or utilize veto threats to regain some agenda-setting control over Congress. Veto politics, often in tandem with bicameral procedural differences, may also prompt the president and the congressional majority to "strategically disagree"[9] because one or the other, or both, believe it is better to "have" an issue than to resolve it. The president or the congressional majority may be convinced that policy stalemate will yield electoral advantages. The features of inter-institutional bargaining in the United States are more likely to result in incremental changes in significant public policies, but also protracted policy stalemate. The tie that nevertheless binds presidents in both countries is the importance of their rhetorical skills to "frame" interbranch disagreements and make a persuasive case to the electorate in the hope of overturning opposition control of the legislature at some future point.

The analysis unfolds in several stages. The next section provides an overview of the unique features of lawmaking in France, and then juxtaposes presidential strategy under split-party control of national institutions in the two countries. The third section presents brief case studies of presidential strategy on high-profile bills in each country to validate the framework. The concluding section reprises questions of institutional power, policy success, and electoral cycles in the U.S. and French cases of divided government.

Lawmaking and Presidential Strategy in Two Separated Systems

The U.S. Congress consists of co-equal chambers with a tradition of a lack of party discipline, despite heightened unity voting in recent decades. In the French Fifth Republic, the *Assemblée nationale*, or National Assembly, is the dominant institution in the bicameral legislature and can trump the Senate's objections to bills. The National Assembly is comprised of generally disciplined parties, though absolute majorities are less common than *majority coalitions* of parties on the left or right. The prime minister is endowed with exceptional tools to avoid legislative paralysis. Those powers far exceed anything the Speaker of the House or Senate Majority Leader enjoy in the U.S. Congress. A brief synopsis of key constitutional provisions for prime ministerial leadership of the National Assembly, bicameralism, and the president's position in the lawmaking process places executive–legislative relations in France into sharper comparative perspective with the American case.

The French Fifth Republic was expressly designed to avoid legislative *immobilisme*, or deadlock, according special lawmaking powers to the government, headed by the prime minister. Article 38 of the Constitution enables the government to legislate by decree (*ordonnance*) and bypass regular lawmaking procedures with the consent of the National Assembly and counter-signature of the president. Article 44 bears more resemblance to an extreme form of the

[9] John B. Gilmour, *Strategic Disagreement: Stalemate in American Politics* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).

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"restrictive rules" in the U.S. House of Representatives. Under the "blocked vote" procedure, the government can decide the length of debate on bills and limit or decline amendments. Article 49 enables the government to attach its responsibility to bills: unless a motion of censure succeeds within a twenty-four-hour period, the bill is considered passed. Prime ministers who have faced recalcitrant factions in the National Assembly have resorted to the *engagement de responsabilité* to whip coalition partners into line. The prime minister can also circumvent delaying tactics by the legislative opposition by declaring a bill "urgent" under Article 45. The bill then requires only one reading before charging a bicameral conference committee with settling on final provisions.[10] Article 47 ensures the impossibility of government shutdowns like those that occurred under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. The annual budget is accorded forty days of debate in the National Assembly and fifteen days in the Senate. In the case of protracted parliamentary conflict, the government can declare its budget passed by decree after a total of seventy days have passed.

When the French president enjoys a majority or majority coalition in the National Assembly, he can exercise a level of control of the legislative agenda that is unknown to American presidents, particularly because he can credibly threaten to discharge the prime minister.[11] The prime minister's proposals and the government's agenda are first deliberated in the Council of Ministers (*Conseil des Ministres*), in which the president maintains an "effective veto" over the presentation of bill proposals to the National Assembly. De Gaulle's heavy-handed tactics in thwarting bills to which he was opposed is well documented.[12] Similarly, the president may intervene later in the legislative process to force the government to pull unpopular legislation, as Mitterrand did with a controversial education bill titled *Projet Savary* when the Socialists had a majority in the National Assembly. All told, neither the French president nor the prime minister needs to engage in the systematic lobbying of individual members to build support in the legislature that is common in the United States. The carrots, sticks, and horse trading around specific bills among members in the individualist U.S. Congress scarcely apply in the French context. The legislative process is driven "top-down."

French presidents also have several other tools at their disposal that provide leverage over the National Assembly. Like their American counterparts, they can call the legislature into special session. Yet, they can also threaten the

[10] Alistair Cole, *French Politics and Society* (New York: Pearson, 1998), 89–90.

[11] Martin A. Schain and John T.S. Keeler, "Le pouvoir présidentiel aux États-Unis et en France: une perspective comparative" in Nicholas Wahl and Jean-Louis Quermonne, eds., *La France présidentielle: L'influence du suffrage universel sur la vie politique* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1995).

[12] William G. Andrews, *Presidential Government in Gaullist France* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982).

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National Assembly with the ultimate sanction—dissolution—which they are permitted to do once in a twelve-month period. Mitterrand occasionally hinted at dissolution during the first cohabitation to force the opposition prime minister to back off perceived encroachments on the president's sacrosanct "reserved domain" of foreign affairs. Jacques Chirac made a monumental error by dissolving the legislature prematurely in 1997, despite having a majority in the National Assembly at the time. The dissolution was aimed at "renewing" the government's mandate, but voters punished Chirac by returning a majority coalition on the left.[13]

French presidents can bypass the legislature altogether in some areas. For example, they can call for a referendum to change provisions in the Constitution. The results of such referenda have been mixed in the history of the Fifth Republic.[14] Article 16 grants the president "emergency powers" and enables him to suspend the Constitution for up to six months. The provision has been utilized only once. De Gaulle invoked the article briefly during the Algerian War.[15]

Cohabitation changes the equation dramatically for presidential dominance of the prime minister and the National Assembly. Three cohabitations have occurred—at regularly scheduled legislative elections during the president's term (1986, 1993), and after early dissolution (1997). The dynamic bears a certain resemblance to the dramatic midterm loss of seats in Congress for the president's co-partisans that reverses party control.[16] The election outcomes were widely interpreted as a discrediting of the presidents' leadership. Mitterrand and Chirac were constrained to select prime ministers to head the new majority whose issue positions and ideological stances conflicted with their preferences. They could not, at least at the outset, credibly threaten to "sack" the prime minister. Consequently, lawmaking reverted definitively to a parliamentary-dominated system. With only delaying tactics available, these French presidents were in a much weaker institutional position than their American counterparts who face opposition control of one or both chambers of the U.S. Congress.

Bicameralism in Perspective

U.S. presidents can cultivate opposition in the upper chamber and benefit from the extraordinary procedural tools of the Senate to obstruct legislation. Whether they invoke the threat of a veto or not, American presidents are

[13] D.B. Goldey, "The French General Election of 25 May–1 June 1997," *Electoral Studies* 17 (December 1998): 536–566.

[14] William Safran, *The French Polity*, 6th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 132.

[15] The extraordinary circumstances required for future usage of emergency powers seem highly unlikely, given France's position with the European Union and the loss of its colonial interests in the 1960s and 1970s.

[16] Republicans' victories in the 1946 midterm elections, and again in 1994, are prime examples.

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frequently able to profit from interparty dissension in the Senate. Senate rules preclude even the most determined opposition majority in the House from expediting passage of bills in the upper chamber, regardless of party control. The special conventions of the Senate enable the minority party to engage in extended debate (filibuster) to halt legislation indefinitely. As Keith Krehbiel demonstrates, sixty votes—not simply a majority, as in the House of Representatives—constitutes a true working majority for the Senate leadership in order to engage cloture.[17] Filbusters, or even their mere threat, can kill bills altogether or have a moderating influence on legislative outcomes. And unless the minority party assents to a unanimous consent agreement, its leadership (and individual members) can offer germane or non-germane amendments to stymie or alter legislative proposals. In this way, American presidents can reap the benefits of bicameral procedural differences and "play off" the upper and lower chambers against one another. President George W. Bush, as will be discussed later, worked with the minority Republicans in the Senate in just such a way to insist on a Homeland Security bill—similar to the version passed by House Republicans—that gave him broader latitude over that department than majority Democrats in the Senate were willing to accept. Similarly, Bill Clinton effectively coordinated with the minority Democratic leadership in the Senate to thwart adoption of key elements of the "Contract with America," the House Republicans' policy agenda that swiftly passed in the lower chamber in early 1995.

Relations between the National Assembly and the Senate do not enable French presidents to block the government's agenda, constitutional amendments notwithstanding. Depending on the partisan configuration of the National Assembly and the Senate, the most French presidents can hope to do is decelerate the government's agenda and use intercameral tensions to their advantage in the public arena. Senators' indirect election for a term of nine years through an electoral college comprised of more than 40,000 *notables* representing France's communes gives the upper chamber a distinctively rural and built-in conservative bias that benefits presidents on the right of the political spectrum. Yet, Senators do not have at their disposal significant autonomous control over lawmaking. At most, the Senate holds a "temporary" veto over legislative dynamics.[18] Although bill proposals can begin in either the National Assembly or the Senate, and bill texts in the two chambers must be identical for passage, the National Assembly plays the decisive role in setting the agenda and ultimately in legislative outcomes.

In the case of disagreement between chambers, legislative leaders may call for a *commission mixte paritaire*, or a conference committee of seven members from each chamber. Alternatively, leaders may use the *navette*, or shuttle

[17] Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

[18] Safran, *The French Polity*, 233–234.

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system, to send bills back and forth between chambers a maximum of three times to reach agreement. But in either case, if divisions persist, the National Assembly can force a "second reading" of the bill, after which it is considered passed. Thus, formal rules all but ensure passage of legislation by a determined government on its terms.

The only point in the legislative process at which the Senate holds an effective veto is over amendments to the Constitution. Any constitutional amendment requires that an identical bill be passed by a majority in both chambers, and then by a three-fifths margin in a *Congrès* consisting of members of both chambers.[19] Of course, the president can circumvent the legislature and call for a referendum. But as we shall see in the case studies that follow, President Chirac refused to call a *Congrès* for amendments supported by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin—and encouraged the majority on the right in the Senate to oppose them.

The Veto, Delaying Tactics, and Presidential Strategy: Blame Game Politics and Strategic Disagreement

Robert Spitzer describes the veto power as the "touchstone" of the American presidency.[20] How French presidents in the Fifth Republic operate without a formal veto power under cohabitation is surely a critical hallmark of their political skill. During periods of cohabitation, the only partial analogies to the American president's veto consist of the French president's constitutional prerogatives to refuse to grant a prime minister's request to expedite legislation by decree (*ordonnance*), to call the legislature into a special session, or to convene a *Congrès* to consider constitutional amendments.

None of these prerogatives, singly or as a whole, amount to the powerful trump card of a U.S. president's veto. But they are not unimportant in the blame game between the president and the prime minister. Mitterrand drew upon his constitutional prerogatives as president "to reaffirm the important position of his office in the French political system and to prevent, or at least delay, certain decisions that the prime minister and his cabinet wanted to take."[21] Requests for decrees, for example, require the counter-signature of the president. Mitterrand refused to sign several under divided government. His refusals did not change the ultimate outcome, but did compell opposition Prime Minister Chirac (1986) to force the measures through the legislature via the regular legislative process. The ample controversy surrounding the bills in the National Assembly constrained the Prime Minister

[19] Cole, *French Politics and Society*, 65–66; Congrès are held at the Château de Versailles outside Paris.

[20] Robert J. Spitzer, *The Presidential Veto: Touchstone of the American Presidency* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

[21] Jean V. Poulard, "The French Double Executive and the Experience of Cohabitation," *Political Science Quarterly* 105 (Summer 1990): 243–267.

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to resort to the blocked-vote procedure or government responsibility to ensure passage by narrow supporting coalitions. Most importantly, the political tempest enabled the President to appear to return to the symbolic role of guardian of the public interest, creating a platform to "go public" and engage in high-profile criticism of the Prime Minister and his majority. Mitterrand also refused to call the legislature into a special session as long as Prime Minister Chirac insisted on reconsidering the status of the Renault automobile company following a European Union directive regarding government subsidies. The highly symbolic move by Mitterrand simply delayed the legislative debate.

Manipulation of the public levers of the presidency to castigate or gain leverage over an opposition majority in the legislature scarcely seems out of place to an American observer. Presidents and opposition leaders in the U.S. Congress often exchange salvos and blame the other branch for "bad" policy or for stalemate under divided government. But the process by which American presidents and leaders in Congress arrive at such "blame game" politics takes a route different from that in the French case—and with far different impacts on policy outcomes because of the veto.

American presidents may veto or threaten to veto legislation for a number of reasons. First, they may seek to kill the bill outright. A majority opposition that is unwilling to compromise on policy details and cannot muster a two-thirds majority might simply be persuaded to drop the proposal altogether following a veto threat. Second, presidents may threaten to veto bills in order to gain some proposal power vis-a-vis the opposition. Since a president cannot feasibly threaten to veto any bill he prefers to the status quo, a veto threat signals how legislation must be altered to meet his demands. The congressional majority must then decide how far to compromise without provoking a veto that the leadership may or may not be able to override.

Scholars have constructed several formal models to explain veto bargaining between the branches. In the "commitment model"[22] and "coordination model"[23] the central assumption is that both the president and the congressional majority are interested in passing laws. Neither model fully considers the possibility of the blame game, which is critical for comparison to executive–legislative dynamics in France under cohabitation.

The premise for blame game politics in the American case is that the president, Congress, or both may not necessarily be interested in substantive policy outcomes. Rather, Congress may intentionally set out to provoke a veto even when there is little possibility of a successful override. Alternatively, the

[22] Daniel E. Ingberman and Dennis A. Yao, "Presidential Commitment and the Veto," *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (May 1991): 357–389.

[23] Charles Cameron, *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Steven A. Matthews, "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 104 (May 1989): 347–369.

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president may veto a bill simply to make a point, even if the bill was originally adopted by a bipartisan coalition in Congress and may be subject to a successful override. Either the president or the congressional leadership may perceive electoral benefits in the blame game that outweigh the potential of a loss or policy stalemate. The goal in such cases is to garner public sympathy, rally partisan support, and posture for the next round of negotiations or the next electoral cycle.

Insofar as the American president and the congressional majority are engaged in a "position-taking" game that intersects with public and electoral politics,[24] blame game politics look rather analogous in the United States and France. The emphasis is on public posturing. The key difference between the French and American cases remains the low probability of "strategic disagreement" and policy stalemate in France due to enhanced parliamentary control under divided government. But the common objective of presidents on both sides of the Atlantic is to accentuate policy disagreements with the legislative majority, force its legislative leadership into uncomfortable positions, and draw public criticism of Congress or the *Hôtel Matignon* (the French prime minister's headquarters).

Decision trees of executive–legislative relations are useful heuristics for understanding at which juncture in the legislative process the president can engage in the blame game in each country. Figure 1 shows hypothetical interactions between the American president and Congress when the latter chooses to ignore his veto threat. The scenario P1→C1→P2→C2→C4 occurs when legislation contains "veto bait" and is passed by a narrow partisan majority. The president has stated his objections to provisions of the bill, but such provisions were retained by the majority. The president's co-partisans in Congress have supported his position, and the roll call vote suggests that the majority leadership cannot prevail in an override attempt. Nevertheless, following the president's veto, the majority leadership pursues an override as a symbolic effort to garner public attention, blame the president for policy stalemate, and posture either for the next round of interbranch negotiations or for an upcoming election.

Alternatively, the president may threaten to veto legislation (P1) and Congress may refuse to modify the bill to his satisfaction (C1). But rather than challenge the president, the majority leadership may decide to put off a vote on the bill. The goal is to make an issue of the president's stance and blame him for stalemate, particularly in an election year, as the majority leadership may see a potential electoral advantage for policy deadlock.

On the other hand, the president may decide to veto legislation that has broad support in Congress and for which an override of his veto is probable

[24] Richard S. Conley and Amie Kreppel, "Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides: Legislative and Non-Legislative Goals with Implications for Presidential and Congressional Power," *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (December 2001): 831–852.

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FIGURE 1
Presidential–Congressional Interaction and Blame Game Politics



(based on a bipartisan voting coalition on the bill's passage). The scenario P1→C1→P2→C2→C4 is a "position-taking" veto on the part of the president. He is willing to accept the override to make a point "in principle." Jimmy Carter's vetoes of public works projects and Ronald Reagan's second-term vetoes of spending bills are exemplary of this dynamic.

The interaction scenarios are slightly more complicated in the French case, because the president does not have at his disposal a veto power. Figure 2 suggests a president's "effective veto" when he has a majority in the National Assembly and a prime minister appointed from that majority. In the scenario PM2→P4, the president may simply sideline bills that he opposes in Cabinet Council deliberations or refuse to accept them in the *ordre du jour*. If, on the other hand, the president supports the measure and the prime minister wishes to expedite passage, the scenario PM2→P3→PM3→P5 (following parliamentary authorization or *loi d'habilitation*) circumvents the normal legislative process and enables the prime minister to effect the law by decree. These scenarios apply outside cohabitation periods.

Under cohabitation, several particular junctures of the process furnish the president opportunities to strategically criticize and cast doubt on the majority's agenda in the media spotlight. In the scenario PM2→P4→PM3→P6→L1→L2→L3→L4→CC1, the president cannot credibly halt a determined prime minister from pursuing his agenda unless he is willing to risk the consequences of a dissolution of the National Assembly. But the president can refuse the prime minister's request to legislate by decree. The president may "go public" and explain his rationale, taking the opportunity to censure the government's agenda from his position as "arbiter of Republican institutions" in the Élysée. The prime minister must then decide whether to drop the bill or route it through normal legislative procedures. Assuming the prime minister is determined, the president's co-partisans cannot halt the bill in the National Assembly (L1), but they can follow the president's cues and bombard it with hundreds of amendments, forcing the prime minister to resort to majoritarian tactics to ensure timely passage.[25] They can also ask for a record vote to demonstrate their solidarity with the president's position (if blocked-vote or urgency measures are not employed). In the Senate (L2), the president can

[25] Henri Paillard, "Les dix moyens de perturber un débat," *Le Figaro*, 13 June 2003, 12.

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FIGURE 2
Presidential–Prime Ministerial Interactions and Cohabitation



publicly or privately cultivate the opposition, whether in the majority or the minority, to amend the legislation and draw public attention to bicameral negotiations (L3). Regardless, the National Assembly has the last word on the outcome (constitutional amendments notwithstanding).

The president must then weigh whether to send the bill to the Constitutional Council for review. The Council's role is primarily to determine whether the legislation violates constitutional distinctions between regulation and organic law. But the Council scarcely has a history of jurisprudence commensurate with that of the U.S. Supreme Court, and it is reticent to go beyond its circumscribed constitutional mandate, with civil liberties issues as an exception.[26] Given the Council's narrow scope of decision making, the president may not ask for such a review, to avoid a potential "defeat." But even as he promulgates the law, the president may use the occasion to express his misgivings about the legislation in much the same way that American presidents use "signing statements" to convey their reservations. Regardless, it is clear that specific points of the parliamentary process are ripe for the president to exploit to blame the opposition prime minister and his government for objectionable policies.

Comparing Blame Game Politics

Brief case studies substantiate how blame game politics between the branches and presidential strategy are comparable in the two systems. President Clinton's standoff with congressional Republicans from 1995 to 1996 and Socialist President Mitterrand's confrontations with Prime Minister Chirac from 1986 to 1988 share certain commonalities. The common linkage in the two

[26] Pascal Jan, "Le Conseil constitutionnel," *Pouvoirs* 99 (mai–juin 2001): 71–86.

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cases is the narrow two-year window of opportunity the Speaker (U.S.) and prime minister (France) had to accomplish significant policy making before scheduled presidential elections. The electoral calendar pushed legislative leaders in both countries to rush the lawmaking process, and presidents exploited their missteps. The second comparative case study weighs presidential manipulation of bicameral politics. The American example is drawn from President George W. Bush's interactions with the Democratic Senate over the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. The French case details Jacques Chirac's relations with the Senate and his bid to frustrate elements of Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's social agenda, including constitutional amendments. The thread that runs throughout each of these blame game scenarios is the power of the president's rhetoric to reproach the opposition in the public arena and eclipse, at least partially, the policy accomplishments of the opposition legislature—and in the American case, to compel substantial changes.

Clinton, the Republican Congress, and Strategic Disagreement

The federal budget was the pivotal point in presidential–congressional relations following the Republicans' stunning victory in the 1994 midterm elections, which gave the Party its first majority in the House in forty years. Led by Speaker Newt Gingrich, Republicans rushed to make good on their electoral pledges connected to the "Contract with America," the Party's platform for smaller government and reductions in government spending and regulation. The leadership of the Grand Old Party (GOP) even arrogated the "100 days" benchmark from the White House in the legislative onslaught.[27] Yet, by June of 1995, the harbinger of the intense conflict between Democratic President Clinton and Speaker Gingrich that would hasten a lengthy government shutdown was the President's decision to veto a supplemental appropriations bill.

Republicans took specific aim at programs favored by the President, including education and national service. Clinton followed through on his veto threat, and demonstrated that he could "make it stick by commanding enough votes not to be overridden by Congress."[28] The president then waged a carefully designed campaign to maximize public sympathy against the GOP. He attempted to depict himself as a centrist willing to negotiate and to portray the congressional majority as intransigent. Clinton pointed to disagreement "over priorities" and not over the basic goal of reduction of the budget deficit. He then outlined how the bill could be amended to win his signature.[29] This

[27] See James G. Gimpel, *Fulfilling the Contract: The First 100 Days* (Boston, MA: Allyn/Bacon, 1996).

[28] David S. Cloud, "Clinton Holds His Veto Power Over Heads of Republicans," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 3 June 1995, 1559–1560.

[29] William Jefferson Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), 828–829.

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was the basic blame game strategy that Clinton would follow in the fiery veto battles over the budget in late 1995 and early 1996.

Blame game politics came into full swing by December, following a brief government shutdown in November 1995, when the White House and congressional Republicans could not come to terms on a temporary spending bill. Disagreement between the White House and Capitol Hill centered on the budget reconciliation bill (HR 2491) and would ultimately deteriorate into strategic disagreement, as both the President and House Republicans believed that policy stalemate was a greater advantage than compromise. Clinton objected to a host of provisions, including reductions to the Medicare and Medicaid programs and education spending, as well as proposed tax cuts, and he threatened to veto the bill. The President's veto threat strengthened the resolve of House Democrats to take the issue public and rally traditional Democratic constituencies who would be affected by the cuts.[30] Yet, these measures comprised the heart of the GOP's Contract agenda, from which the majority was unwilling to retreat, including components of welfare reform and a balanced budget within seven years.[31]

For months, Speaker Gingrich insisted that he would hold other spending bills hostage to the President's acceptance of the balanced budget targeted by the reconciliation bill.[32] Gingrich emphatically denied that the reconciliation measure and other spending bills could be divorced. Moreover, he emphasized his steadfast opposition to assent to any further temporary spending measures unless the President accepted the Republican version of a balanced budget.[33]

By locking themselves into irreversible positions, the White House and congressional Republicans raised the stakes dramatically. Clinton's eventual veto of the reconciliation bill became embroiled in the politics of high rhetoric and was joined by symbolic, if failed, override attempts on other bills that Republicans hoped would enable them to scapegoat the President for the three-week-long government shutdown. For his part, the President emphasized that the veto was consistent with his long-standing threats that the majority chose to ignore.[34] In returning the bill to Congress, Clinton symbolically used the same pen to sign the veto that Lyndon Johnson had used to sign the bills that had created the Medicare and Medicaid programs. And the President's

[30] George Hager, "The Budget: In the House, GOP Leadership Scores Comfortable Win," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 28 October 1995, 3287–3289.

[31] Robert Pear, "Officials Assure Democrats of a Veto of the Welfare Bill," *The New York Times*, 30 November 1995; Al Kamen, "Clinton Attacks Republican Environmental Proposals," *The Washington Post*, 5 November 1995, A18.

[32] Eric Pianin and John Harris, "President Gains Status in Budget Battle," *The Washington Post*, 3 September 1995, A6.

[33] George Hager, "Problems in Opening Round Could Signal Bigger Woes," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 December 1995, 3635–3640.

[34] Todd S. Purdum, "As Long Promised, President Vetoes the G.O.P. Budget," *The New York Times*, 7 December 1995.

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rhetorical attack on the GOP agenda became harsher. Clinton's veto message placed the blame for policy deadlock squarely on the Republican majority, contending that the bill would "make extreme cuts and other unacceptable changes in Medicare and Medicaid, and ... raise taxes on millions of working Americans."[35] The President went on to detail how he and Congress could arrive at a balanced budget within a seven-year time frame without endangering basic entitlement programs.

In this effort, Clinton endeavored to portray himself as a centrist defender of principles and responsible governance, emphasizing that he was protecting more than just narrow programs. In the President's view, a self-serving congressional majority was attacking fundamental American values, not just Democratic Party values. For his part, Speaker Gingrich accused the President of being uninterested in balancing the budget. From Gingrich's perspective, Clinton was simply engaging in hollow "campaign gimmickry." The House Speaker contended that the President was unwilling to accept that "Lyndon Johnson's Great Society has failed. The people know that a Washington-based, Washington-spending, Washington bureaucracy, Washington red-tape Great Society isn't the answer."[36]

The ensuing budget stalemate between the White House and Capitol Hill precipitated shutdowns of portions of the executive branch in December 1995 and January 1996. Neither Clinton nor Gingrich would budge from their positions. Instead, each continued to posture in the bid for public sympathy. The Republican majority sought to embarrass Clinton by sending him four appropriations bills that he had promised to veto. Speaker Gingrich brought three of the four bills to the House floor for override attempts. The overrides had little chance of passing, as the bills had been passed via party-unity votes and few Democrats could be compelled to abandon Clinton's "principled" vetoes. The override attempts of the Commerce, State, and Justice (HR 2076), Defense (HR 1530), and Interior (HR 1977) bills all failed—as the GOP leadership expected them to. The Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Bob Livingston, summed up the leadership's strategy to reprove the President: "The Congress did its job. We sent the President three major funding bills that would have enabled Federal employees to return to work, but the President vetoed them. We are here once again attempting to send these people back to work."[37] However, while Republicans blamed the President for refusing to compromise, a closer reading of the bills indicated that the GOP leadership had retained the very programmatic cuts to which the President had objected, as outlined in his veto threats.

[35] Clinton, *Public Papers of the President*, 1853.

[36] Quoted in Ann Devroy and Eric Pianin, "Clinton Vetoes GOP's 7-Year Balanced Budget Plan," *The Washington Post*, 7 December 1995, A1.

[37] Quoted in Jerry Gray, "Battle over the Budget: The Legislation: House Fails to Override Veto of Spending Bills," *The New York Times*, 4 January 1996.

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It is impossible to discount the effect of the President's rhetoric on the eventual resolution of the crisis on his terms. From the time of his veto of the reconciliation bill through the end of December, Clinton made innumerable public comments, which apparently contributed to an upswing in his popularity as he sought to frame the conflict as a product of Republicans' intransigence. Indeed, some studies have concluded that esteem for Congress declines when the legislative branch challenges the president.[38] In December 1995, at the outset of the budget imbroglio, Clinton's job approval climbed above 50 percent. As the budget confrontation continued into the New Year, his approval reached 58 percent and peaked at 62 percent by mid-January. One irritated Senate Republican, Pete Domenici, contended that Clinton would not accede to the Republicans' demands because "it looks like they like what they're getting in the polls, and they don't want to take any risks."[39]

Gingrich and GOP House leaders clearly underestimated the President's influence from the bully pulpit. Not only had public esteem for Clinton increased, but the public progressively blamed congressional Republicans for the stalemate. "Part of the Republicans' strategy in the budget fight with President Clinton," *Washington Post* writer Jerry Gray argued, "has been to use the furloughed workers as leverage against the White House."[40] Frustrated Republicans, like Susan Molinari of New York, posited that "this is not *our* Government shutdown, this is *his* Government shutdown."[41] But the public was not persuaded. By early January of 1996, 44 percent of survey respondents blamed Republicans for the continuing budget impasse, while only 25 percent blamed Clinton. The numbers worsened for the GOP a little less than a week later, when one poll found that 50 percent approved of the way Clinton was handling the dispute, while less than a quarter approved of the Republicans' efforts.[42]

A large part of the Republicans' failure to cast Clinton as the primary obstructionist in the rhetorical blame game over the budget stemmed from a central dilemma for Congress. The "public speakership" has a difficult time competing with the vast media resources of the "public presidency." As the focal point of media attention, the president commands far more attention than the Speaker of the House. And as the nationally elected leader, the president can speak with a single voice and claim to be the spokesman

[38] Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht, "Explaining Congressional Approval," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (January 1997): 175–207.

[39] Quoted in Jerry Gray, "Political Leaders Make No Progress on a Budget Deal," *The New York Times*, 18 December 1995.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Quoted in Frank Rich, "Let 'Em Eat Vermeer," *The New York Times*, 10 January 1996. My emphasis.

[42] David Maraniss and Michael Weisskopf, "As Time Ebbs, Futility of Talks Starts to Dawn," *The Washington Post*, 21 January 1996, A1.

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for the national interest. These factors combined to strengthen Clinton's strategic position in the public arena. Clinton deftly manipulated his veto power alongside centrist rhetoric aimed at transcending a narrow partisan debate on budget details. Negative media coverage of how the budget impasse affected routine government services to tourists unable to access national parks turned the tide against the GOP leadership, which Clinton more or less successfully depicted as "extreme," intransigent, and self-aggrandizing. The President capitalized on his position in late January to reach an accord with Republicans, who eventually compromised on the specifics of the budget to Clinton's satisfaction.

Mitterrand, The Decrees Controversy, and Blame Game Politics

François Mitterrand's presidency represented the first *alternance* in the Fifth Republic. He was the first Socialist to win the Élysée.[43] He did so in 1981, on an ambitious agenda to nationalize certain industries and spur job growth. However, the failure of his economic plan to redress employment stagnation, followed by an about-face with austerity measures that looked more Thatcheresque than neo-Marxist, yielded a steady loss of public support three years into his *septennat*, or seven-year term.[44] With his public approval rating below 40 percent in advance of the regularly scheduled legislative elections in the spring of 1986, Mitterrand and the Socialists in the National Assembly saw the writing on the wall. The electorate stood poised to deal the President an opposition legislature—and the first cohabitation in the Fifth Republic.

To minimize their losses, the Socialists scrapped the traditional two-ballot majority vote and adopted proportional representation. The change was a success, insofar as the left's representation in Parliament was diminished but not decimated. The Socialists and Communists retained 247 of the 577 seats in the National Assembly and comprised a viable opposition. Nonetheless, the proportional scheme left the two parties of the right with a narrow three-seat majority between them with the support of several independents—155 seats for Jacques Chirac's *Rassemblement pour la République* (RPR) and 131 for former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's *Union pour la Démocratie Française* (UDF). The new electoral rules also enabled the extreme-right candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and his National Front Party to capture 35 seats. The RPR and UDF had no interest in allying themselves with the feisty Le Pen, who promised to engage in disruptive tactics that would add to the new Prime Minister's frustrations.

Mitterrand defied those who argued that he should resign now that he was confronted with an opposition legislature. He moved quickly to dispel

[43] Depending on where one classifies Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Mitterrand may also be considered the first non-Gaullist.

[44] For a detailed review, see Thomas Christofferson, *The French Socialists in Power, 1981-86: From Autogestion to Cohabitation* (Dover: University of Delaware Press, 1991).

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notions that the Fifth Republic was in crisis. He duly appointed Jacques Chirac, the leader of the largest block of deputies on the right, to the post of prime minister, and invited him to form a government. Mitterrand also let it be known that he would neither remain silent about nor facilitate the new majority's ambitious agenda, the core of which was to privatize a range of state-owned enterprises.

On 8 April 1986, Mitterrand addressed the opening session of Parliament.[45] He called to mind his institutional responsibilities and prerogatives, and accentuated to the deputies that he would respect "the Constitution, nothing but the Constitution, and all of the Constitution" and invited them to do the same.[46] He also sought to set limits on a range of acceptable legislative actions and procedures contemplated by the Prime Minister, even if he could not ultimately prevent the majority from enacting its agenda. He explicitly warned about intentions to legislate by decree:

> I think that decrees (*ordonnances*), as I have already stated, should not be used to backpedal on entitlements (*acquis sociaux*), should be limited in number, and enabling legislation sufficiently precise so that the Parliament and Constitutional Council can make clear decisions. I have conveyed this point to the Prime Minister as I was presented with two bills that will be examined tomorrow by the Council of Ministers.[47]

One of the measures to which Mitterrand referred was a proposal to transfer authority to the Ministry of the Economy, Finances, and Privatizations to de-nationalize sixty-five state-owned enterprises. Some of the corporations were historic icons of French *dirigisme* of the national economy, such as Saint Gobain (glass), banks including Parisbas (now BNP-Parisbas), the Compagnie d'Électricité de France (electricity), and the TF-1 television network. The next day, on 9 April, Chirac addressed both the National Assembly and the Senate and outlined his government's plans. He gave no indication that he had heard Mitterrand's words of caution. "The French people," the Prime Minister contended, "understand the dangers of state intervention and do not want it anymore."[48] And in that day's Council of Ministers meeting, Chirac offered up his plans to implement privatization by decree. Mitterrand flatly refused.

After the first Council of Ministers meeting, the Élysée quickly issued a communiqué that elucidated that Mitterrand would not assent to any decree

[45] All speeches, public comments, and communiqués issued by French presidents and prime ministers cited in this research are available on-line at *La Documentation française* at http://discours-publics.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr.

[46] François Mitterrand, "Message de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, adressé au Parlement, à l'occasion de l'ouverture de la session parlementaire, sur les pouvoirs respectifs du Président de la République, du Gouvernement et du Parlement," Paris, 8 April 1986. My translation.

[47] Ibid., my translation.

[48] Jacques Chirac, "Déclaration de politique générale de M. Jacques Chirac, Premier ministre, sur le programme du gouvernement, à l'Assemblée nationale," 9 April 1986. My translation.

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that, in his view, violated employee evaluation rules as the enterprises passed from the public to the private sector, or contained measures that were "contrary to the democratization" of the public sector.[49] Mitterrand also made it clear that he would not allow changes to electoral boundaries to be overhauled by decree, another agenda priority of the government. Nonetheless, on 10 April, the RPR–UDF majority (along with one National Front member and five independents) voted enabling legislation (*loi d'habilitation*) that authorized the government to legislate by decree relative to the denationalization project.

Thus, at the opening of the legislative session, the rhetorical battle between the Élysée and the Hôtel Matignon was joined. Through early June, Chirac made numerous television appearances to expound upon his government's plans to rapidly redress economic stagnation through privatizations and reform of social services. For his part, President Mitterrand appeared to anticipate disputes with Chirac and selectively used the bully pulpit to remind the Prime Minister, and the electorate, of his stance. In a key interview with the *International Herald Tribune*, Mitterrand recapitulated that while his institutional position had been weakened by cohabitation, his essential responsibility was to guard the nation's interests—and he retained sufficient constitutional powers to put the National Assembly on notice. When asked how he could affect the equilibrium of national institutions, he replied:

> I can dissolve the National Assembly and organize presidential elections or a referendum. As for the rest, I must respect the parliamentary majority—but that does not prevent me from making known to the country my opinion on issues that concern the general interest, both at home and abroad, without waging a petty personal war that would be of no use to anyone. You are, as well, familiar with the preeminent role of the President on foreign and defense policy, security, and for the respect of basic rights. This is not changed by electoral outcomes.[50]

Debates in academic and legal circles centered on whether the president was constitutionally obligated to sign decrees presented by the prime minister with parliamentary support. Proponents of a strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitution argued that the president's counter-signature is a *competence lié*—a constitutional responsibility that links the Élysée to the government and the legislature, and binds the president to sign.[51] Mitterrand, supported by many scholars, took the "presidentialist" interpretation that the

[49] François Mitterrand, "Déclaration du porte-parole de l'Elysée, en date du 9 avril 1986, sur l'usage des ordonnances envisagé par le gouvernement," 9 April 1986. My translation.

[50] François Mitterrand, "Interview accordée par M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, à l'International Herald Tribune, notamment sur les grandes écoles, les projets de privatization, le role et les pouvoirs du chef de l'État," *International Herald Tribune* interview, Paris, 28 May 1986. My translation.

[51] Yves Gaudemet, "Le president est tenu de signer," *Le Monde*, 18 April 1986, accessed at http://www.lemonde.fr, 15 September 2003.

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president's counter-signature is a discretionary power (*pouvoir discretionnaire*), since the Constitution does not set a time limit for signing.[52] General de Gaulle had seemed to endorse such an interpretation during a press conference on 31 July 1964, when he simply stated that the president either signs or does not sign decrees. Mitterrand himself had refused to sign a decree in 1982, when Socialists had majority control of the National Assembly.[53]

What arguably added to the fiery debate was that the use of decrees in the history of the Fifth Republic had been both relatively moderate and typically for issues that were far less controversial than the privatization of long-standing national industries.[54] Several decisions in late June and early July of 1986 by the Constitutional Council essentially endorsed Mitterrand's position, much to the consternation of the majority in the National Assembly.[55] Some on the right would even go so far as to suggest that Mitterrand had, for the first time in the Fifth Republic, arrogated a veto power.[56]

The timing of the decree controversy could scarcely have been worse for Jacques Chirac. Forcing the privatization issue on the legislative calendar in July gave President Mitterrand a superlative platform from which to rally the public, and Socialists in the legislature, against the project. Mitterrand took to *les petits écrans*—television—on Bastille Day, 14 July, in the annual address to the nation, which is the closest analogy to the U.S. president's State of the Union Address. He made his opposition to the privatization project clear and carefully admonished the Prime Minister and his parliamentary majority:

> Let me briefly recall that the present majority, which was elected on 16 March, wants to sell part of the national trust (*patrimoine national*) to private interests. That's the majority's opinion, not mine .... But it is critical to understand the scope of this proposal: Selling off sixty-five industrial and banking enterprises is enormous, just enormous .... In particular, the Constitutional Council has raised several objections, or rather demanded clarifications. The first, which is very important, I would sum up in this way: "You don't have the right to sell even a fraction of the national trust cheaper—not one franc less—than its value." Therefore, we have a real problem of evaluating worth.

Mitterrand then sought to elevate the debate to a different level and accentuate his supra-partisan responsibilities as president:

> The second principle elaborated by the Constitutional Council is this: "Be careful, you cannot harm the national interest," in other words, we cannot cede property

[52] Le Mong Nguyen, "Réflexions sur l'affaire des ordonnances," *Alternances: Review de l'association de recherché et d'études en science politique* 2 (juin 1986): 119–125.

[53] Pierre Avril and Jean Gicquel, "Chronique constitutionnel," *Pouvoirs* 23 (janvier–mars 1982): 193.

[54] See Didier Maus, "Les ordonnannances et la Constitution," *Regards sur l'actualité* 81 (mai 1981): 11–17.

[55] Bertrand Mathieu,"Le rôles respectifs du Parlement, du Président de la République et du Conseil constitutionnel dans l'édiction des ordonnances de l'article 38," *Revue française du droit administratif* 3 (septembre–octobre 1987): 700–722.

[56] "M. Mitterrand censuré par la majorité, M. Chirac critiqué par l'UDF," *Le Monde*, 30 July 1986, 2.

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> that belongs today to the Nation under the pretext of transferring such property to private or foreign interests .... But I have an additional responsibility: I am not only responsible for guaranteeing respect for the Constitution, but I am also the guarantor of national independence.

Mitterrand vigorously defended his decision to refuse to sign the decree by appealing to the symbolic value of state-owned enterprises and nationalistic sentiments that traversed partisan divides. All told, Mitterrand referred to the "national interest" nine times during his televised speech to cast doubt on the denationalization plans. He insisted that his refusal did not block the government from its plans. Rather, the legislation would have to be passed via the standard parliamentary route. Mitterrand contended that the Prime Minister should "not look to me, as I do not have this responsibility. It is up to Parliament to make laws."[57]

Chirac, loathe to engage in a protracted constitutional conflict over the decree power, moved quickly in late July to end the controversy and force parliamentary adoption of the bill. The longer the debate continued in the National Assembly, however, the more vociferous the criticism was from the Socialists. Moreover, the RPR's junior coalition partner, the UDF, evidenced signs of internal fissures over the denationalizations. After only fifty-five minutes of debate, Chirac decided to peg the responsibility of the government on the denationalization project to end deliberation and pass the bill. The motion of censure failed and the bill was adopted. Nonetheless the scars of the battle following Mitterrand's refusal to sign the decree left the Prime Minister's spokesman to cast the best light on the decision to fall back on majoritarian tactics to pass such a controversial bill. He blamed the President's staunch opposition to legislating by decree for Chirac's move, which was putatively aimed at avoiding a "shouting session" in the National Assembly.[58]

Mitterrand would use the refusal to sign decrees on other high-profile issues later in 1986, such as proposed changes to electoral boundaries, and would continue to criticize the government on hot-button issues such as immigration reform. In each case, he publicly cast the majority's legislative proposals as imprudent, ill-conceived, and hastily constructed. Mitterrand's deft use of rhetoric to criticize the opposition majority and inform the public of his unhappiness with the way the majority was handling national affairs, combined with his use of institutional rules, compelled Chirac to resort to extraordinary legislative tools—and had the effect of portraying the Prime Minister as brash and impetuous. The proof was evident in public approval ratings of Chirac, which began near 60 percent in the spring of 1986 and plummeted to just above

[57] François Mitterrand, "Interview de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, accordée à TF1 à l'occasion de la fête nationale, notamment sur son refus de signer l'ordonnance relative aux dénationalisations," Paris, 14 July 1986. My translation.

[58] "Les avatars de la cohabitation: M. Mitterrand a utilisé un fusil à un coup," *Le Monde*, 26 July 1986, 6.

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40 percent in advance of his bid for the presidency in the election of May 1988. Mitterrand's job approval, by contrast, rose from the low 40s when cohabitation first began to the low 60s by the time of the 1988 presidential and legislative elections.

Without the veto power, Mitterrand lost the policy battles of the first cohabitation. But Chirac and the right lost the next presidential election. Mitterrand's skillful manipulation of the media enabled him to reconstruct his image and move to the center of the electorate by 1988.[59] Running for reelection on a platform of "neither privatization nor nationalization," Mitterrand handily defeated Chirac for the Élysée. His subsequent dissolution of the National Assembly returned the left to power, at least until the next legislative elections in 1993.

Reflections on Bicameralism and the Blame Game

A brief, comparative examination of bicameral politics and presidential strategy under divided government reinforces the centrality of strategic disagreement in the United States. The analysis also shows how the French Senate can work to the advantage of right or center-right presidents, particularly if the prime minister's agenda includes proposals for constitutional change. The two examples that follow trace intercameral relations when the lower and upper chambers of the legislature were split. In the case of George W. Bush's standoff with the Democratic Senate over the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, the blame game deteriorated into strategic disagreement. The protracted deadlock was broken only by legislative elections that reversed partisan control of the Senate. In the case of Jacques Chirac's opposition to Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's agenda from 1997 to 2002, Senate Gaullists' solidarity with Chirac forced the government to bypass the upper chamber altogether on a number of laws. Most importantly, Chirac worked with the conservative majority in the Senate to block constitutional changes proposed by Jospin. Chirac's blame game with Jospin did not hamper most of the government's agenda, but was critical in renewing his presidential legitimacy following the disastrous decision to dissolve the National Assembly in 1997.

Bush, the Democratic Senate, and Strategic Disagreement over Homeland Security

Vermont Senator James Jeffords's stunning decision to leave the Republican Party in May 2001 and throw his support to the Democrats reversed GOP control of the upper chamber just five months into George W. Bush's presi-

[59] Didier Maus, "La cohabitation: Deux ou trois choses que je sais d'elle," *Revue politique et parlementaire* 955 (septembre/octobre 1991): 26–30.

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dency. Democratic control of the Senate not only complicated Bush's judicial appointments but also put him at odds with new majority leader, Tom Daschle, over the creation of the Department of Homeland Security—the largest reorganization of the federal bureaucracy in over a half century.

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Bush issued an executive order just a few weeks later creating an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) within the executive office of the president. But in the months to follow, many members of Congress contended that the Director of OHS, Tom Ridge, had inadequate human and financial resources, as well as a lack of authority, to effectively coordinate governmental anti-terrorist programs scattered across numerous agencies. As proposals for a full-scale governmental reorganization emerged on Capitol Hill, Bush preempted Congress in the spring of 2002 and launched his own effort to reorganize twenty-two agencies into a new Homeland Security Department.

The Republican-controlled House passed the President's plan swiftly by mid-summer. Senate action, however, became embroiled in debates about federal labor rules. Bush repeatedly called upon the Senate to follow the House's example and pass the legislation on his terms. The President insisted that he would not accept any Senate version of the legislation that did not accord him broad latitude on hiring, firing, and organizational authority in the new department. He issued a clear veto threat to that effect. Senate Democrats contended that Bush's demands were unprecedented and, if accorded, might serve as a blueprint to undo labor protections in other agencies.

The standoff between the White House and Senate Democrats continued from late July 2002 and was settled only after the midterm elections in early November. During these months, the whip count for the President's preferred provisions in the Senate evidenced a tie. All Republicans save for Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island favored the President's plan; all Democrats except Zell Miller of Georgia were opposed to it. During the three-month-long hiatus, Bush could therefore claim that *each and every Democrat* up for reelection was to blame for the delay in passage, since the White House was one vote short of victory.

Bush used this as a mantra in the run-up to the midterm elections. Between August and the end of October, he referred to the Senate deadlock over three dozen times on the campaign trail. He accused Democrats of being less interested in the security of the nation and more beholden to "special interests."[60] Democrats, for their part, staked out their position on the principle of federal employee workplace protections. Taking cues from the White House, Senate Republicans filibustered the Democrats' attempt to bring their version of the bill to the floor in lieu of the President's preferred bill. Neither the President nor Senate Democrats would budge on the issue. Each believed that the

[60] George W. Bush, speech in Trenton, New Jersey, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 27 September 2002, 1598.

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impasse had electoral advantage and could galvanize key constituencies in the November balloting.

Democrats lost the blame game definitively. The issue of national security and Bush's steadfast campaigning on the deadlock of the homeland security bill turned key Senate elections to the Republicans' favor, particularly in Missouri and Georgia.[61] The GOP picked up two seats in the upper chamber and re-took the majority. Admitting defeat, Democrats dropped their objections and the lame-duck session of the 107th Congress passed the reorganization on the President's terms.

Chirac and the Senate versus Jospin's "Plural Left": Resistance and Reform

The third cohabitation (1997–2002) was nothing less than a self-inflicted wound for Jacques Chirac. He dissolved the National Assembly a year in advance of scheduled legislative elections in order to "renew" the government's mandate. But the elections turned on the lack of popularity of Chirac's incumbent Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, and the President himself. Juppé's public approval had declined precipitously since his appointment in 1995. His job approval hovered in the mid-30s by spring of 1997 following a number of attempted reforms of the social security system that proved highly unpopular and led to national strikes. Moreover, Chirac's own job approval was only 40 percent when he made the fateful decision to disband Parliament. Many voters apparently perceived Chirac's move as a slapdash power grab. The electoral backlash resurrected the left, enabling the Socialists, Greens, and other smaller parties to win a majority referred to as the "plural left" or *gauche plurielle*. Worse yet for the President was the disarray of the right, including Chirac's RPR party, over which one of his principal rivals, Philippe Séguin, took control.[62]

The war of words between Chirac and the Prime Minister he was forced to appoint, Lionel Jospin, commenced immediately with the President's Bastille Day address to the nation in July 1997. The politically weakened President took responsibility for the electoral defeat. But he quickly sought to reassert his authority by stating that the Constitution essentially gives the president "the last word" on policy, even under cohabitation.[63] Jospin quickly issued a defiant rejoinder in a Council of Ministers meeting, citing, in particular, Article 20 of the Constitution, which clearly states that the gov-

[61] Andrew Busch, "National Security and the Midterm Elections of 2002" in Richard S. Conley, ed., *Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2005).

[62] Lara Marlowe, "France's Left Returns from the Dead," *The Irish Times*, 30 December 1997, 53.

[63] Jacques Chirac, "Intervention télévisée de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, le 14 juillet 1997, notamment sur les projets du Gouvernement Jospin, la nécessité de réduire le déficit budgétaire, les pouvoirs du Président de la République, la cohabitation," 14 July 1997.

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ernment determines the nation's policies.[64] The letter of the Constitution may have been in Jospin's favor, but the reality of the configuration of institutional power gave Chirac some decided advantages in the blame game that would develop.

For any majority of the left in the National Assembly, the Senate—with its built-in conservative bias—represents a more or less difficult obstacle to surmount.[65] But as one scholar observed, Lionel Jospin was "the prime minister in the most uncomfortable position of all prime ministers in the Fifth Republic."[66] Not only did he have to manage a loose coalition of Socialists, Communists, Greens, and independent groups on the left in the National Assembly, he also confronted a Gaullist Senate that stood squarely in line with Chirac's opposition to the government's agenda, whatever the extent of interparty disputes on the right in the upper chamber. Key to the Chirac–Senate axis of opposition was the appointment of conservative Christian Poncelet to the presidency of the Senate in 1998. Poncelet would spearhead a veritable revolt against the central objectives of the government's policies, including legislation authorizing civil unions for homosexuals.[67] It is little wonder that Jospin called the Senate "an anomaly among democracies" and an "upper chamber that is a relic of conservatism."[68]

The rhetorical battle between Chirac and Jospin is best described as "punch-counterpunch." Ever the grassroots campaigner, Chirac was most comfortable traveling around *la France profonde*—everyday France—to revitalize his image. His public criticisms of the government were typically followed by Jospin's rejoinders.[69] On the institutional terrain, Senate opposition to the government's social reforms—with Chirac's blessing—forced Jospin to resort to the extraordinary measure of using Article 45 of the Constitution to adopt laws despite the objections of the upper chamber. As Marie-France Verdier reports, with Chirac's support, the Senate categorically rejected bills concerning social security, government appropriations, youth employment, immigration reform, and the thirty-five-hour work week.[70] Between 1997 and 1998, twenty-one conference committees were established to iron out interchamber differences, but fifteen failed to reach agreement, with the National Assembly forcing a second reading (and passage). Similarly, between 1998 and 1999,

[64] Olivier Schrameck, *Matignon Rive Gauche: 1997-2001* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001), 95.

[65] Didier Maus, "Le Sénat, l'Assemblée nationale et le Gouvernement," *Pouvoirs* 44 (janvier 1988): 119–130.

[66] Marie-France Verdier, "La IIIe cohabitation ou le retour aux sources du Sénat?" *Revue politique et parlementaire* 997 (janvier-février 1998): 74–88. My translation.

[67] Robert Elgie, "La cohabitation de longue durée: Studying the 1997-2002 Experience," *Modern & Contemporary France* 10 (August 2002): 297–311.

[68] Quoted in Alain Laquièze, "Histoire du bicaméralisme en France," *Revue politique et parlementaire* 1007 (juillet–août 2000): 12–28. My translation.

[69] Elgie, "La cohabitation de longue durée," 307–308.

[70] Verdier, "La IIIe cohabitation," 84–85.

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twelve of eighteen conference committees failed to find common ground, compelling the government to have the last word.[71]

The interchamber discord was unique for periods of cohabitation, inasmuch as open warfare between the National Assembly and the Senate had not occurred from 1986 to 1988 or 1993 to 1995. In those instances, Socialist President Mitterrand was the sole *résistant*: Prime Ministers Chirac and Édouard Balladur, respectively, worked with the right/center-right majorities in the Senate to carefully avoid having recourse to Article 45. This enabled the government to present a more unified front against Mitterrand's critiques.

Chirac and his Senate colleagues were most successful in blocking institutional reforms. Senate recalcitrance derailed several important institutional and constitutional changes envisioned by the left, including the accumulation of political offices (*cumul des mandats*), judicial reform, and the adoption of the European Charter on Regional Languages. The Senate vetoed an organic law that would have limited the types of political offices senators could concurrently hold.[72] Chirac dickered with Jospin over judicial reform, but ultimately withdrew the convocation of a *Congrès* to hold a vote on a constitutional amendment when it became clear that Senate Gaullists' opposition would preclude a three-fifths majority.[73] Finally, Chirac referred the matter of the European Charter of Regional Languages to the Constitutional Council, which found the directive incompatible with the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.[74] Chirac used the Council's decision to refute Jospin's position, arguing that he would not "undertake any constitutional reform initiative that would harm the fundamental principles of the Republic."[75]

Despite the destabilizing effect of the 1997 elections on the Élysée, Chirac utilized the longest cohabitation in the history of the Fifth Republic to reformulate his role into the suprapartisan "guardian of the Constitution." He did so through several mechanisms, including careful coordination with partisans in the Senate to frustrate the government's reform initiatives and his prerogative to call for the Constitutional Council's review of legislation. In sum, the president's ability to halt constitutional reform enables him to retain a powerful role in the institutional game.[76] For Chirac, his rehabilitation in the court of public opinion took five years. His job approval climbed from lows of

[71] Didier Maus, "Le Parlement et les cohabitations," *Pouvoirs* 91 (novembre 1991): 76.

[72] Any proposed law that changes the Senate's powers and prerogatives must obtain that chamber's consent.

[73] Schrameck, *Matignon: Rive-Gauche*, 113–116.

[74] Gérard Courtois, "La Charte des langues régionales est jugée non conforme à la Loi fondamentale par le Conseil constitutionnel," *Le Monde*, 18 June 1999, accessed at www.lemonde.fr, 15 September 2003.

[75] Quoted in Cécile Chambraud and Béatrice Jérôme, "M. Chirac refuse à M. Jospin la révision constitutionnelle pour la protection des langues régionales," *Le Monde*, 25 June 1999. My translation. Accessed at www.lemonde.fr, 15 September 2003.

[76] Hugues Portelli, "Arbitre ou chef de l'opposition?" *Pouvoirs* 91 (novembre 1991): 69.

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38 percent before the dissolution to the mid-50s by the time of the 2002 election, and he was eventually able to overtake Jospin's popularity.

Conclusions

This article has demonstrated the potential for comparing executive–legislative relations in the United States and France—two systems with separated institutional structures and recent experiences with divided government. The focus on blame game politics is consistent with elements of the "new institutionalism" perspective. Formal rules matter for explaining divergent policy outcomes in the two countries. The veto power in the United States and its loose analogies in France (counter-signing decrees, constitutional change) fundamentally shape the degree to which presidents can moderate or block policies to which they are opposed. At the same time, the analysis emphasizes presidents' use of informal prerogatives to frame disagreements in their blame game with an opposition legislature, to build public sympathy against policies, and to prevail in the public relations and electoral arenas.

The first set of empirical cases suggests that while Speaker Newt Gingrich and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac were well within their formal, constitutional authority to press their majority's agenda, the presidents they confronted were skillful in exploiting missteps and attempts by the legislative leaders to upstage them in the court of public opinion. Neither Gingrich nor Chirac could neutralize the president's public criticism, and they apparently underestimated the president's privileged position vis-a-vis the national media. In other words, as Marie-Eve Malouines notes in the case of Chirac, they misjudged the president's *force de la parole*—the power of his words and rhetoric, and misjudged the difficulty in offsetting or overtaking the White House's or Élysée's advantages of the bully pulpit.[77] The reelection victories of both Clinton and Mitterrand following two years of institutional combat reinforce this point.

Evaluating presidential success in the second set of case studies obliges nuance. The president in both systems seems to have gained the upper hand in the blame game with the aid of bicameral politics, though policy outcomes differed dramatically. Bush earned a narrow Republican Senate after the elections of 2002 and won the reorganization of the federal government on his terms. But what was the cost of strategic disagreement for homeland security? It is arguable that the price of the three- or four-month stalemate between the White House and Senate Democrats was the delay of vital efforts in interagency coordination at a critical juncture in time.[78]

[77] Marie-Eve Malouines, *Deux hommes pour un fauteuil: Chronique de la cohabitation, 1997-2001* (Paris: Fayard, 2001).

[78] Richard S. Conley, "The War on Terrorism and Homeland Security: Presidential and Congressional Struggles" in Bryan Hilliard, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson, eds., *George W. Bush: Evaluating the President at Midterm* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004).

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In France, Chirac was unsuccessful in halting the Jospin government's agenda, and at times, he even sought to share in the credit for popular policy accomplishments such as the thirty-five-hour work week.[79] He was most successful in blocking constitutional change. Ultimately, cohabitation may have benefited Chirac in ways he could not have predicted. He was no longer constrained by the internal bickering in the RPR, he was no longer compelled to support the unpopular reform efforts of Alain Juppé, the opposition government's program provided an opportunity to differentiate his vision from that of the left, and he found solace in the "statesman" role of the presidency. His manipulation of institutional and public politics helped rehabilitate his image. The very weakness of his position after 1997 may have marshaled public sympathy. His public approval increased over the five-year cohabitation period, and eventually surpassed Jospin's by the 2002 election.[80] At the same time, Chirac's showing in the first round of the presidential election—at just 19.9 percent of the popular vote—was the worst for any incumbent president in the Fifth Republic. The only definitive conclusion to draw is that voters may have liked cohabitation more than they liked either Chirac or Jospin individually.

In sum, the analysis accentuates the disjuncture between presidential policy, rhetorical success, and electoral success under divided government in the two systems. When divided government intersects with different formal powers of the president, the relative advantages of each constitutional arrangement for executive power become clearer. In France, the president is not helpless under cohabitation, but his ability to act as a "veto player"[81] and to delay or block legislation is contingent upon prime ministerial actions (for example, decree requests), the partisan configuration of the National Assembly and Senate, and the nature of the government's agenda (organic laws or constitutional revisions). He seeks to carefully manage public relations and to criticize the majority while appearing to be above the fray of partisan politicking, even as he may work behind the scenes to cultivate partisan opposition in the legislature. But winning the rhetorical battle against an opposition prime minister is little compensation in policy terms. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic was established to avoid legislative paralysis, and the French presidents' misgivings about the majority's policies notwithstanding, considerable policy shifts—from the social realm to denationalizations—have been the result of divided government in the last two decades. Parliament's responsibility for such policy changes is clear.

In the United States, the president's veto power fundamentally alters the nature of the blame game and gives him a decided advantage against an opposition legislature. Using the veto in conjunction with the rhetorical levers

[79] Elgie, "La cohabitation de longue durée."

[80] Philippe Méchet, "Jacques Chirac/Lionel Jospin: 7 ans après, 5 ans plus tard" in Sofres, *L'État de l'opinion* (Paris: Seuil, 2002).

[81] See George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Institutional Analysis," *Governance* 13 (October 2000): 441–474.

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of their office, U.S. presidents are usually better placed in the institutional setting to prevail in strategic disagreement—at least with respect to the cases examined here.[82] While strategic disagreement may galvanize partisan electorates, the drawback is the possibility of policy paralysis that can inflict significant damage on day-to-day governmental operations (for example, the budget shutdown of 1996/97) or on short- and long-term imperatives (for example, homeland security). And it is more difficult for the electorate to assign blame or credit for policy changes or stalemate. Divided government in the United States is more likely to obscure responsibility.

The constitutional frameworks in the American and French Republics are remarkable, insofar as they have proven pliable enough to allow presidents to adapt to changing policy-making contexts and shifting balances in institutional power, despite important differences in formal powers. In neither country did the principal Founders envision a presidency-centered regime. It may be argued that the advent of cohabitation in the Fifth Republic is more in line with the expectations of parliamentary-centered policy making than de Gaulle's "hyperpresidentialism." Similarly, the temporary deadlock and slow movement on policy making in the American context would probably not surprise James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, or other constitutional architects who favored legislative government.

With the two systems' Founders in mind, of greater normative concern may be the increased reliance of modern presidents in the United States and France on the rhetorical arms of the office. The American Founders were particularly apprehensive about the potential for "demagoguery" in the presidency. France has a long history of plebiscitarian politics dating to Napoléon Bonaparte—an era of unrivaled glory according to some, an era of disastrous militarism to others. Regardless, given the importance of media politics in the new millennium, how presidents play the rhetorical game and manipulate the public presidency surely must be one criterion in scholars' evaluation of their success. Whether it is more or less important than the imprint they leave on actual policy outcomes is an open question for political scientists and historians alike.

[82] Cases in which the U.S. president was in a particularly weak position might include Harry Truman during the 80th Congress, when the conservative coalition of the majority Republicans in Congress and Southern Democrats were able to trump a number of his vetoes.

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THE MEANING OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

Edited by Robert Y. Shapiro

This volume offers appraisals of democracy, institutions, and rights. A section is devoted to analyzing what has transpired from September 11, 2001 through the subsequent war in Iraq. The book also examines 2004 elections, and concludes with a historical and further normative perspective on current politics and challenges to American democracy.

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The Structural Causes of Trusting Relationships: Why Rivals Do Not Overcome Suspicion Step by Step

AARON M. HOFFMAN

If Israel and the Palestinians restarted their peace process, how would they overcome their suspicion of one another and form a trusting relationship? A prominent response is that actors develop trusting relationships gradually by probing each other's trustworthiness in a series of increasingly stringent tests. This paper challenges the efficacy of such incremental strategies on the grounds that they force actors to expose themselves to exploitation *before* their counterparts demonstrate their trustworthiness, and offers an alternative approach that relies on the capacity of rules ("institutions") to limit opportunistic behavior.

Trusting relationships emerge when suspicious parties limit the consequences of exploitation. Governments will not transfer control over their interests to others if doing so creates a significant risk of domination by former rivals or loss of political office to internal opponents. These dangers can be reduced by designing institutions that guarantee potential trustors the ability to influence collective choices ("effective voice") and that enable leaders to make decisions without undermining their standing among their supporters ("breathing space").

I examine the plausibility of this argument through a case study of governance in the European Community (EC) from the 1957 Treaty of Rome (TOR) to the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. The EC (now European Union) is arguably the most important example of successful conflict resolution in the twentieth century, seen by policymakers as a model for resolving long-standing interstate conflicts.[1] The European case was also a relatively easy one for trust-building strategies to succeed: U.S. troops on the Continent

[1] See, for example, Shimon Peres and Arye Naor, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt), 11.

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after WWII meant that destruction was not one of penalties for misplaced trust that EC member states had to contemplate. Nevertheless, step-by-step approaches produced few gains, casting doubt on their effectiveness under more trying conditions.

Trust, Trusting Relationships, and Cooperation

At its core, *trust* refers to an actor's *perception* that it may safely delegate control over its interests to others (that is, potential trustees) under certain circumstances.[2] This perception is rooted in the belief that potential trustees will protect the interests placed in their care even if some of their own interests suffer.[3] When I say I trust my sister to look after my son, I mean that I think that my sister will put my child's welfare ahead of her own while he is under her care. I consider my sister to be a *trustworthy* babysitter. However, my sister is an untrustworthy oral surgeon because she lacks medical training. Others might be untrustworthy because they are unwilling to protect interests placed under their control even though they possess the skills to operate. Trust is situational: actors that are trustworthy in one instance might be untrustworthy in another.[4]

Trusting relationships are behavioral manifestations of trust. They emerge when actors delegate control over their interests to others, in part because they believe in the dependability and rectitude of their counterparts. Both *trusting attitudes* and *delegation* are necessary for trusting relationships; neither is sufficient in itself, and the presence of one cannot explain the presence of the other. When I leave my son with my sister, I act on my trust in her and, in so doing, create a trusting relationship. Yet, I do not *entrust* my son's welfare to my sister all the time, even though my faith in her caregiving remains constant. I enjoy caring for my son myself and do not ask for help whenever my sister is available. I create a trusting relationship with my sister only when I transfer control over my son's welfare to her.

The distinction between trust and trusting relationships is a meaningful one. For example, it captures the difference between U.S. President George W.

[2] Annette Baier, "Trust and Antitrust," *Ethics* 96 (January 1986): 231–260; James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 91–103; Russell Hardin, "Conceptions and Explanations of Trust" in Karen S. Cook, ed., *Trust in Society* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 3–39; Niklas Luhmann, *Trust and Power* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979), 4–82.

[3] Bernard Barber, *The Logic and Limits of Trust* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 9; Aaron M. Hoffman, "A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 8 (September 2002): 375–401; Martin Hollis, *Trust Within Reason* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 70; Bernhardt Lieberman, "i-Trust: A Notion of Trust in Three-Person Games and International Affairs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 8 (September 1964): 271–280; David M. Messick and Roderick M. Kramer, "Trust as a Form of Shallow Morality" in Cook, ed., *Trust in Society*, 89–118.

[4] Barber, *The Logic*, 17.

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Bush's statement that he "found [Russian President Vladimir Putin] to be very straightforward and trustworthy" and decisions by the Bush administration to entrust U.S. interests to Russia. In the study of international politics, we are typically less interested in trust than in trusting relationships, because the latter describes situations in which governments make trust *matters of policy*. Trust is a cognitive notion. Trusting relationships involve actions.

Conceptualizing trusting relationships as a mixture of delegation and trusting attitudes is superior to definitions that equate trusting relations with arrangements that simply create the possibility of exploitation.[5] Actors may expose themselves to exploitation for reasons that are unrelated to trust. For example, in 1999, eight oil workers in Ecuador were kidnapped and ransomed for $3.5 million. Oil company representatives "gambled with a low bid of $500,000" and lost, when the kidnappers killed a hostage.[6] Definitions that equate trust with risk taking would count the oil company's wager as a case of trusting relations even though the negotiators did not premise their behavior on beliefs about the trustworthiness of the kidnappers. In contrast, the notion of trusting relationships described above would not make the same mistake because of its sensitivity to the reasons actors take chances on the behavior of others.

Emphasizing the combination of delegation and trusting attitudes also distinguishes trusting relationships from other forms of cooperation. Interstate cooperation typically lacks at least one of these characteristics. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated to control the growth of their nuclear arsenals without either delegating control over their interests to one another or believing in the other's trustworthiness. Cooperation remained viable between the superpowers because in the absence of trust, the United States and the USSR developed costly monitoring devices that helped protect their interests from harm.

Actors prefer trusting relationships to nontrusting forms of cooperation because the latter require more-extensive and, therefore, more-expensive monitoring devices. Compare the border security requirements between Israel and Egypt and the United States and Canada. In order to secure their 1973 cease-fire, Israel and Egypt required UN intervention at a cost of approximately $75 million per year.[7] In contrast, the United States and Canada spend less to defend their common border because they trust one another.

Efficiency gains notwithstanding, it is not easy to foster trusting interstate relationships. Fewer safeguards means that trusting relationships offer more opportunities for exploitation than do nontrusting relations. Enemies sense the dangers of exploitation intensely and fear giving one another the chance to

[5] See, for example, Coleman, *Foundations*, 91.

[6] Juan Forero, Marlise Simons, Joseph B. Treaster, and Sam Howe Verhovik, "Kidnapping with Money as the Only Object," *The New York Times*, 30 June 2001.

[7] Data drawn from the United Nations website, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/co_mission/unefii.htm, accessed 17 June 2004.

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harm their interests. Still, suspicion is not intractable, even in interstate relations in which former rivals, such as the United States and Canada, the United States and Mexico, Israel and Jordan, and Sweden and Denmark, all entrust their interests to one another to varying degrees. So long as their interests overlap, strategies that enable actors to overcome their suspicion of one another are available.[8] The question is what works?

Fostering Trusting Relationships: Two Strategies

In this section, I lay out two methods of fostering trusting relationships among suspicious parties. The first approach is premised on the idea that trustworthiness is a characteristic that actors reveal to one another gradually in repeated interactions. Trusting relationships are thought to emerge from a process of experiential learning. The second approach suggests that trusting relationships develop when changes are made to the incentives that make exploitation more attractive than loyalty. I discuss these strategies below.

Incremental Strategies

Incremental or step-by-step strategies foster trusting relations gradually, often through formal agreements designed to elicit cooperation in stages, starting with issues that are relatively easy to solve and ending with the hardest issues.[9] The "Road Map," the George W. Bush administration's plan for resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is prototypical of incremental strategies. The Road Map attempts to resolve the dispute at the heart of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in three stages. In stage one, the Road Map specifies that the Palestinian Authority must, among other things, "immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence" and issue an unambiguous statement regarding Israel's right to exist. Meanwhile, Israel must withdraw its forces from Palestinian lands occupied after 28 September 2000 and dismantle settlements erected since March 2001. The most intractable issues of settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem are not tackled until the plan's final stage.

By starting with issues that are relatively easy to resolve, plans like the Road Map attempt to replace the fear of exploitation with a gathering wave of trust that enables disputants to resolve the most contentious issues in their relationships. The underlying idea is that trusting relationships are learned responses

[8] When incompatible interests drive conflicts, trust is irrelevant, because actors lack incentives to resolve their differences cooperatively.

[9] Roger Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict" in Roger Fisher, ed., *International Conflict and Behavioral Science* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), 91–109; Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," *World Politics* 49 (April 1997): 371–400; Andrew Kydd, "Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation," *International Organization* 54 (Spring 2000): 325–358; Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 45; Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), 85–183.

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to the behavior of others: previously reliable actors can be trusted in the future; unreliable actors cannot.

The learned aspect of trust makes it possible for actors to change their reputations for trustworthiness in a series of tests that force them to choose between the long-term benefits of reliability and the short-term benefits of perfidy.[10] Initial tests start with issues of relatively small significance,[11] because the costs of exploitation are relatively minor, reducing the concerns that suspicious parties have about betrayal.[12] Subsequent tests involve increasingly important issues, until actors are convinced that they can safely transfer control over their core interests to one another.

The success of incremental strategies depends on the ability of small tests to separate trustworthy from untrustworthy actors—a tall order. The problem is that tests on relatively insignificant issues are not costly enough to convince suspicious parties that their counterparts can be trusted as the benefits of exploitation increase. As long as future rewards for opportunism exceed present benefits, which they must when issues are arrayed from least significant to most significant, actors have incentives to feign trustworthiness in order to position themselves to exploit their counterparts when the payoffs for doing so are greatest.

Observable implications. Incremental trust-building strategies posit that trusting relationships develop after actors demonstrate their willingness to protect their counterparts' interests in situations that present temptations to betray those interests. However, if arraying issues from easiest to hardest is flawed, we should expect incremental trust-building strategies to break down as the interests actors have at stake increase in value. The timing of these failures should coincide with the penultimate stage of formal trust-building processes.

When actors attempt to foster trusting relationships informally, failures at the penultimate stage are less likely, because participants have less sense of their place in the overall process. In these situations, theory suggests that actors rely on their counterparts' record of compliance with group decisions to assess trustworthiness, for it is through compliance with group decisions that actors demonstrate their willingness to either exploit situations for their own gain or pursue a course that benefits the group.[13]

Finally, it is reasonable to expect that leaders' calculations will be influenced by incremental approaches. When incremental approaches work, we can expect leaders to point to the influence of retrospective assessments of their counterparts' behavior in their decision making. A corollary is that leaders will place less emphasis on the conditions under which future interactions will

[10] Schelling, *The Strategy*.

[11] Osgood, *An Alternative*, 8.

[12] Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict"; Schelling, *The Strategy*.

[13] George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (Summer 1996): 379–406.

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take place, that is, prospective factors, than they place on the past behavior of others.

Institutional Strategies

Institutional approaches suggest that the greatest barriers to trusting relationships are situations that reward opportunism.[14] Actors recognize that trusting relationships pose an irreducible danger of exploitation. Nevertheless, actors will risk betrayal so long as grave injuries will not result from misplaced trust. Consequently, for trusting relationships to develop, potential trustors require safeguards that limit their potential trustees' capacity to exploit them severely.

In interstate relations, the two big fears that inhibit trusting relationships are the fear of domination and the fear of electoral loss. Domination implies a threat from abroad, in which a state (or states) eliminates the autonomy of another. Electoral loss implies a threat from within, in which internal groups muster enough support to remove leaders from office. Both threats are significant because they strike at that which actors care for most in politics: their power.

Institutions designed to protect the external and internal power of governments can alleviate the fears that inhibit trusting relationships by limiting the negative consequences of cooperation.[15] In other words, institutions are available that are capable of substantially reducing the capacity of actors to inflict serious injury on one another. Mechanisms (for example, voting rules) that provide actors with reliable opportunities to participate in and influence collective choice reduce the potential for domination.[16] Actors that possess "effective voice" can defend themselves against domination over the long run by preventing others from undermining their interests.[17]

Supplying others effective voice not only promotes trusting relationships by enabling actors to defend their interests, it also communicates the provider's willingness to employ restraint. Institutions are never perfect solutions to

[14] See, for example, George A. Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 84 (August 1970): 488–500; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 65–109.

[15] See Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43 (April 1991): 336–366, and Lisa L. Martin and Beth Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization* 52 (Autumn 1998): 729–758, for discussions of the problems that plague international cooperation.

[16] Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Masstricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," *Security Studies* 5 (Spring 1996): 261–305; G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 50–79.

[17] This is not to say that actors with effective voice will always be able to influence group decisions. Rather, actors with effective voice can expect their influence to be felt often, and not just on nonessential decisions.

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insecurity, and therefore it is helpful when actors signal their intention to avoid behaving in ways that might undermine their partners' welfare, should the opportunity to do so arise.[18]

In addition to the fear of domination, governments are also concerned about the electoral consequences of international choices. When states change the nature of their relations with long-standing rivals, they create opportunities for internal opposition groups to mobilize support against the leadership. Because leaders value their positions, the stronger the potential domestic opposition to international cooperation, the less attractive that option becomes. Overcoming this barrier to trusting relationships involves structuring cooperative relations in ways that limit the capacity of internal opposition groups to undermine their respective leaders. "Side payments" that help leaders maintain their supporters' loyalty and prevent the defection of "swing voters" are the most widely cited way politicians protect one another against domestic opponents. However, any agreement that restricts the capacity of internal groups to challenge the leadership's political standing will help make trusting relationships more attractive.

Observable implications. Institutional arguments imply that trusting relationships should emerge once governments provide one another effective voice in group decisions and develop mechanisms that insulate leaders from domestic political pressures. In other words, the timing of trusting relationships should be proximate to the development of institutional safeguards that protect actors from catastrophic losses in the event they are exploited. Institutions that do not provide these protections will not produce trusting relationships.

When institutions play a decisive role in the formation of trusting relationships, leaders will emphasize the importance of rules, norms, and principles during their deliberations. A corollary is that leaders will place less emphasis on their counterparts' records of reliability. Instead, leaders will be primarily concerned with the constraints on future interactions.

Research Design

Incremental and institutional approaches each imply that trusting relationships develop in response to distinct sequences of events. Because the causal mechanisms underlying the strategies also differ—incremental approaches suggest that retrospective learning is decisive for trusting relationships, whereas institutional approaches suggest that principles, rules, and norms control the process—it is possible to assess the efficacy of each approach.

[18] Zeev Maoz and Dan S. Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, and the Theory of International Cooperation," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (June 1987): 177–200; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 357–369.

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In this section, I discuss the research design I employed to test the ability of incremental and institutional approaches to explain the decision by EC member states to entrust the governance of their cooperation to one another. I begin by focusing on measurement issues, particularly the strategy I used to identify trusting relationships.

The Dependent Variable: Measuring Trusting Relationships in EC Governance

States empower others to govern their cooperative relations when they provide those actors the capacity to make and implement collective decisions on their behalf. This implies that individual states cannot unilaterally scuttle group decisions at either the decision-making or implementing stages of the policy-making process.

In deliberative bodies, such as the EC's Council of Ministers, states relinquish the capacity to nullify collective decisions by giving up the power to unilaterally veto group decisions, by providing their counterparts with independent revenue for implementing collective decisions, and by establishing mechanisms to enforce compliance with group decisions. States that surrender their formal vetoes over group decisions agree to be bound by decisions with which they disapprove. Independent revenues, that is, revenues that are not controlled by any particular party to an agreement, facilitate the implementation of group policies by creating incentives for actors to comply. Finally, states that create supranational armies ensure that group decisions can be enforced even over the objections of particular parties.[19] Table 1 describes how the combination of the trusting attitude and the forms of delegation discussed above produces trusting relationships over the governance of interstate cooperation.

This measurement strategy suggests that low-level trusting relationships emerged in the EC in 1986 with the signing of the SEA. Prior to the SEA, EC member states refused to grant one another control over Community governance. Each state's de facto veto over Community policy enabled them to defend their interests in the Council. Meanwhile, the TOR specified that the independent European Commission had responsibility for proposing and implementing Community policies. A series of developments, culminating with the SEA, altered this governing arrangement. The SEA (re)introduced qualified-majority voting (QMV) in the Council, enabling a supermajority of states to make decisions on behalf of those in the minority. The member states also took over the Commission and its functions, ensuring member state dominance over the definition and management of Community development (member states provided the Community its "own resources" in 1970).

[19] Although it is relatively rare for independent states to create supranational armies, such steps are not unheard of in world history. The decision by the American states to create a federal army in 1789, before their union was consolidated, is probably the best-known example.

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TABLE 1

Operational Rules for Identifying Trusting Relationships and Their Intensity

Trusting Relationships (DV)	*Trusting Attitudes?*	*Majority Voting?*	*Independent Revenues?*	*Supranational Army?*
Non-trusting	Yes/No[a]	No	No	No
Low	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
High	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

DV, dependent variable.
[a]See note 20.

Interviews I conducted in January 2003 with Belgian and Dutch participants in the negotiations over the SEA suggest that European heads of state and government trusted one another when they agreed to delegate control over their interests. As one interviewee told me, those that crafted the SEA "were not only colleagues, but also friends and there was confidence and trust between [them]." For these reasons, I identify the SEA as the moment in Community development when low-level trusting relationships emerged among the member states. (EC member states made little progress toward a Community-wide armed force.)

It is worth noting that this interpretation of the SEA differs from those that suggest concern for "credible commitments" drove the agreement.[21] Credibility problems arise when actors face ex ante difficulties convincing others of their determination to fulfill their promises because of incentives that make promise breaking attractive.[22] Commitments solve the credibility problem by eliminating the freedom actors have to violate their agreements.[23]

When actors make credible commitments, they remove the need for trust on those issues: trusting relationships involve the risk of betrayal, and commitments eliminate that risk. In the EC case, however, the member states introduced QMV (the mechanism of credible commitment) *before* they knew the issues to which it would apply.[24] This is surprising because theories of credible commitments suggest that actors pressure others to relinquish control only over those issues on which they expect to benefit from collaboration. Instead, proponents of QMV, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, made it possible

[20] Because trusting relationships combine actions with attitudes, actors can trust one another without producing trusting relationships.

[21] Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 314–378; Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht," *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993): 1–39.

[22] James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49 (Summer 1995): 379–414.

[23] Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 228.

[24] Moravcsik, *The Choice*, 376.

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for others to force them to accept resolutions that cut against their interests. In short, they accepted the uncertainty that goes hand in hand with trusting relationships.

Gauging the Effectiveness of Incremental and Institutional Trust-building Strategies

I use two strategies to assess the efficacy of incremental and institutional trust-building strategies. First, I examine whether the sequence of events in the European case is consistent with the sequences predicted by the respective theories. When states use formal incremental trust-building strategies, trusting relationships should develop during the final stages of the process. When states use institutional strategies, trusting relationships should emerge once the parties guarantee one another effective voice in group decisions and insulate their leaders from domestic political pressures.

States possess effective voice when formal voting rules and/or informal decision-making norms permit the least powerful states to influence collective decisions. Institutions insulate leaders from domestic political pressures when they permit governments to avoid or alleviate costs to their citizens produced by involvement in group projects.

Second, I examine whether the mechanisms thought to cause trusting relationships operated in the EC case. As I argued, incremental approaches assume that experiential learning drives trusting relationships. If this is true, there should be evidence that leaders relied on retrospective assessments of their counterparts' policy making in calculating the costs and benefits of trusting relationships. In contrast, institutional approaches are premised on the notion that trusting relationships develop in response to the introduction of devices that protect governments against catastrophic losses. Prospective assessments are critical. Therefore, we would expect to find evidence that leaders emphasized rules and normative pressures in their decision making.

Governance in the European Community: A History

In this section, I detail the change in the dependent variable from the nontrusting arrangement established by the EC member states in 1957 to the low-level trusting relationship that emerged under the SEA. I begin by detailing the EC's initial design and planned evolution as envisioned by its founders in the TOR. This discussion serves two purposes. First, it shows what *non*trusting cooperative relations initially looked like among EC member states. In 1957, distrust of one another led Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands ("The Six") to make the Commission, an independent organization, responsible for directing Community development and overseeing the Community's day-to-day operations, rather than the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. Concerned that their counterparts would use their author-

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ity for selfish purposes, The Six took steps to ensure that a neutral arbiter made policy in the best interests of the Community.

Second, the discussion of the Treaty of Rome provides a baseline against which to measure subsequent changes to Community governance that made it possible for the member states to entrust their interests to one another. Had the member states maintained the course they set for themselves in 1957, they would have delegated governing authority to the supranational Commission through the mechanism of QMV. However, the Community never fully realized the TOR's plan. The 1965 "empty chair" crisis crippled the transfer of power to the Commission by forcing the de facto return of the national veto over Commission proposals. Other, less-dramatic changes also took place that strengthened the members' control over Community governance: responsibility for providing the Community's strategic vision shifted to the European Council, a body of European heads of state and government; the member states established a permanent committee of their own representatives to mediate the relationship between the Council and the Commission; and the member states undermined the Commission's independence by sending defenders of their national interests to serve as commissioners. The transformation of EC governance comprises the latter portion of the discussion below.

Suspicion and Governance under the Treaty of Rome

The TOR divided responsibility for governing Community relations among four organizations: the Commission, the Council of Ministers (Council), the Court of Justice, and the Assembly.[25] Of these organizations, the TOR conferred special responsibility on the Commission and the Council, the two bodies expected to play the greatest role in Community development. In contrast, the Parliament received relatively few powers and the Court was expected to play the limited role of policing the Community's legal boundaries.

The Commission's job was to manage the daily functioning and growth of the customs union at the heart of the Community design. Article 155 required the Commission to implement Community rules, formulate proposals to develop the common market, offer recommendations and opinions on matters germane to the TOR, and participate in the preparation of acts of the Council and of the Assembly in an effort to advance the Community's interests. Furthermore, the Commission's near monopoly on the right to select and table proposals for member state consideration gave it a commanding position over the shape and direction of EC development.

Given its importance, the TOR tried to protect the Commission's independence from member state influence and ensure that it operated in the general interest of the Community. Article 157 required that commissioners be se-

[25] For text, see *Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community* (Belgium: United Nations Publications, 1958).

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lected on the basis of their general competence and "indisputable independence"; commissioners had to discharge their duties in the "general interests of the Community" and with "complete independence"; commissioners were barred from "seek[ing] or accept[ing] instructions from any Government or other body," and member states could not influence commissioners in the performance of their duties.

The Commission's independence was a holdover from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which also insulated the High Authority, the Commission's predecessor, from member state influence. In 1950, France saw an independent High Authority as protection against future German domination of the coal–steel pool and the associated threat of war on the Continent. In 1957, fear of cheating led the member states to make the Commission independent in an effort to "lock in" credible commitments on vital issues.[26]

Despite its independence, the EC's founders declined to give the Commission a free hand to exercise its powers. Instead, virtually all significant Commission activities required approval by the Council of Ministers, an intergovernmental organization comprised of one representative per member state. Like the Commission, the Council's roots can be traced to suspicion on the Continent in 1950. When The Six drew up the ECSC, the small states, led by the Netherlands, feared that an unchecked High Authority would lead to de facto domination by France and Germany.[27] By overseeing the High Authority's activities—and later the Commission's—the Council provided the small states the modicum of protection against large-state dominance that they craved.

The Council exercised its oversight authority primarily through the ratification of Commission proposals. The intensity of Council oversight, defined by the level of member state support Commission proposals required, varied with the stage of Community development and the importance of the issues under consideration. Initially, most Commission proposals required unanimous approval by the Council. However, the TOR created a three-stage process to replace consensus decision making with QMV. During the first stage, Commission proposals needed unanimous support in the Council, but in the second and third stages, consensus would slowly give way on those issues The Six agreed to decide by qualified majority.

The planned move to QMV was designed to strengthen the Commission's control over Community development. By selecting proposals capable of garnering qualified-majority support in the Council, the Commission could press ahead with integration even in the face of strenuous objections from a minority of members.[28] Consequently, every increase in the number of issues decided by QMV reduced each state's ability to defend its interests by blocking

[26] Moravcsik, *The Choice*, 86–158.

[27] Martin Westlake, *The Council of the European Union* (New York: Stockton Press, 1995), 19–21.

[28] Geoffrey Garrett, "International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992): 533–560.

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particular Community decisions, giving the Commission a decisive advantage over EC governance.

The Luxembourg Compromise and the return of the veto. The TOR's plan to make the Commission the dominant force in Community governance ended abruptly in July 1965 when a crisis over the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) brought about the de facto return of national vetoes in the Council. Following the resolution of a 1964 dispute over grain prices, the Commission introduced an ambitious proposal that called for financing the CAP entirely from a common resource pool by 1967, transferring control over the Community's customs duties to the Commission over a five-year period, and augmenting the European Parliament's capacity to oversee the Community's budget.[29]

The proposal left all the member states uneasy.[30] France wanted the transitional phase of CAP financing extended until 1970, but Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands united to oppose French demands. Dissatisfied with what they perceived as French domination of the Community, the five chose to make a stand before "the distribution of costs and benefits within the [EC became] even more skewed in [favor] of France."[31]

Confronted by strong opposition, the French government broke off negotiations with its counterparts over the plan, declared that the Community faced a serious crisis, and withdrew its representative from Brussels.[32] In September 1965, France expanded the conflict by challenging the increased use of QMV in the Council. Although the crisis did not start over Community governance, the French attack on QMV was not just a tactic designed to secure more-favorable CAP financing. Prior to the crisis, Charles de Gaulle had planned to "strip the Commission of its unique power of proposal, to block the transition to majority voting, and to fire the [Hallstein] Commission."[33] The dispute ended in January 1966, after two Council meetings produced an accord, known as the Luxembourg Compromise, that provided member states a de facto veto over Council decisions.

By restoring the veto, the member states denied the Commission the advantage it anticipated receiving under the TOR. So long as the veto remained in place, the Commission could not table proposals with qualified-majority support to advance Community development over the heads of objectors. Instead, Commission proposals had to satisfy the state least interested in

[29] Miriam Camps, *European Unification in the Sixties* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 30–40; John Lambert, "The Constitutional Crisis 1955-56," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 4 (May 1966): 195–228.

[30] N. Piers Ludlow, "Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966," *Contemporary European History* 8 (July 1999): 231–248.

[31] Ludlow, "Challenging French Leadership," 247–248.

[32] Lambert, "The Constitutional Crisis," 210–212.

[33] Moravcsik, *The Choice*, 194.

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cooperation over the issue in question, ensuring that the member states, not the Commission, controlled Community development.

While the 1965–1966 crisis produced the most dramatic shift in the distribution of Community authority toward the member states, it was just one of a number of developments that cemented member state dominance over EC affairs. As I argued above, focusing on how the member states asserted control over EC governance is important for understanding the development of trusting relations in the Community. Absent changes to the TOR's initial design, the member states would not have been in a position to entrust the governance of their efforts to one another.

In the following section, I detail three additional developments that cemented the member states' control over the Community: the emergence of the European Council, the creation of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and the member states' capture of the Commission.

The European Council and the rise of European summitry. In 1974, the member states took the step of agreeing to hold regular summit meetings among the heads of state and heads of government known as the European Council. Although the TOR's framers thought the Commission would provide the Community's long-term vision, the European Council quickly took over this role, further reducing the Commission's importance.

Summitry among the member states began in 1962, when de Gaulle convened The Six to discuss his vision of European political union.[34] In those early days, the other member states feared summit meetings would undercut the authority vested in Community institutions. The smaller member states also feared that summitry would lead to Community domination by France and Germany.[35] Nevertheless, the member states convened summit meetings on an ad hoc basis in 1961, 1969, 1972, and 1973 before agreeing to make them a regular feature of Community decision making.

Two issues convinced the member states to make European Council meetings permanent. First, the summits gave leaders a hand in decisions that could ultimately harm their constituents.[36] Second, the threat of vetoes increasingly forced the Council to produce complex package deals that provided each member state some benefit in order to secure passage of Community legislation. The intricacy of these deals quickly overwhelmed the Council of Ministers and created a need for more-active involvement by leaders of the member states.[37]

[34] Westlake, *The Council*, 18.

[35] Simon Bulmer and Wolfgang Wessels, *The European Council: Decision-Making in European Politics* (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd, 1987), 28; Jan Werts, *The European Council* (New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., 1992), 20–22; Westlake, *The Council*, 19–21.

[36] Bulmer and Wessels, *The European Council.*

[37] Ibid.

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The Committee of Permanent Representatives. COREPER also augmented member state control over Community governance. Officially recognized in the 1965 Merger Treaty, but appearing in various forms as early as 1958,[38] COREPER is the central intermediary in Council–Commission relations. COREPER acts as the first review board that Commission proposals encounter[39] and although COREPER cannot change Commission proposals, it can detail the provisions members disagree with and make (nonbinding) requests for revision.[40] Given that the Commission requires Council approval to act, there are strong incentives for it to adopt COREPER's suggested revisions into its proposals.

COREPER also controls the number of Commission proposals the Council must consider at any given time.[41] In this role, COREPER prevents the Commission from overwhelming the Council with proposals. Finally, in conjunction with a series of management committees, COREPER assists the Council's efforts to oversee the Commission's activities.[42]

In short, COREPER strengthens the members' control over Community governance by ensuring that member states' interests are reflected in Commission proposals and by limiting the Commission's ability to swamp the Council with proposals, thereby preventing it from overseeing the Commission's activities.

The political makeup of the Commission, 1958–1985. The member states delivered a final assault on the Commission's independence through the Commission's nominating process. Coinciding with the Luxembourg Compromise, the member states increasingly expanded the political composition of the Commission, ignoring the TOR's stricture that commissioners be independent. Of the fourteen commissioners that served between 1958 and 1967, only five held senior ministerial positions in their home governments before serving on the Commission.[43] By comparison, after the Compromise, political appointees comprised up to 85 percent of the college membership.[44]

[38] Fiona Hayes-Renshaw, Christian Lequesne, and Pedro Mayor Lopez, "The Permanent Representation of the Member States to the European Communities," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 28 (December 1989): 119–137.

[39] B. Guy Peters, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Institutions of the European Community" in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), 75–122.

[40] Hayes-Renshaw, Lequesne, and Lopez, "The Permanent Representation," 132–133; Westlake, *The Council*, 290–296.

[41] Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, "Executive Power in the European Union: The Functions and Limits of the Council of Ministers," *Journal of European Public Policy* 2 (December 1995): 559–582.

[42] Peters, "Bureaucratic Politics," 81; Mark A. Pollack, "Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community," *International Organization* 51 (Winter 1997): 99–134.

[43] Peter Ludlow, "The European Commission" in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community: Decision Making and Institutional Change* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 85–132.

[44] Andrew MacMullen, "European Commissioners 1952-1995: National Routes to a European Elite" in Neill Nugent, ed., *At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 27–48.

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The implications of this transformation in the political makeup of the Commission are not lost on the member states, who lobby the Commission president to place their respective commissioners in charge of important portfolios. As Martin Donnelly and Ella Ritchie point out, "Governments are obviously keen for their nominees to have politically advantageous portfolios in the belief that this will open up a channel of influence for them on key issues."[45]

Summary

Shortly after ratifying the TOR, The Six implemented a series of changes to the Community's design that left them, rather than the Commission, firmly in control of EC governance. The de facto replacement of QMV with unanimous voting provided the greatest assurance to states that their wishes would be respected in group decisions, but the Luxembourg Compromise was not the only strike against the EC's supranational ideal. The emergence of the European Council, the growth of COREPER, and the appointment of partisan commissioners shifted the balance of power toward the member states.

This is not to say that events always undermined supranationalism. In 1970, for instance, the member states agreed to replace their individual contributions to the EC budget with revenues generated by the Community's common customs tariff, and in 1978, the European Court of Justice, in *Simmenthol v. Commission*, effectively established the supremacy of Community law.[46] Still, on balance, the de jure and de facto changes to the TOR favored the member states with respect to the management of Community affairs, and these gains came largely at the Commission's expense.

The changes made to the TOR's original design, however, went beyond simply shifting of responsibilities between the Council and the Commission. Under the provisions of the TOR, any transfer of governing responsibility was scheduled to go to a set of relatively independent commissioners. However, when the member states finally transferred governing authority to the Commission, the Commission was no longer a neutral arbiter between the conflicting interests of the members. Thus, by 1986, states that agreed to delegate their authority over policy to the Community really delegated to the member states, entrusting them with their interests. Explaining this transformation is the subject of the next section.

The Failure of Incremental Strategies

Initially, the member states embraced an incremental strategy to induce one another to relinquish control over Community governance. The member states

[45] Martin Donnelly and Ella Ritchie, "The College of Commissioners and their Cabinets" in Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence, eds., *The European Commission* (Essex, UK: Longman Group Ltd, 1994), 31–61.

[46] Desmond Dinan, *An Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 304.

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planned to give up their command over issues gradually, by introducing QMV in the Council over three stages. In each stage, the member states extended QMV to those issues over which they could most easily agree to relinquish command. This strategy guaranteed that the issues the states cared for most would remain under their control until the end of the transition period. Despite this design, the formal process failed to bring about the complete transfer of Community governance to the Commission.

Stage One of the transition to QMV and the customs union went smoothly. Resolution of a 1964 dispute over grain prices convinced many that the Community was "condemned to succeed"[47] and that 1965 would bring "a long train of consequential decisions... [that] would carry the Community irresistibly down the road to economic union."[48] Clearly, the sense of optimism in the Community overlooked growing unrest over the impending transition to QMV and the loss of control it implied for the member states. During the 1964 grain prices dispute, for example, Germany proposed exempting decisions on cereal prices from QMV since, in the words of Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröeder, "it would be difficult to imagine one of the partners finding himself in a situation incompatible with his vital interests."[49]

Concern over the repercussions of QMV culminated in a crisis initiated by France on the eve of the third transition phase that was resolved only after the member states agreed to permit one another de facto vetoes over Council decisions. Although the crisis pitted the member states against France, the Luxembourg Compromise's promise to allow any state to veto matters that might adversely affect its vital interest was "probably almost as welcome to the other five as it was to France."[50]

In reasserting their right to veto proposals, the member states aborted the TOR's plan to delegate control over Community governance to the Commission. Growing concern over the transition to QMV, combined with the timing of the crisis, suggests that the member states' willingness to entrust their interests to the Commission during the first two phases of the transition to common market, that is, when the costs of betrayal were relatively low, did not reassure them that their interests would be protected as the costs of betrayal rose. The early successes did not require enough sacrifice to convince the member states that it would be safe to give up control of their interests at higher levels of risk.

Although the formal effort to encourage the member states to delegate control over Community governance cannot explain the development of

[47] John Newhouse, *Collision in Brussels: The Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), 54.

[48] Camps, *European Unification*, 30.

[49] Quoted in Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963), 257.

[50] Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1995), 115.

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trusting relationships in 1986, it is possible that an informal learning process—driven by observations of compliance with Community legislation—was at work. However, the evidence suggests that member states showed little interest in their counterparts' fidelity to Community standards. As a participant in the negotiations over the SEA told me, his government did not consider the other member states' record of compliance with EC law while they deliberated over the importance of the veto in the Council.[51]

Given what we know about compliance in the EC, this official's disinterest in compliance issues makes sense: the number of suspected infringements of EC rules grew from a low of approximately 200 cases in 1980 to slightly more than 800 cases in 1986.[52] Roughly 500 of these suspected infringements resulted in formal efforts by the Commission to induce compliance.[53] Significantly, the Commission initiated about 200 infringement proceedings in 1986 because of deliberate noncompliance by member states, an increase of nearly 400 percent over the number of shirking cases investigated in 1978 (the first year of available data).[54]

The increasingly poor record of compliance with EC directives suggests that it would have been difficult for member states to draw favorable conclusions about their counterparts' trustworthiness. Perhaps fortunately, it appears that participants in the negotiations over the SEA were inattentive to their counterparts' rates of compliance. Nevertheless, the member states established trusting relationships among themselves during this period. This is damaging evidence for incremental approaches because it suggests that leaders do not emphasize their counterparts' rate of policy compliance when assessing their trustworthiness. Given that step-by-step strategies assume that demonstrations of reliability are critical in overcoming suspicion as expressed in policy, evidence suggesting that leaders are relatively uninterested in compliance makes it difficult to be optimistic about the capacity of incremental approaches to generate trusting interstate relationships.

Institutional Strategies and the Formation of Trusting Relationships

In this section, I examine whether the emergence of institutions that provide governments effective voice in group decisions and domestic breathing space better explain the development of trusting relationships in the EC than the incremental approach examined above.

[51] Interview with a Belgian representative, 8 January 2003. A Dutch representative I interviewed (10 January 2003) could not recall if questions about compliance influenced Dutch deliberations during the SEA negotiations.

[52] Jonas Tallberg, "Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union," *International Organization* 56 (August 2002): 609–644.

[53] Ibid., 625.

[54] Ibid.

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Effective Voice

Initially, the EC's founders invested little time in ensuring that the member states possessed effective voice in group decisions. Under the Treaty of Rome, QMV in the Council typically required proposals from the Commission, whereupon passage required affirmation by any combination of states holding twelve votes.[55] Between 1958 and 1973, the states with the smallest populations (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) held five votes in the Council, while the states with the largest populations (France, Germany, and Italy) possessed the remaining twelve votes (four votes each). This distribution created the possibility that their larger counterparts could consistently outvote the small states once QMV became the operative decision rule. Belgium and the Netherlands, with two votes apiece, could exert leverage on voting outcomes only if they voted together *and* one of the large states broke with the other two; Luxembourg's vote was not "critical" to any winning coalition.[56]

Even though the 1965/66 crisis ended the danger the smaller states faced of becoming a permanent minority in Community decision making, the allocation of votes in the Council remained an issue that the member states revisited periodically. The first change in the distribution of votes in the Council occurred during the first enlargement in 1973. Before enlargement, the small states controlled 29 percent of the votes in the Council; after enlargement, they controlled 31 percent of the total votes in the Council.

The small states' 2 percent increase in voting shares gave them the capacity to block proposals supported by the large states from passing the Council under QMV. Subsequent enlargements in 1981 and 1986 followed the same pattern. Figure 1 depicts the voting strength of large and small member states in the Council relative to the number of votes needed to block the passage of Community legislation. As the Figure shows, after the first enlargement, small states could veto legislation in the Council of Ministers without the support of a large state if, and only if, they voted together. Following the second and third enlargements, the small states could block legislation favored by the large states even if they suffered defections from their ranks. From 1981 to 1985, for example, Denmark, Ireland, or Luxembourg could vote with the large states without preventing a small-state veto in the Council. Following enlargement in 1986, the small states could block legislation favored by the large states even if states with as many as five votes (for example, Belgium and Greece) broke with a small-state coalition.

In addition to hardwired voting rules, the member states counted on norms of inclusivity to guarantee their voice in Community decisions. Participants in

[55] On rare occasions, when the Council made decisions without a Commission proposal, twelve votes cast by at least four member states constituted a qualified majority.

[56] Madeline O. Hosli, "Admission of European Free Trade Association States to the European Community: Effects on Voting Power in the European Community Council of Ministers," *International Organization* 47 (Autumn 1993): 629–643.

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FIGURE 1
Distribution of Votes in the Council of Ministers, 1958–1992



Source: See footnote 56.

the negotiations over the SEA experienced these norms as obligatory, requiring them to respect one another's interests and to further the project of European integration. Policy proposals had to be "fair"[57] to the citizens in each country before they were approved, and there was pressure to find formulae capable of bridging differences among the member states. States that maintained their objections to Community proposals were put in the uncomfortable position of being "no-sayer[s] in the European Community."[58]

The member states further augmented their voice in Community governance by forcing the Commission to effectively negotiate the details of its proposals with the member states through COREPER, shifting responsibility for long-term strategic planning to the European Council, and undermining the Commission's independence. By 1986, the Commission was effectively an intergovernmental institution, thoroughly penetrated by the member states'

[57] Interview with a Dutch representative, 10 January 2003.
[58] Interview with a Belgian representative, 8 January 2003.

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national representatives. Consequently, Commission proposals increasingly had the member states' fingerprints all over them.

In sum, by the time the SEA was up for discussion, both large and small member states had ample opportunities to influence Community policy. This does not mean that the member states were immunized against any and all harmful decisions. Rather, the member states created a system that gave each government enough leverage over collective decisions to ensure that over the long run, EC policy would take the interests of each state into account. In the short run, the SEA ended each state's ability to influence any particular piece of Community legislation. Under the new arrangement, the states had to rely on one another to restrain whatever impulses they might have to take advantage of one another.

Breathing Space

While changes to the institutional structure of the EC provided member states with a degree of protection against domination by their counterparts, the member states also made sure to provide mechanisms designed to enable their leaders to avoid domestic political problems. Initially, the TOR provided member governments modest protections against the dislocating effects that integration might have on their citizens and, hence, their reelection chances. Article 26, for example, authorized the Commission to direct "any member state encountering special difficulties to postpone the lowering or the raising of the duties on certain headings of its tariffs." Concern for citizens is also evident in Article 123, which called for the development of a Social Fund to "improve opportunities of employment of workers in the Common Market and thus contribute to a rising standard of living . . . ."

As policy making in the Community became more complex, the member states turned to a more comprehensive solution to the potentially negative domestic consequences of integration: the European Council. Described by the member states as permitting them to establish "an overall approach to *the internal problems* involved in achieving European unity and the external problems facing Europe,"[59] the European Council gained principle responsibility for setting the EC's strategic vision. More importantly, the European Council gave EC leaders a direct hand in the creation of the very policies that could affect their political standing at home.

The member states also availed themselves of informal mechanisms to protect their governments' domestic political standing. For example, the member states gradually accepted the idea of "selective exit"[60] from specific treaty obligations, a principle originally promoted by French officials concerned about the Community's effect on their ability to retain power. The British

[59] Quoted in Bulmer and Wessels, *The European Council*, 147, (italics mine).

[60] Joseph H.H. Weiler, "The European Community in Change: Exit, Voice and Loyalty," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 3 (1990): 15–25.

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refusal to join the monetary union is the best-known example of selective exit, but states can also exercise their exit option by refusing to implement or comply with EC law, although this latter option is dwindling in importance as European justice becomes stronger.

In short, the member states recognized that the process and goals of European integration could not expose a state's leadership to undue electoral competition, and took pains to make certain that this did not occur. The mechanisms used to accomplish this varied, from explicit rules allowing states to implement EC rules at a more comfortable pace to selective exit from those aspects of the treaties that were most objectionable.

In terms of timing, the emergence of trusting relationships among the member states coincided with the presence of both the rules guaranteeing the member states effective voice in group decisions as well as the ability to insulate themselves from domestic political pressures. While the member states were sensitive to the domestic political problems their respective leaders faced throughout the history of European integration, they had paid less attention to ensuring that both large and small members could defend their core interests effectively. Only with the final redistribution of votes in the Council in advance of the admission of Spain and Portugal did Community rules assure all the states that their counterparts would not dominate them.

Consistent with expectations, EC leaders focused on the availability of rules to protect them against exploitation during their deliberations over the SEA. Norms of inclusivity and fairness in EC decision making were prominent in the minds of participants. Retrospective assessments of behavior did not appear to be significant. While this result may be surprising, given that the conventional wisdom points to the importance of incremental learning, it is in keeping with the history of EC governance, which is marked by persistent concerns among the members about relative power. For as long as the states have pursued European integration, they have worried about the fate of their interests under the Community structure, leading to significant changes in the organization of Community relations: the Council of Ministers, the Luxembourg Compromise, and the continual reallocation of votes under QMV all clearly emerged in response to fears about the consequences of international cooperation. Seen in this light, the formation of trusting relationships appears to be part of a normal international process in which states privilege issues of power over reputation.

Can the Institutional Approach "Travel"?

If one accepts the preceding analysis, the next logical question concerns the applicability of an institutional approach to other conflicts. In other words, is the institutional approach that produced trusting relationships among EC member states generalizable?

The nature of research that relies on "easy" cases makes it difficult to assess the portability of successful formulae. In the EC case, conditions favored

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the formation of trusting relationships to an extent we may not see in other rivalries. This means that evidence emerging from the EC case will be more convincing in terms of what will not work to foster trusting relationships in other conflicts than what will work. Because the barriers to trusting relationships were relatively low, the EC case damns the incremental approach's failure more strongly than it supports the institutional approach's success.

Of course, demonstrating the limits of incremental strategies is important, given their widespread use, even if institutional strategies are unlikely replacements. However, my research on the development of trusting relationships among the American states (1776–1789) and between Israel and Jordan (1950–1992) confirm the evidentiary pattern found in the EC, suggesting that institutional strategies may be able to withstand the tests of time and space.[61]

In the American case, conflicts among the former British colonies and revolutionary activity within them led individuals like George Washington to proclaim the existence of a crisis that they feared would inexorably lead to war.[62] The Constitutional Convention, held in Philadelphia in 1787, was called with the crisis in mind. Although most of the Convention's delegates agreed that the states had to change the way they cooperated—the bonds among them were so loose that none of the states could be trusted—the deliberations deadlocked over political representation in the proposed Congress. Large states, such as Virginia, argued that seats in Congress should be apportioned relative to population size. Small states, such as Delaware, objected on the grounds that proportional representation would enable the large states to threaten their existence.[63] The impasse broke only after the delegates found a compromise that guaranteed the small states a voice in federal decisions.[64]

The so-called Great Compromise did not produce trusting relationships by itself, however. The delegates still had to protect the tenure of state leaders before the Constitutional design would be acceptable. With the threat of insurgencies high—a revolt in Massachusetts prior to the Convention frightened everyone—the delegates made sure to reassure state governors that they would be restored to office in the event of rebellion: Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution promised to protect state governments against both external and, critically, internal threats to their office.

[61] See Aaron M. Hoffman, *Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

[62] David C. Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2003), 7; Peter S. Onuf, "Anarchy and the Crisis of Union" in Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert, eds., *To Form a More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992), 272–302.

[63] See, for example, George Reed's letter to John Dickinson in Orin Grant Libby, "The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen States on the Federal Constitution, 1787 - 8," *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin: Economics, Political Science, and History Series 1* (1897): 1–117.

[64] The authoritative accounts of the Convention are found in Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, vols. i-iv (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

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In the Israeli–Jordanian case, Israeli peace negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization gave Jordan's King Hussein the protection he needed from domestic groups to establish a near-trusting relationship with Israel over the waters of the Yarmouk River—a result that years of secret cooperation had not produced.[65] Only the absence of guarantees of effective voice over the management of the Yarmouk prevented Israel and Jordan from fully entrusting control over the waters to one another.

Prior to the 1994 Treaty of Peace that changed the nature of Israeli–Jordanian relations, water relations between the two states teetered on the brink of collapse. Frequent mediation by U.S. envoys produced only temporary cessations of the dispute. For Jordan, the lack of progress toward a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict prevented the Hashemite Kingdom from altering its basic orientation toward Israel: pressure from Jordanian Palestinians and other Arab governments to oppose the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip simply did not permit King Hussein much latitude over his Israeli policy.[66]

Revelations of Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations in 1992 changed the basic dynamic underlying Israeli–Jordanian relations. The public "Oslo process" freed King Hussein to pursue relations with Israel without fear of offending a powerful segment of Jordanian society. Reflecting this change, in 1994, Israeli and Jordanian officials signed a peace treaty that included provisions that brought them closer to entrusting control over the waters of the Yarmouk River to one another than they had ever been before.

While the American and Jordanian cases are just two additional cases, the evidence suggests that the pattern found in the European case is not an anomaly. In both cases, trusting and near-trusting relationships developed in response to specific institutional changes rather than to learning processes that convinced the respective states of their counterparts' reliability. Whether these results can be found elsewhere remains to be seen. Like laboratory experiments, case studies must be replicated under a variety of conditions to get a measure of their limitations.[67] Nevertheless, the results presented above suggest that students of conflict resolution must pay closer attention to the institutional sources of trusting relationships.

Conclusion

When policymakers attempt to resolve long-standing conflicts, they often turn to strategies designed to establish trust little by little. As Israel's chief

[65] For a history of the Israeli–Jordanian water relationship, see Miriam R. Lowi, *Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[66] Adam Garfinkle, *Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a Small Place* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 9; Moshe Zak, "Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations," *Washington Quarterly* 8 (Winter 1985): 167–176.

[67] David H. Barlow and Michel Herson, *Single Case Experimental Designs: Strategies for Studying Behavior Change* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 326–367.

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negotiator during the Oslo peace process argued, "Peacemaking is a gradual revolution that moves from hostility to a desired conciliation, a collection of moments in which a new trend is set in motion."[68] However, the failure of incremental approaches to foster trusting relationships among EC member states suggests that such strategies are poorly suited to the task. First, the member states' formal attempt to delegate control over Community governance failed largely because its graduated structure did not reassure the parties that their interests would remain safe in the future. Second, when the member states finally decided to entrust their interests to one another, they did so with apparently little consideration of their counterparts' records for reliability. The past played a smaller-than-predicted role in the formation of trusting relationships.

It is true that trusting relationships, as defined here, require leaders that trust one another. But there is no evidence that the bonds of trust among EC leaders in 1986 emerged in response to prior policy decisions of their respective governments. More likely, EC leaders established trust during the course of personal interactions with one another that typically take place outside of official bargaining sessions. Although the evidence is silent on this point, the EC case suggests that if learning plays a role in the formation of trusting relationships, it plays that role over dinner and drinks, not, as incremental approaches presume, during the policy process.

In a general sense, incremental strategies do not work, because they erroneously locate the problem of trust in interstate relations with the actors themselves. However, suspicion is a product of the context in which actors relate to one another. Therefore, overcoming suspicion requires strategies that affect the incentives actors face in particular social situations. In anarchic environments, actors fear that entrusting their interests to others brings with it an unacceptably high chance of domination or destruction. Institutional strategies that provide effective voice in group decisions address this fear. But protecting states from one another is not enough. Leaders must also know that the decision to entrust their interests to others will not lead to their own political defeat. For them, mechanisms that relieve domestic political pressures are necessary. In combination, institutions creating effective voice and breathing space make the worst-case scenarios that actors can envision resulting from betrayal as unlikely as possible. It is in the new institutional environment that trusting relationships ultimately thrive.

To be clear, I am not arguing that incremental strategies are useless in situations of conflict resolution or that they cannot or should not be used in conjunction with institutional approaches to trusting relationships. Strategies such as "Tit-for-Tat"[69] and GRIT[70] are both capable of fostering cooperation

[68] Uri Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), ix.

[69] Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[70] Osgood, *An Alternative*, 85–134.

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and reducing hostilities among suspicious parties. In the face of ongoing violence, incremental strategies may play a critical tension-reducing role. However, it is important to understand that incremental approaches are unlikely to produce trusting relationships. Although there is an argument that getting rivals to cooperate at all is what we should focus on, the additional costs associated with nontrusting cooperative relationships invariably price some states out of the conflict resolution market. For example, while the United States has shown interest in serving as a guarantor of peace for Israel, it has been much less interested in playing the same role for India and Pakistan. For these states, trusting relationships may be the only way they can terminate their rivalries, because third-party guarantors are unavailable.

Unfortunately, rather than recognizing the limitations of incremental strategies, policymakers use them as a cure-all for suspicious relations. The research presented here suggests another conclusion: successful trust-building strategies tackle the hardest issues *first*, through the provision of rules and procedures that enable actors to reliably influence and defend their core interests and that shield leaders from domestic political pressures.*

* The author would like to thank Michael Aleprete, Karen Alter, Sangmin Bae, Davis Bobrow, Ann Marie Clark, Charles S. Gochman, Bert Rockman, Alberta Sbragia, and Laurel Weldon for their thoughtful comments on this research.

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Book Reviews

Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell *by Karen DeYoung. New York, Knopf, 2006. 610 pp. $28.95.*

The first half of the *Washington Post* reporter Karen DeYoung's biography of Colin Powell goes over much the same ground as Powell's 1995 engaging and informative autobiography, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House). The remainder of her book makes a much more fundamental contribution by drawing on the author's extensive on-the-record interviews with Powell, as well as other sources, to recount his often bruising experiences as Secretary of State. DeYoung's book is also of interest for the light it sheds on the inner workings of the George W. Bush presidency.

The policy-making process Powell experienced in the Bush administration was a near antithesis of a multiple advocacy decision-making process in which a wide range of clearly posed options are subjected to rigorous debate in the presence of the chief executive. The Bush presidency was a bureaucratic battlefield in which back-channeling and end runs were the norm, and policy outcomes were a function of bureaucratic politics and ideological affinity rather than of the merits of the policies under consideration. The result was a state of affairs in which Powell and the State Department were marginalized, and the hawkish views of Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld regularly prevailed.

The outflanking of Powell was well under way in the first year of the Bush presidency. On 13 March 2001, Powell received an urgent request from National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to comment on a public letter to a group of congressional opponents of an agreement that had been drafted by the Vice President's office for Bush's signature. The letter put the President on the record as opposing mandatory restrictions on global emissions. Powell raised no objection to the proposed policy, but urged that the letter include a passage reassuring the nation's allies that the United States would continue to work with them on climate control, providing Rice with a suggested wording. When she informed him that his suggestion "didn't make it" into the letter, Powell hurried to the White House to argue his case in person, only to find that the communication had already been personally taken to Capitol Hill by Vice President Cheney.

"Powell took the sequence of events as a warning about the Bush administration's decision-making process," DeYoung writes. There was nothing in

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the Bush process comparable to the formal options papers Powell had prepared for Ronald Reagan during his time as National Security Advisor. Nor was there anything resembling the "less formal but decisive" policy discussions between George H.W. Bush and his senior advisors in the Oval Office or the lengthy National Security Council debates in the administration of Bill Clinton. "In this administration," DeYoung remarks, "presidential decisions seemed to come out of the ether" (pp. 328–329).

There was a second such episode in the opening days of 2002. The topic was the status of al Qaeda and Taliban members captured in Afghanistan. Negotiations were under way between the legal staffs of the State and Justice Departments on whether they should be accorded prisoner-of-war status. The State Department argued that the captives were guaranteed that status by the Geneva Conventions, whereas the Justice Department held that the Geneva rules did not apply to the prisoners because they were "illegal combatants." The debate was still ongoing and Powell was on a trip to Asia when the White House approved the Justice Department's position. "Once again," DeYoung comments, "the president's decision on a matter of international importance seemed to have materialized out of thin air; there had been no high-level meeting or debate over prisoner treatment, and Bush had apparently ruled without full consideration of the issue" (p. 369).

The months following this episode were marked by a seeming march toward war with Iraq. In his State of the Union Address in late January, Bush declared that his administration would not "wait on events, while dangers gather" and included Iraq in what he referred to as "an axis of evil." In his June 1 West Point commencement address, Bush went on to enunciate a more fully developed doctrine of preemptive war. Meanwhile, there was a drumbeat of assertions by the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and their subordinates about the imminent danger posed by Iraq, which, they insisted, possessed weapons of mass destruction that it might well put to use. Powell, however, held that the regime of Saddam Hussein was being successfully contained and viewed the use of force as a last resort.

Early in August, it became Powell's turn to engage in a bureaucratic end run. To counter the pressure of administration hard-liners for military action against Iraq, he arranged with Rice to meet privately with Bush and argue the case for diplomacy. In what ultimately proved to be only a tactical victory, he persuaded Bush to seek a United Nations resolution requiring Iraq to permit arms inspectors to search the country. In November, such a resolution was voted by the UN, and Iraq agreed to open itself to inspection (pp. 401–402). But when the early inspections failed to turn up evidence of weapons of mass destruction, there was renewed pressure within the administration for an invasion of Iraq.

In January 2003, Bush called Powell into the Oval Office and said, "I really think we are going to have to take this guy out." As Powell pointed out, Bush had made the decision to go to war without a meeting in which the relevant

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members of his administration debated their positions (p. 429). Moreover, despite Powell's qualifications as the architect of the 1991 Gulf War and a former National Security Advisor and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there also was never a point at which he was asked for his considered views on the matter. And for all of his skepticism about military intervention, Powell was called upon to make the case before the Security Council that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. He did so with impressive fluency, drawing on the most persuasive intelligence then available, but no such weapons have ever been found.

This is a fascinating and instructive work, but it must be mined by the reader to yield some of its most interesting implications. It would have profited from a less exclusive focus on individual events and greater attention to their larger context. It also would have been helpful if DeYoung had quoted more extensively from her interviews with Powell. For example, in a key concluding passage on Powell's code of organizational loyalty and its implications for his failure to advance his views more effectively, it is not clear whether DeYoung is paraphrasing assertions Powell made to her or presenting her own views of his seeming convictions (p. 516). Finally, the book might well have concluded with a sustained discussion of the relationship between Powell the man and his performance in the Bush administration. A tantalizing clue is provided in a 1960 military performance evaluation DeYoung unearthed on the 23-year-old Lieutenant Colin Powell: "He expresses his opinions quietly and convincingly. If his recommendation is not accepted, then he cheerfully and promptly executes the decision" (p. 37).

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Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention *by Jonathan Renshon. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2006. 240 pp. $49.95.*

Will fear of North Korean or Iranian nuclear weapons development result in preventive or preemptive military strikes by the United States or others? If preventive war is based on a perception that an adversary cannot be deterred, will the "war on terror" result in an increasing number of preventive actions by more countries? Or have the costs of the Iraq war dampened optimism about their efficacy? Jonathan Renshon's timely and important analysis sheds light on these questions by focusing on the beliefs and psychology of leaders. He refutes realist accounts of decision making based on objective assessments of relative military capability alone, and shows how leaders particularly matter in explaining decisions regarding preventive action or war, since the information on which such decisions are based—information about an adversary's potential actions in the future—is by nature limited and ambiguous.

To delineate the factors that influence decisions about preventive war, Renshon compares three cases in which leaders used force in a preventive

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fashion—British action in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, Israel's preventive strike against the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, and George W. Bush's preventive war in Iraq—with two cases in which leaders decided against such action—Harry Truman's and Dwight Eisenhower's decisions against striking Soviet nuclear capabilities, and India's and Pakistan's determinations to refrain from destroying one another's developing nuclear capabilities. He argues persuasively that the factors that contribute to a decision to initiate preventive action are: a perception of declining power relative to an adversary; an inherent bad-faith image of the adversary; a belief that war is inevitable; a belief that there is only a short "window" in which to act; a situation that is believed to favor the offensive; and "black-and-white thinking."

Renshon's analysis is sure to capture the attention of policymakers, scholars, and students alike (including my own undergraduate honors students, among whom the book inspired lively debate), and makes a strong contribution to security studies and to political psychology. Although the book is strong conceptually, more original evidence (interviews or archival research) could have been brought to bear to show that individual leaders played a determining role in decisions against preventive action and that a leader's personality traits become evident over a long period of time or in a cross-section of issue areas, rather than in just one particular decision. Also, apparent inconsistencies in the description of a trait need to be explained. For instance, Renshon argues that President George W. Bush thinks in black and white terms but is cognitively flexible (pp. 115–117, 122). Renshon commendably acknowledges the complexity of politics and does not force a parsimonious framework onto a diverse set of cases. Nevertheless, he shies away from arguing that any variable, or combination of variables, is necessary or sufficient to explain a decision for or against preventive action (when traits such as the degree of black-and-white thinking and the perceived strength and permanence of the bad-faith image seemed to separate out cases in which action was initiated as opposed to cases in which a leader opted against preventive action).

I strongly and wholeheartedly recommend *Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention*, as it fosters critical thought and contributes to theory building by placing leaders front and center in explaining why countries make the consequential decisions to advocate or to oppose preventive war or preventive strikes. An engaging read for a variety of different audiences.

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Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism *by Bruce Ackerman. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2006. Cloth, $26.00; paper, $17.00.*

Law professor Bruce Ackerman proposes that in the near future, we adopt two framework statutes to govern congressional action after the next devas-

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tating terrorist attack. One proposal is relatively uncontroversial in the large, although some may quibble with details. We need some system to keep a government running if such an attack kills or disables a large number of elected officials in Washington DC. Perhaps we could jury-rig some sort of solution after the attack, but Ackerman is concerned that whatever solutions we would come up with after an attack would have less democratic legitimacy than we could confer on a "replacement" government designed by rules set in advance. For the House of Representatives, Ackerman proposes simultaneous election of a real representative and a shadow representative who would step in after a disaster. Ackerman also urges changes in the statutory designation of successors to the president and vice president, allowing the president to choose—once, at the outset of the presidential term—between the Speaker and the minority leader in the House.

These are interesting ideas, but they have little to do with "preserving civil liberties" in the usual sense. Ackerman's other proposal, to which he devotes more attention, does, though in a limited domain. Ackerman assumes, reasonably enough, that the survivors of a devastating attack will seek some sort of immediate response against its perpetrators and, importantly, those within the United States who might have participated in the attack. But, he notes, in the immediate aftermath, we will rarely have good information about who did what. The result will be an indiscriminate roundup of "suspects"—that is, those who many people think might have been involved in the attack. Ackerman wants to regulate this response. Acknowledging in somewhat ungenerous terms that the South African Constitution develops a scheme like his, Ackerman proposes to authorize detention on much less than probable cause for a limited period. That authorization could be renewed periodically, but only by increasing majorities—50 percent then 60 percent, then 70 percent, up to 90 percent.

The idea of requiring increasing majorities for long-term intrusions on civil liberties is intriguing. We might worry about all sorts of improvident restrictions on civil liberties in the immediate aftermath of an attack, and an escalator clause might seem an attractive way to limit the damage that those impulses could cause. But Ackerman only indirectly faces up to the politics of these renewals.

Consider the case in which the initial authorization and the first renewal receive votes of 67 percent, and then so does the third. In Ackerman's scheme, the authorization would lapse. But it is hardly unimaginable that Congress would conclude that no obstructionist minority of a mere third of the people should prevent the continued implementation of what a strong majority believes to be a vital program for national security, and would repeal the 70 percent requirement. Ackerman's response is that absent an emergency, the detention program is plainly unconstitutional, that the courts should take the framework requirement as a strong indication of a considered judgment about what constitutes an emergency, and that the courts should therefore

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hold detentions after the 70 percent requirement's repeal unconstitutional. Perhaps so, but note that this route is available only with respect to a detention program. On Ackerman's analysis, Congress could repeal the ratcheted-up majority requirements for other programs that civil libertarians would worry about.

As always, Ackerman's work is thought provoking. Filled with what in the end are basically intriguing asides, this book is more modest than its subtitle suggests, and is a minor addition both to the corpus of Ackerman's work and to the literature on the constitutional dimensions of emergency powers.

MARK TUSHNET
Harvard Law School

Is Iraq Another Vietnam? *by Robert K. Brigham. New York, Public Affairs, 2006. 224 pp. $24.00.*

Armchair analysts and political pundits were making comparisons between the current U.S. military effort in Iraq and the Vietnam War even before the March 2003 invasion. Few, however, bring Robert K. Brigham's extensive knowledge of Vietnam to the task. Brigham breaks no new historical ground in this short, easily accessible book. Instead, its strength lies in the analytical precision with which he attempts to answer the question that forms the book's provocative title, "Is Iraq Another Vietnam?"

Brigham finds three overwhelming similarities between the two cases, not one of which bodes well for the current effort in Iraq or the future of U.S. foreign policy. First, Brigham contends that the United States was never able to translate its massive military superiority in either Vietnam or Iraq into the political outcome it sought, because it lacked an effective nation-building program. Second, Brigham illustrates the decline in public support for both wars, which he argues will ultimately force the George W. Bush administration to withdraw from Iraq. Third, Brigham argues that the most important parallel between Vietnam and Iraq is the lesson it holds regarding the efficacy and limits of U.S. power. He contends that the leaders who authorized military intervention in Vietnam and Iraq shared an illusion that U.S. power could produce a stable, noncommunist regime in Vietnam and a stable, democratic regime in Iraq. Brigham argues that once U.S. policymakers learned that there were limits to U.S. power, they suffered from a "Vietnam syndrome" that made the United States wary of intervening in humanitarian crises. Brigham is obviously concerned that the short-sighted decision to invade Iraq will produce an "Iraq syndrome" and constrain U.S. involvement in conflicts such as Darfur, where it could save lives.

Brigham acknowledges many significant differences between Iraq and Vietnam. In contrast to Vietnam's homogeneous population, Iraqi society is

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marked by sectarian differences. In Vietnam, the war began as an insurgency and escalated into a conventional war, while the U.S. effort in Iraq began as a conventional war but has morphed into an insurgency. The United States sent young, relatively poorly trained soldiers to Vietnam on one-year tours of duty. In contrast, the all-volunteer army serving in Iraq is significantly older, better trained, and deployed for extended periods.

Anyone reading this book after voters registered their disapproval of the Bush administration's handling of the Iraq war in the November 2006 elections will be interested in Brigham's discussion of exit strategies in a chapter titled "Staying the Course," and it is here that one wishes Brigham had explored the differences in greater depth. Fears that a U.S. withdrawal will precipitate civil war in Iraq have delayed plans for a drawdown of U.S. troops. Brigham reminds us that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were convinced that U.S. withdrawal would trigger a civil war in Vietnam, so they requested a "decent interval" before the resumption of hostilities, in order to limit the damage to U.S. credibility. Brigham implies that neither U.S. security nor credibility were irreparably damaged by withdrawal from Vietnam, and that the same would be true in Iraq. A civil war in Iraq, however, could provide increased opportunities for terrorist recruitment and training. The emergence of Iraq as a safe haven for terrorist groups would threaten the United States in a way that the emergence of a united Vietnam under communist rule never did.

Policymakers reason by historical analogy so that the mistakes of the past are not repeated. Readers of this wise, insightful book will be appalled at how Bush administration officials willfully ignored so many of the lessons of Vietnam, and how a compliant legislature and docile public did not act to remind them.

ANN MARIE MURPHY
Seton Hall University

Conned: How Millions Went to Prison, Lost the Vote, and Helped Send George W. Bush to the White House *by Sasha Abramsky. New York, New Press, 2006. 304 pp. Paper, $25.95.*

The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons *by Elizabeth A. Hull. Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 2006. 232 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

The modern debate over U.S. policies barring people with criminal convictions from voting—"felony disenfranchisement" or "criminal disenfranchisement" laws—began in the late 1990s, with a few advocacy reports, court challenges, law review articles, and congressional hearings. The 2000 election brought new attention to the issue, and the voting rights bar, interest groups, foundations, and both major political parties have all found

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reasons to focus on these laws. These two books criticize criminal disenfranchisement law, arguing that it is counterproductive and damaging to the American polity.

Political scientist Elizabeth Hull leaves no doubt as to her own views, urging activists to "commit themselves anew" to the cause of securing "basic rights for America's last remaining group of second-class citizens" (p. 154). But Hull takes pains throughout *The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons* to "respect those who support disenfranchisement on thoughtful and public-spirited grounds" (p. 15). Indeed, the book is built to respond to these imagined debating partners, with early chapters explaining the historically "deep roots" of such policies (p. 16) and the "nondiscriminatory and salutary objectives" offered by defenders of disenfranchisement (p. 43). To be sure, Hull concludes that most such arguments are "baseless" (p. 53), but she frankly acknowledges that part of her own opposition arises from "a gut sense that the practice is unfair," and that much of the public seems to support disenfranchisement because of "strongly held values" (p. 54). Such fairness strengthens Hull's treatment of questions such as disenfranchisement's heavy toll on minority communities, the potential for constitutional challenge, and the policy's uneasy relationship to the Voting Rights Act. Indeed, this book summarizes and explains the core of virtually every major problem related to U.S. disenfranchisement law, and does so with a brevity sure to please both general readers and harried undergraduates: the book's twelve chapters average only about twelve pages each. Readers who find such treatment cursory are directed by Hull's ample citations to longer academic articles, press accounts, testimony, court cases, and on-line commentaries.

An interest in the politics of efforts to change disenfranchisement law is the book's center of gravity. Groups working on the issue range from large bureaucratic organizations to "seat-of-the-pants enterprises that meet in someone's kitchen" (p. 58). Hull concludes that reformers "can't rely on Congress ... which lacks the will and possibly even the constitutional authority to be of much help" (p. 95), and a useful series of case studies demonstrates that most meaningful recent changes have come at the state level—a result quite consistent with the traditions of American federalism (p. 68). The book also features an excellent short introduction to other "collateral" consequences of criminal convictions, a summary of key international legal instruments, and a concluding chapter in which Hull "crawl[s] out on a limb" (p. 15) and suggests that even inmates can plausibly claim a right to vote.

Surveying so much terrain, the book makes occasional mistakes. The tables that open the book present very conservative state-by-state estimates of the disenfranchised population that are sometimes at odds with numbers offered elsewhere in the text (pp. 1–4, 130). There are a few citation errors, such as a note ascribing to the magazine *Sojourners* a criticism that actually appeared in a *New York Times* editorial (p. 152); a Mississippi federal court case described the disenfranchised as "severed from the body politic and

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condemned to the lowest form of citizenship" in 1995, not 1951 (p. 5). But these are quibbles.

In the run-up to the 2004 election, journalist Sasha Abramsky traveled to twelve states affected by criminal disenfranchisement: Florida, Washington, Nevada, Utah, Montana, Texas, Iowa, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Mississippi, and Alabama. Equal parts policy critique, polemic, and travelogue, *Conned* is the story of that journey as a reflection on laws that stand at the "intersection of incarceration and political disempowerment" (p. 112). Reading de Tocqueville along the way, Abramsky argues that American "'habits' of republicanism" are being "eroded by the competing 'habits' of incarceration and disenfranchisement" (p. 257). Abramsky concludes that "incrementally" and "unconsciously," the United States is "sliding back into . . . a constricted definition of citizenship and of democracy" (p. 165).

Abramsky's mobile method captures an important truth about disenfranchisement: its real impact depends on legal, administrative, and political details. Such details are the best thing in *Conned*. For example, we learn that Tennessee lawyers have to avoid concentrating their vote restoration appeals with any one judge, because the judge would catch "political heat" (p. 170). We glimpse the politics behind Mississippi's astonishing "suffrage bills," full-dress state laws with the sole purpose of restoring the voting rights of a single person (p. 201). We meet a Tennessee politician who grimly admits that he cannot afford to campaign in his poorest precincts, because disenfranchisement and alienation mean that virtually no one who lives there votes (p. 162). And we get indelible images like that of sixty-eight-year-old great-grandmother Marianne Johnstone, founder of Utah's Prison Information Network, running through the parking lot of a Utah prison to catch up to a just-released burglar—so she could get his signature on a voter registration form (p. 75). Disenfranchisement's racial contours appear at every turn. And for all the alienation he experiences, Abramsky leaves no doubt that many disenfranchised people very much want to vote.

This book's weakness is that Abramsky too often injects himself into the narrative in a distracting way. We learn that some Tennessee fried food was the worst meal he's ever had (p. 168), and that Abramsky stayed in a gorgeous hotel in Brussels when he took a break from researching the book (p. 79). We get condemnations of Houston—"I hated it" (p. 109)—and Iowa—"the state was just rubbing me the wrong way" (p. 124). And Abramsky is an all-out partisan, comparing President George W. Bush's voice to the sound of a bomb falling (p. 121). Such asides limit the book's power as policy critique, because readers who do not share Abramsky's view of the American political landscape will not be inclined to learn from his insights about disenfranchisement's damaging effects.

ALEC EWALD
University of Vermont

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In the Name of National Security: Unchecked Presidential Power and the Reynolds Case *by Louis Fisher. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2006. 256 pp. $34.95.*

In 1948, a B-29 bomber on a secret military mission crashed in Georgia. Widows of three civilians on board brought a civil suit against the government. In *United States v. Reynolds*, decided in 1953, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Air Force could assert a "state secrets privilege" that would block any judicial examination, even in the judges' chambers, of the accident report from the crash and other material.

Louis Fisher, an expert in congressional institutions and the separation of powers, recounts the history of the state secrets privilege and the post-history of *Reynolds*. Forty years after the Court's decision, surviving relatives obtained the accident report and attempted to reopen the case. The relatives argued that the government had committed fraud on the courts in 1953, in part because the accident report in fact contained no sensitive information. Fisher advocates the relatives' version of events. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell what to make of this dispute, from within the four corners of the book. Every court to hear the relatives' renewed claim rejected it; the book does not reprint the investigative material, and Fisher's tendentious presentation gives one no confidence in his conclusions.

Whether or not the *Reynolds* case was an example of executive abuse, what is the right regime for dealing with state secrets, especially when relevant to litigation? Fisher strongly favors a court-centered model, in which there is rarely, or perhaps never, good reason to deny judges the right to examine material in their chambers to determine whether it implicates national security. He suggests that any contrary rule implicitly casts aspersions on the judiciary, licenses unchecked presidential power, and even threatens judicial independence (pp. 253–262). The problem, however, is that there are two sides to this ledger. The benefit of the court-centered approach is that it reduces the rate and perhaps gravity of executive abuses, but there are costs as well. A major cost is that judges are not perfect, and may be wrong about whether disclosing the evidence to parties or others would harm national security. Given the costs arising from judicial fallibility, executive abuses are to be optimized, not minimized to zero; some positive rate of abuse is the inevitable by-product of the optimal state secrets regime.

An alternative regulatory strategy is the one the Court actually adopted in *Reynolds*. The Court required "a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer" (p. 345; *United States v. Reynolds* 345 *United States Reports* 1 [1953] 7, 8). This is a standard technique for controlling various forms of executive discretion in administrative law, as legal scholars David Barron and Elena Kagan have recently emphasized (Elena Kagan and David J. Barron, "Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine," *Supreme Court Review*

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201 [2001]). Requiring the privilege to be asserted by high executive officers makes the decision to invoke it more visible and thus more accountable; activates political checks and partisan oversight; and forces a kind of deliberation by responsible principals with a systemic perspective, as opposed to subordinates with tunnel vision. Here, there is a useful distinction between first-order and second-order transparency. Even if the content of the state secret is not transparent, the executive must make the very decision to assert the privilege in a publicly accountable fashion, producing a kind of second-order transparency: the executive can keep secrets, but cannot keep secret that it is doing so. Too much secrecy will become politically costly, as the recent elections seem to evidence.

ADRIAN VERMEULE
Harvard Law School

The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track *by Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. New York, Oxford University Press, 2006. 288 pp. $26.00.*

Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, in *The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track*, lay out the institutional development of Congress over the last twenty years, a history during which they "have grown more and more dismayed" (p. x). Their long list of grievances against the modern Congress includes "a loss of institutional identity, an abdication of institutional responsibility vis-à-vis the executive, the demise of regular order (in committee, on the floor, and in conference), and the consequent deterioration of the deliberative process" (p. 215).

Most of their criticism regarding the way Congress operates today is aimed at the Republicans, who have been in control since the 1994 elections (with an eighteen-month respite for the Democrats in the Senate when Jim Jeffords switched parties in 2001). But this book cannot be dismissed as a visceral attack on Republicans by authors who are self-confessed Democrats. The authors generously pass around the blame. For Democrats who want to absolve themselves of the guilt of the branch's brokenness, Mann and Ornstein remind, "Few of the steps Republicans took in the majority were invented by them" (p. xi), an obvious allusion to the highly partisan tactics of Speakers Jim Wright and, less so, Tom Foley.

The authors methodically retell congressional history extending back to the framing of the Constitution. They don't intend for this to be a history-of-Congress kind of book, but they nicely show the historical roots of the problems present in today's Congress. The evidence they bring to bear on the argument of the book is behind-the-scenes stories and examples that show the worst side of Congress. They admittedly cherry pick in their selection of stories, but, by the end of the book, even the biggest proponent of Congress

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or most loyal Republicans will be disgusted by the overall picture Mann and Ornstein paint.

Though the authors are not particularly optimistic, they do offer several suggestions that might, if implemented, re-attach the broken branch to the tree of American democracy. These potential fixes include challenger-friendly campaign finance law revision, redistricting reform, a new congressional schedule, new rules for debate, earmark reform, ethics reform, and the prohibition of leadership political action committees (pp. 229–237).

In the end, though, the authors too easily let the Democratic Party and/or the American public off the hook. Let us not forget that it was the consistent drumbeat that the Republicans played in the lead-up to the 1994 election that led to the tsunami in the November 1994 elections. If the Republicans had not been effective at selling their plan, the voters might have kept the Democrats in power. The Republicans, however, masterfully kept the eye of the public focused like a laser beam on the dismal failings of Congress. If the Republicans of today are that much more abusive to the institution of Congress than the Democrats of the 1980s, it is the Democrats' duty to sound the alarm and organize themselves in the way that the Republicans did in 1994. If they do, but the cynicism of the American public precludes them from answering the alarm, we will end up with the legislative branch that we deserve—a branch that is, indeed, broken.

This book is a must read for everyone interested in American politics. Few political scientists have their feet planted so firmly in the world of Washington DC politics and the halls of academia as Mann and Ornstein. Undergraduates will be given an entire semester's worth of information in an interesting, compelling, and concise read. Scholars who do not study Congress will walk away with a more complete understanding of how Congress has developed and the role it plays in today's politics. Congressional scholars, who are quite familiar with the story that Mann and Ornstein are telling, will get a book's worth of anecdotes, stories, and quotes to enliven their theories of congressional decision making. Finally, politicians, political observers, and politically interested readers will be rewarded with a nice mix of anecdotes and political science; the latter will give them a framework for understanding congressional development not only over the last twenty years, but also for the next twenty years.

SEAN M. THERIAULT
University of Texas

Whistling Past Dixie: How Democrats Can Win Without the South *by Thomas F. Schaller. Riverside, NJ, Simon & Schuster, 2006. 320 pp. $26.00.*

Thomas Schaller has strong views about what strategy Democrats should pursue in future presidential elections. Specifically, in *Whistling Past Dixie*,

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he argues that "Democrats should forget about recapturing the South" (p. 2). Democrats do not need the region. Winning the presidency does not require any southern electoral college votes. Nor does a congressional majority require increasing the number of Democratic seats within the region. Democrats are also unlikely to win there. The South, according to Schaller, "is America's most militaristic and least unionized region" (p. 2). Further, the combination of race and religion makes the region a "socially conservative, electorally hostile environment for most statewide Democratic candidates and almost all Democratic presidential nominees" (p. 2).

In place of the South, Schaller argues, Democrats should focus first on reinforcing their support within current "blue" states, now largely located in the Northeast and along the Pacific coast. Next, the Party should build its support in what the author calls the "Democratic Diamond," a "group of swing states in the pan-western polygon formed by connecting Ohio, Montana, Nevada and New Mexico" (pp. 132, 133). Compared to the South, demographic trends and existing political climates in the states located within this area are more favorable to Democrats.

Not only should Democrats ignore the South, they should run against it. According to Schaller, "Because Republicans run the county and the South runs the Republican Party, the southern Republicans are now running the country"(p. 67). Thus, in appealing "to the true American majority of the future" (p. 238), Democratic candidates should link Republicans to the region's poverty, racism, intolerance, militarism, and environmental backwardness.

Schaller's views about what Democrats should do are clear, forceful, and worthy of close consideration. Still, some of his assertions, such as those involving the decision-making process of southern voters, lack full documentation. Similarly, some of his arguments about the development of southern electoral politics fail to reflect nuances and qualifications suggested by recent research.

More generally, Schaller's work raises the important question of whether it is useful to distinguish between the South and elsewhere in setting national political strategies. In essence, Schaller is arguing that Democrats should follow the advice attributed to Barry Goldwater—the politician often credited with a major role in ending the Solid South—to "hunt where the ducks are." Schaller believes that the region is so different from elsewhere, and so hostile to Democrats, that with the possible exception of Florida, there are no Democratic-leaning states within the South. Thus, the Party should avoid the entire region.

Schaller presents a strong case for his argument. Still, the argument would be even stronger if closer and more-systematic attention had been given to the issue of regional differences. Previous analyses of public opinion data suggest that assertions of southern distinctiveness often require qualification. These studies also indicate that the differences that do exist may not be substantively significant once the South is compared to other regions rather than to the entire "non-South."

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More thoroughly considering possible political variations among southern states would also strengthen Schaller's argument for ignoring the region. Accounts of recent presidential elections, for example, show that Democratic candidates have typically ignored, in terms of campaign visits and advertising dollars, all or most of the region's states. However, the relatively few southern states that have been targeted for attention, such as Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, and Tennessee during the Clinton and Gore campaigns, have generally demonstrated a considerable level of competitiveness, even if they have not always produced Democratic victories. Thus, within the South, just as within Schaller's Democratic Diamond, locations may differ in being more or less Democrat-friendly.

PATRICK R. COTTER
University of Alabama

Addressing the State of the Union: The Evolution and Impact of the President's Big Speech *by Donna R. Hoffman and Alison D. Howard. Boulder, CO, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2006. 213 pp. $49.95.*

Increasingly, political scientists are paying serious attention to the form and content of political speech in general, and specifically to presidential speech. And increasingly, political scientists are paying attention to the work of communication scholars to assist in these analytic tasks. This book is a welcome addition to the research that reflects both of these trends.

Donna Hoffman and Alison Howard focus on the president's annual message to Congress, now, of course, called the State of the Union Address, and find that what was once a duty has now become a major vehicle for the exercise of presidential power (p. 44). They offer a brief but thorough history of the annual message, examine the changing structure of the speech, provide an analysis of what they call its "substantive rhetoric," and then explore the utility of the speech (in instrumental terms) in four case studies, each with a different outcome.

Throughout, their concern is less with rhetoric than with communication, at once more broadly and more narrowly understood. That is, they do not examine the "available means of persuasion," in any given speech, but focus instead on policy outcomes understood in the most basic sense. That is, they assume that if a president *said* he supported a specific policy, he did, in fact, support that policy, and they do not look for other possible reasons for the offering of such support. This is both a strength of the book (they are able to compare presidents in interesting ways) and a weakness (they are not able to assess why, for instance, a president might ask for a constitutional amendment he may not really want).

Their main focus is on the period after 1965, when the State of the Union moved to prime time, and the president's role as chief legislator expanded.

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They provide a detailed content analysis of annual messages that spans that period, and which offers some important insights into the functioning of the White House, studying presidents' policy proclivities (they favor social welfare, economic, and governmental affairs policies) and their symbolic language and images (the authors treat the annual message as a symbolic event, and note presidential use of symbolic and religious rhetoric, as well as presidential use of individuals as symbols).

The authors are adept at using theories and ideas from other contexts to shed light on State of the Union addresses. For instance, they look at them as examples of position taking and credit claiming. They also analyze them comparatively, in terms of inaugural examples, intermediate messages, election year speeches, lame duck speeches, and crisis speeches. Finally, they examine successful, unsuccessful, partially successful, and eventually successful instances of State of the Unions, adding depth to the broad analyses of overall trends.

Although they are primarily concerned about the president's role as chief legislator, the authors offer a useful view of how presidents have been able to use the constitutional requirement that they offer information on the state of the union to aggrandize the power of the office and to establish the legislative role of the chief executive. They wield presidential history deftly, and with purpose, and clearly locate this work within the study of the presidency, the rhetorical presidency, and presidential rhetoric. This is a well-written and insightful analysis that will be of use to undergraduates, graduate students, and scholars of political communication, presidential rhetoric, and the presidency.

MARY E. STUCKEY
Georgia State University

Electoral Politics is Not Enough: Racial and Ethnic Minorities and Urban Politics *by Peter F. Burns. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2006. 192 pp. $60.00.*

Urban scholars have been debating the sources and effects of minority political incorporation for well over a quarter of a century. The title of Peter Burns's thoughtful and detailed study accurately signals his thesis. Blacks and Latinos increase city government responsiveness to their concerns primarily through "unconventional resources" (p. 4),—dominantly strong community organizations—rather than through electoral mobilization and representation.

By comparing four medium-sized northeastern cities, the author shows how Bridgeport, in contrast to Hartford, Stamford, and Waterbury, has developed a stronger minority presence within its machine-style, unreformed governance structure. The collaboration and unity of minority and nonminority neighborhood associations and community-based organizations served to make elected leaders aware of minority concerns.

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Not unlike earlier findings in many other American cities, white elected leaders were more aware of African American interests than of Latino concerns. The history of black protest and organization continues to be, in these and most other multiracial cities, a strong marker of mobilization and response to minority interests. Not surprisingly, political leaders in each of the four cities are less responsive to Latino concerns because of the lack of Latino political organization and involvement. Recent research in other cities indicates that with increases in naturalization and second-generation immigrant leadership, Latino mobilization rates are changing rapidly.

The source of the title, "Electoral Politics is Not Enough," explicitly stems from a presumption that earlier writers believed that city governments respond to bi-racial electoral coalitions rather than to varieties of demand and protest activity. In fact, much work focusing on the Civil Rights era demonstrated that demand and protest activity was a necessary but often not sufficient condition for blacks and Latinos in their struggles for political equality.

Though bi-racial electoral coalitions were one among many routes to political incorporation, they were always less likely to explain the variety of coalitions that came together in East-Coast cities with strong parties and machine-style traditions.

Contemporary urban scholars often go further to argue that not only are "elections not enough" but minority political incorporation itself is not enough. Even where minorities have become dominant partners in governing coalitions, as in Atlanta and New Orleans, cities still remain, for the most part, largely incapable of responding or unwilling to respond effectively to the least-well-off in their communities. But city governments and the coalitions that control them are not entirely without resources.

Contemporary successful efforts by progressive regimes to build multiracial, class-based coalitions suggest signs of change. Recently, imaginative leadership and group solidarity in Los Angeles brought together a powerful political coalition of unions, community organizations, environmental groups, religious institutions, and ethnic civic groups to elect a progressive governing coalition. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, through his appointments to boards and commissions, has pushed through anti–sweat shop policies, living-wage laws, health care protection, and important increases in housing trust funds. Like most progressive regimes, the Los Angeles mayoral coalition is fragile and subject to attack from commercial and residential developers as well as others who are resistant to progressive interests. But at a time when millions of people protested the proposed reforms of U.S. immigration laws in 102 cities across the country, the prospects for more-stable and stronger progressive coalitions seem not impossible. These events alone suggest the applicability of Peter Burns's thesis.

DAVID TABB
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Gay Marriage: For Better or for Worse? What We've Learned from the Evidence *by William N. Eskridge and Darren R. Spedale. New York, Oxford University Press, 2006. 352 pp. $29.95.*

Readers interested in a comprehensive accounting of the experience of same-sex registered partnerships in the Nordic countries will find this an illuminating volume. However, those seeking a fuller accounting of the causes and consequences of "gay marriage" may find themselves disappointed by this well-intended but rather misleadingly titled book.

In fairness, the Nordic countries are about the only place that it is possible to study legally sanctioned same-sex unions, which began to be introduced there in the late 1980s. Most other jurisdictions, including places in which same-sex couples have been fully admitted to civil marriage, such as Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, and Massachusetts, have done so only within the past few years.

The heart of the book, chapters 2–5, appears to be have been written chiefly by Darren Spedale, an attorney who spent a two-year Fulbright fellowship studying Scandinavian same-sex unions. While exhaustive in coverage, the discussion doesn't really amount to much; nor, it seems have these marriage-equivalent arrangements. By the book's own estimate, probably no more than 1 percent of the gay and lesbian population (not the general population) have entered such unions, suggesting that they are quite marginal institutions and their participants highly unrepresentative.

The book is leavened with the stories of Scandinavian same-sex couples whose experiences illustrate various points but do not add much to the "evidence" referred to in the volume's subtitle. What impact can be discerned tends to be more social and psychological than legal or political. Legalized same-sex unions provide a few inheritance and tax benefits, and some medical decision-making and immigration rights, but otherwise seem mostly to improve gay and lesbian people's self-esteem and personal relationships.

One dimension of the discussion that is underdeveloped is the degree to which the Nordic countries may be very atypical societies. Their robust social welfare programs, for instance, render moot the kinds of insurance and other benefits that are a major argument for same-sex marriage in the United States. The book also never fully explores how thoroughly secularized and socially egalitarian the Nordic countries have become, compared to the United States (and most of the rest of the world).

Chapter 5 confronts the ways in which social conservatives in the United States, such as Senator Rick Santorum and Judge Robert Bork, use the Nordic experience to claim that same-sex unions undermine traditional values and degrade society. The authors systematically dismantle these arguments, but it barely seems worth the effort. At least as presented by the authors, these claims are so paper-thin that they cannot bear even the slightest logical scrutiny. Such "defense-of-marriage" arguments, it seems, gain much of their power from their emotional, religious, or symbolic resonance with many on

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the political right, making them largely immune to the rational refutation attempted by the authors.

The volume opens and closes with chapters that are quite different from the rest of the book. Chapter 1 provides a straightforward chronological account of the past few decades of the gay and lesbian movement in the United States, with particular attention to the legal evolution of same-sex partnerships. Chapter 6, which the text suggests was authored principally by Yale law professor William Eskridge, offers a wide-ranging overview of various dimensions of the same-sex marriage debate, only partly linked to the early material on the Nordic countries. This chapter offers some fascinating "big picture" ideas about how to understand the various dimensions of the same-sex marriage debate, while a speculative epilogue offers an interesting "emerging menu of relationship options" (p. 251). But neither can contribute much to the task of compiling *evidence* about same-sex marriages. Indeed, it may simply still be too early for a truly compelling book on this topic.

RAYMOND A. SMITH
Columbia University

How Voters Decide: Information Processing During Election Campaigns *by Richard R. Lau and David Redlawsk. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 366 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $29.99.*

In the 2000 presidential contest between Al Gore and George W. Bush, voter errors on the infamous "butterfly ballots" in Florida contributed to a narrow victory for President Bush. Thousands of Florida Democrats who had spoiled their ballots soon realized they had voted incorrectly and cost their candidate the election.

If one believes Richard R. Lau and David Redlawsk, however, these clumsy voters should stop flogging themselves, because they represent just a fraction of the full quarter of the electorate who voted incorrectly in 2000. As Lau and Redlawsk point out in *How Voters Decide: Information Processing During Election Campaigns*, had each voter chosen the candidate who best represented his or her values, preferences, and concerns, Gore would have won by a landslide.

Unlike Thomas Frank, in *What's the Matter with Kansas?* (New York: Henry Holt, 2004), Lau and Redlawsk are reluctant to throw such incendiary findings at the reader, leaving the task instead to insouciant reviewers. In the tradition of Kurt Lewin, Lau and Redlawsk make their case carefully and gradually, through a sequence of innovative information-gathering experiments, coupled with complementary national survey data.

The most novel feature of Lau and Redlawsk's research is their "dynamic information board." If you participated in one of their experiments, you would be asked to make a voting choice after studying rival hypothetical presidential candidates. On your computer monitor, you would see an ever-shifting menu of information categories. Want to learn the Republican's view on abortion?

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Click fast, before that tidbit goes away. Want to know about the Democrat's personal background? Hurry up and click.

When time runs out, the campaign ends and you cast your vote. Later, the experimenters reveal the entire "information board" and give you ample time to read it and reconsider your vote. If you change your mind at this stage, the experimenters code you as having initially voted "incorrectly."

From this experimental design comes the authors' finding that roughly 70 percent of people vote "correctly" under the time pressure and shifting information environment of a simulated presidential general election. Make it a four-candidate presidential primary, and voting accuracy falls by half. (For that matter, one could shorten the experiment's time limit to thirty seconds, and behold the probable voting accuracy of most non-presidential elections.) Not surprisingly, partisans and political sophisticates vote correctly about 30 to 40 percent more often than their counterparts, but no group is error-free.

It is remarkable how well the experimental findings match the national data that Lau and Redlawsk have gathered. To estimate "correct" voting in real elections, the authors relied on expert assessments of the information available to voters during past presidential campaigns, then predicted which candidate voters would select if they were fully informed, given their pre-existing policy preferences, values, and so on. (Try to picture an election in a truly *deliberative* democracy.)

Anyone committed to understanding voter behavior should read this book, which integrates many years of research. *How Voters Decide* offers a novel approach to studying voter cognition, and it yields provocative and detailed findings about memory, heuristics, and decision making that go far beyond this brief review.

Hopefully, readers will accept Lau and Redlawsk's challenge to carry their research program farther. One fruitful direction would be to supplant the information board with a more realistic *message* board. After all, elections are not about information so much as *communication*—one side's rhetorical strategy pitted against that of the other. Campaigns craft images and messages, then deliver these through complex media and interpersonal interactions, striving to stir the passions of their base, woo the undecided, and dispirit their enemies. In the fog of such a rhetorical war, voters surely fail in their task at an even more distressing rate.

JOHN GASTIL
University of Washington

The Constitution as Social Design: Gender and Civic Membership in the American Constitutional Order *by Gretchen Ritter. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2006. 384 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $29.95.*

American politics has been marked by a central tension between its liberal constitution, premised on the equality of individuals, and a social order of

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ascriptive hierarchies of age, race, and gender. In approaching the U.S. Constitution "as social design," Gretchen Ritter illuminates how these distinctive principles have been reconciled in changing, partial, and unstable ways from the founding to the present. Gender, she argues, is a particularly powerful lens for understanding the competing claims of liberal individualism and social order. Women have been constituted as citizens both in their standing as individuals and through their relationships to others, including fathers, husbands, and physicians. The struggle for equality, therefore, has proceeded through thickets of legislation and case law imbued by principles of social order. Not surprisingly, the path of progress toward gender equality has taken strange and unexpected turns.

Take, for example, the case of the Nineteenth Amendment, which gave women the right to vote. Initially conceived as a companion to the Fourteenth Amendment, which had provided a capacious foundation for challenges to racial inequality, the puzzle of the Nineteenth is that it changed very little. Even women's right or obligation to serve on juries did not follow directly from this other central element of citizenship but required further litigation and legislation. Tracking the changing delineation of women's civic membership through judicial decisions and legislative debate, Ritter reconstructs the processes by which advances in women's claims to liberal equality are met by relocations of the principles of ascriptive social ordering. Most strikingly, the recognition and articulation of a right to privacy creates a constitutional space for the social orders of marriage and family—a domain of gender difference insulated from the civic sphere of equal and undifferentiated individuals.

Ritter uses the concept of "civic membership" to reconstruct how constitutional structures have absorbed and redirected pressures for change. These pressures may take many forms: intellectual developments, social movements, historical events such as war, or more gradual demographic trends. Separate chapters are devoted to voting, marriage, and jury service in the wake of the Nineteenth Amendment; to labor and war service during the 1940s; and to the relationship of second-wave feminism to legal doctrines of equality and privacy. In each instance, the tension exerted on existing laws and constitutional theory creates an opportunity for the courts to realign the principles of liberal individualism and the inequalities of social ordering. Thus *The Constitution as Social Design* presents a compelling case for how institutions matter—not as determinative constraints on action but rather as a kind of matrix that dampens, deflects, or even amplifies many possible sources of social change.

The result is a powerful response to the nagging question of why it has taken—or is still taking—so long for women to gain civic equality. At each turn in Ritter's account, successful dismantling of one form of constitutional inequality is followed by a reinscribing of gender inequality in new forms. Overall, one can still detect a secular trend toward a lessening of ascriptive inequalities, yet the argument clearly points to the power of the courts to protect principles of social order through legal interpretation. This argument

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entails a theory of change centered on the capacity of the courts to come to new understandings of civic equality. In the normative concluding chapter, Ritter contends that recent decisions concerning the rights of the disabled and defending the promotion of diversity within educational institutions provide rationales for reconciling liberal equality and differences among persons.

ELISABETH S. CLEMENS
University of Chicago

The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State *by Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana, eds. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 616 pp. Cloth, $110.00; paper, $55.00.*

The title of this hefty collection of twenty-eight essays by American, Canadian, and Israeli legal scholars and political scientists is something of a misnomer. Many of its chapters give little attention to the workings of legislatures but focus instead on general issues such as the nature of deliberation, popular constitutionalism, and the scope of judicial review. Of the pieces that do consider the legislature, most focus on how the legislature deals with constitutional issues rather than on the organization, structures, procedures, or actions of the "least examined branch."

Reframed more narrowly as a study of legislatures—particularly in the United States and Canada—as producers and interpreters of constitutions and constitutional law, however, many of the book's essays make valuable contributions. It is well known that legislatures play an important role in drafting constitutions and constitutional amendments, but some of this book's most interesting chapters demonstrate how legislatures can effectuate constitutional development implicitly, without directly adopting or amending a constitution. Thus, William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn's co-authored chapter on "super-statutes"—such as the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Civil Rights Act, and the Endangered Species Act—indicates that Congress can, through the enactment of ordinary statutes, "introduce or consolidate a norm or principle" that becomes fundamental in our society and has a "broad effect on the law—including effects beyond the four corners of the statute" (p. 321). Not only can such legislatively created norms attain quasi-constitutional status, but these statutes can provide a foundation for a governmental commitment to economic regulation, the social safety net, and environmental protections. In other words, Eskridge and Ferejohn contend, super-statutes can add positive liberties and affirmative duties to the negative liberties that are normally thought of as characterizing American constitutionalism. Similarly, Elizabeth Garrett's treatment of "framework legislation" (p. 294) examines how Congress adopts special rules and procedures to change the deliberative and enactment processes for particular matters, such as the budget process, international trade agreements, and the review of presidential war

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powers. These quasi-constitutional measures can both change the balance of power within Congress and strengthen the ability of the legislature to deal effectively with the executive.

Legislatures not only make constitutional decisions, they epitomize important constitutional values. Although much of the literature on constitutionalism emphasizes the role of constitutional law in constraining the legislature in order to protect fundamental rights and the rule of law, constitutions are also intended to create and empower governments, with modern constitutions creating democratic governments. As Jeremy Weber explains, "Democratic decision making [i]s the first principle of contemporary constitutionalism" (p. 422), and the elected, majoritarian legislature is surely the most democratic branch of government, even though, as Andrew Petter's critical evaluation of Canadian legislatures contends, electoral rules and internal legislative procedures can render many legislatures imperfect democratic vehicles.

Unsurprisingly, in a volume focused on legislatures and constitutionalism, many essays address the conflicts between legislatures and courts over constitutional interpretation. American readers will find the analysis of Canada's "dialogue theory" (p. 519) particularly valuable. Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms subjects fundamental rights to "such reasonable limits . . . as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" (p. 520) and enables Parliament or a provincial legislature to declare that a law may continue to operate for a limited time (subject to renewal), notwithstanding a judicial determination of unconstitutionality. The resulting judicial–legislative dialogue creates a system of judicial review that arguably provides a "fuller realization of the democratic ideal" (p. 462) than does the American norm of judicial supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation.

RICHARD BRIFFAULT
Columbia Law School

The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass Incarceration in America *by Marie Gottschalk. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 451 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $28.99.*

The U.S. prison and jail population currently stands at more than two million people, with incarceration rates five to twelve times those of Western Europe and Japan (p. 1). By its very uniqueness, this policy of mass incarceration should provoke considerable political analysis and alarm. What is striking, then, is how much the current system is taken for granted, having emerged, as Marie Gottschalk notes, without becoming the subject of meaningful political debate.

The Prison and the Gallows provides a highly informative account of the origins of this "carceral state," adding historical depth and a more sophisticated political analysis to the typical focus on developments such as the war on drugs and recent "tough on crime" electoral campaigns. Some prevailing

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views are rejected outright, most notably the claim that prison growth derives from rising crime rates. Law-and-order politics, on the other hand, emerges as a central pillar of the carceral state, but by way of a much longer history than is generally recognized. Here Gottschalk stresses the cumulative effect of various anti-crime political campaigns in establishing the institutional capacity required for contemporary mass incarceration.

Yet the rise of the carceral state also reflects the evolution of interest group politics since the 1960s. For Gottschalk, a crucial and overlooked question in this context is why elite support for mass incarceration met with so little resistance. The thought-provoking answer, central to the book's analysis, is that a range of groups and movements that might have challenged the carceral state, including the women's movement, the prisoners' rights movement, and opponents of the death penalty, instead embraced political perspectives and strategies that facilitated its rise. Thus, for example, the mainstream women's movement took a punitive approach to addressing rape and domestic violence that fed into the victims' rights movement and bolstered law-and-order forces.

Cross-national comparisons are essential to this argument. Most significantly, the absence of comparable prison growth in Britain despite the parallel prominence of neoliberalism and law-and-order politics clarifies the importance of a specific institutional and historical context to recent developments in the United States. Partly because of a stronger welfare state, the British women's movement, for instance, was less inclined to pursue punitive solutions to domestic violence. Access to the courts and receptive law enforcement agencies in turn shaped the actions of the U.S. women's movement, while civil servants in Britain resisted both "penal populism" and any alliance with a women's movement that was itself more ideologically opposed to working with the state (p. 107).

This kind of contrast is illuminating with regard to the distinct trajectories of particular social movements in different countries. Yet the analysis of Britain suggests that the more important contrast in relation to prison growth involves the ways in which existing government institutions and programs mediated the larger political pressures emanating from neoliberalism and law-and-order populism, independent of the social movements under consideration. Similarly, when it comes to race, the book perhaps places too much weight on the prisoners' rights movement and its significance as an unintentional catalyst for the victims' rights movement. This focus on one specific conflict succeeds in contextualizing the politics of race as Gottschalk intends, but it also risks obscuring the broader links between race and U.S. prison growth.

Nonetheless, this is an important, carefully argued, and richly detailed analysis that deserves wide attention. As Gottschalk emphasizes in a largely prescriptive concluding chapter, any efforts to reverse current penal policy should be clear about its origins.

CHARLES WILLIAMS
University of Washington

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Disarmed: The Missing Movement for Gun Control in America *by Kristin A. Goss. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006. 304 pp. $29.95.*

Rarely does a book make a significant contribution to two separate fields, but this work by Kristin Goss does. Readers interested in social movements and social movement theory will find an interesting case study of a movement that never happened—efforts to strengthen gun control laws in the United States. Those who study gun control will encounter a unique perspective on the interest group politics and policy making of firearms regulation.

Well-researched and clearly written, the book is insightful and informative. Goss's journalistic background is evident, both in her prose and in the relative brevity of the book. Her arguments are clearly elucidated in a first chapter that should serve as a model.

The book attempts to explain why there has never been a true gun control "movement" in America. The "gun control paradox" has been stated as why policy has not followed public preferences for gun control laws. Goss restates the paradox as why those preferences resulted in political inactivity (p. 7).

No coordinated grassroots movement for gun control has emerged, despite periods of citizen activism following "movement moments," that is, events that could have precipitated a full-fledged movement (p. 35). Movements require participants' efficacy, sufficient organizational resources, and opportunities to expand the number of participants (p. 32). Only movements that socialize the costs, personalize the benefits, and increase the "payoff" of participation will grow and prosper (p. 51).

By examining archives of gun control leaders, interviewing over seventy activists, and analyzing public opinion data, Goss concludes that gun control failed to coalesce into a social movement for several reasons, including a lack of resources and the fact that those who were most likely to participate and for whom gun control had appeal (middle-class, politically active women) were engaged with different issues. Goss argues that when the issue was finally framed as protecting children rather than as crime control, that is, the Million Mom March, many more citizens became involved.

Choices made by activists also contributed to the lack of a movement. Incremental strategies can result in small victories that build and sustain momentum, but the various gun control organizations focused on national laws they believed would have the greatest potential impact on gun violence—gun registration and the banning of handguns and other types of firearms. This strategy allowed the National Rifle Association (NRA) and other gun rights groups to portray those who favored gun control as radical and outside the mainstream of American thought as they pursued the one policy—a gun ban—that the public opposed. Thus, the NRA employed a successful strategy of "defund, delegitimize, and deprive" (p. 74).

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It is not clear what strategy would have led to movement formation and policy adoption, given the rapid decline of the Million Mom March, the only real grassroots gun control movement. Goss may have too readily dismissed the perceived utility of gun control laws, which is lower than support for various restrictions, and the importance of citizen beliefs regarding the Second Amendment, which she barely mentions.

Gun rights advocates will also be unhappy with Goss's apparent preference for gun control policies. For example, she begins by discussing President Bill Clinton's "modest" measures (p. 1) and later notes that "young people were dramatically less likely to be involved in firearms offenses . . . in the late 1990s," but in the next paragraph, refers to the "gun violence epidemic of the late 1990s" (p. 139). These glimpses of preferences are relatively few and only minimally detract from the overall quality of the research and writing.

HARRY L. WILSON
Roanoke College

The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam *by Andrew Preston. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2006. 334 pp. $49.95.*

As National Security Adviser to Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, McGeorge Bundy was at the center of U.S. foreign policy making for five of the most eventful years of the Cold War. In *The War Council,* Andrew Preston argues that Bundy and his counterparts acted axiomatically on the kind of legalistic-moralistic worldview that George Kennan famously attributed to Bundy's mentor, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and on that of other policymakers who were obsessed with America's global responsibilities. Bundy, the National Security Council (NSC) staff, and the foreign policy establishment they represented brought us disaster in Vietnam, it is argued, because they could conceive of no alternative. Yet despite the strong overtones of tragedy, Preston also argues that Bundy bears a unique responsibility for the unnecessary deaths of millions because he used his skills and bureaucratic proximity to skew debate and force the wrong choices on an unsure Lyndon Johnson.

This book is well written, neatly incorporates many primary sources, and provides cogent summaries of the positions taken by Bundy and some of his key assistants. The author also provides an excellent synopsis both of Bundy's intellectual development and of the transformation of the NSC during this period. Such shortcomings as there are relate to the focused nature of the study. One finds no reference to advice from senior military and diplomatic leaders in Asia who stressed the need and ability to hold the line in Vietnam. Nor does either Hanoi or the National Liberation Front make more than fleeting appearances, making it difficult to assess claims that Bundy misunderstood the enemy's intentions, the impact of bombing, and the pros-

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pects for negotiations. The broader foreign and domestic agendas of the presidents whom Bundy served are given short shrift. In addition, Bundy's behavior seems mischaracterized, since he not only questioned his own assumptions but required his staff officers to do likewise, often in writing.

Most importantly, the presidents themselves are largely missing from the analysis. Bundy's two bosses strengthened the NSC so they could make their own foreign policies. Both did so, and both ignored the recommendations of their key advisers on important foreign policy issues. On Vietnam, however, Kennedy and Johnson both saw a long-standing commitment made by President Dwight Eisenhower and one to be broken only at great cost. Withdrawal, either unilaterally or via negotiations, was never a serious policy option; ideology had little to do with it. The real puzzles relate to how, not why, the United States went to war and, in particular, why Johnson ignored his own plans to solidify congressional support and rally public opinion. This was, in fact, the subject of the project Bundy commenced but did not complete before his death in 1996.

Near the end of *The War Council*, we witness the national security adviser explaining in late 1965 that while he does not believe a bombing pause will be effective, he appreciates the secretary of defense's view that a pause *might* work and in any case would probably ease acceptance of a forthcoming request for 200,000 more ground troops. The author passes over this very political argument and instead quotes approvingly the lament of Chester Cooper, a Bundy aide who dissented strongly on Vietnam, to the effect that Johnson acted more like the "ringmaster of a three-ring circus, rather than as the focal point of a carefully worked out exercise in diplomacy" (p. 231). LBJ would have considered this naïve, particularly when the other rings included his civil rights, voting, anti-discrimination, and anti-poverty legislation. One can surmise that Bundy, who never wavered in his belief that the war would be won or lost on the political battlefield in Vietnam, may have come in his later years to appreciate that the domestic political front was of equal importance to the ultimate decision maker.

JOHN GAROFANO
U.S. Naval War College

A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas *by Chae-Jin Lee. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 376 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $27.95.*

Chae-Jin Lee provides a consciously dispassionate account of the last sixty years of the triangular relationship between the United States and the two Koreas. In a brief introduction, Lee outlines his narrative as a study of policy continuity and discontinuity toward the two Koreas by successive American presidents from Richard M. Nixon to George W. Bush. Lee begins with a con-

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cise overview of Korean–American relations from the mid-nineteenth-century Age of Imperialism to the mid-twentieth-century height of the Cold War. In this first part of the book, Lee relies heavily on published archives, particularly on the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office) series. Lee's scrupulous summary of declassified American sources in examining the administrations of Nixon and Jimmy Carter (1969–1981) is a welcome supplement to Donald S. MacDonald's *U.S.-Korean Relations from Liberation to Self-Reliance: The Twenty-Year Record: An Interpretive Summary of the Archives of the U.S. Department of State for the Period 1945 to 1965* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992). However, in the following chapters that comprise the bulk of the book, dealing with more contemporary events from the administration of Ronald Reagan to that of George W. Bush (1981–present), Lee relies almost exclusively on American and Korean newspaper sources. In the most speculative part of the book, Lee proposes four possible outcomes on the peninsula: an indefinite maintenance of the status quo (likely); the absorption of North Korea by South Korea (less likely); the renewal of inter-Korean hostilities (least likely), or (most desirable) the peaceful reunification of Korea.

Lee concludes by remarking, "As far as the goals of U.S. policy toward Korea are concerned, I am impressed by the remarkable degree of continuity since the end of the Korean War [as outlined] in NSC 170/1 (p. 275)." However, NSC 170/1 (20 November, 1953) was inherently unclear and inconsistent as a foundation, stating in the span of two sentences, "[The US shall] continue to seek . . . a unified and *neutral* Korea under an independent and representative government. To this end be prepared to accept: (1) A unified Korea *friendly* to the United States, *without* U.S. or other foreign forces or bases in Korea (emphasis added)." The last sixty years of American policy toward Korea might better be understood if instead of NSC 170/1, one looks to the "middle course" adopted in NSC 8 (2 April 1948), "To establish within practicable and feasible limits conditions of support of a government established in south Korea as a means of facilitating the liquidation of the U.S. commitment of men and money in Korea with the minimum of bad effects." American desire to withdraw from the peninsula was interrupted by the outbreak of the Korean War in the 1950s, the need for Korean troops for the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the reassessment of North Korean troop strength in the late 1970s, and recently, by North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Lee warns that the United States must soberly recognize Korea's significance to its own economic and military interests, for if Korea were to become neutralized or aligned to a regional power (most likely China), the United States would lose an important economic and military foothold in Asia.

Throughout the narrative, Lee conspicuously avoids explicitly criticizing the past policies of any president, Korean or American. But he offers an oblique criticism of the current Bush administration's militant "hegemonic diplomacy," by emphasizing that policy theorists as divergent as Henry Kissinger

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and Joseph Nye advocate "moral consensus" and "soft power," respectively, over threat and force (p. 278). Overall, Lee's comprehensive and well-documented book is primarily intended for an American audience and is an important new contribution to the understanding of a troubled but vital region.

TAE YANG KWAK
Georgetown University

A Theory of Foreign Policy *by Glenn Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006. 224 pp. $35.00.*

This book offers an explanation of foreign policy that the authors refer to as a portfolio approach. Actually, it has nothing to do with portfolio theory (which would require specification of risk and return trade-offs), but is a microeconomic analogy in which the state is both the producer and the consumer of two foreign policy goods: "change" and "maintenance."

The major problem is that the model is little more than a metaphor that does not yield any testable hypotheses. The model has numerous unstated assumptions. For example, the authors state that countries will always seek both change and maintenance policies (p. 27), which assumes that the indifference curves are specified such that there is no corner solution producing a foreign policy of only one good. Model specifications do not fit descriptions. They refer to states as "expected utility maximizers," but the model has no references to the probabilities of outcomes. The propositions suggested by the authors in chapter 2 appear to be derived more from intuitive common sense rather than to have been deduced from the microeconomic metaphor (for example, as state capabilities increase, defense spending increases at a decreasing rate). Some of the hypotheses even contradict the model (for example, the hypothesis that change-seeking behavior increases at an increasing rate and maintenance-seeking policies increase at a decreasing rate is inconsistent with the decreasing returns to scale assumption implied by the concave production frontier in Figure 2.2, which shows that both must increase at a decreasing rate). Yet when they return to a formal specification of the model (see Figure 5.1), it now has constant returns to scale. There is just too much confusion here to motivate the reader to invest much time in following the elaboration of the model, especially since the historical cases and empirical tests can be followed without reference to the model. All these problems suggest that the theory part of the book is best skipped over and that the reader should focus on whether the empirics add to our knowledge.

The application of the model to case studies is not enlightening. In chapter 4, the authors explain the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in terms of the model. They frame the policy disagreements between the primary Russian policymakers (Bukharin, Lenin, and Trotksy) in terms of preferences for change- or maintenance-seeking policies. It is unclear how such a framing increases

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our understanding of the treaty. Of more interest are the data-based studies in chapters 6 and 7. In chapter 7, we find, for example, a large-n test of the proposition that strong states are more likely to engage in change-seeking behavior. Finally, in chapter 7, there are some equally interesting speculations subjected to large-n tests, such as the hypothesis that large alliance members will give less foreign aid.

This book is something of a curate's egg. Though it does not attain its claim to specify a general theory of foreign policy as a portfolio of goods, much less produce testable hypotheses from this theory, it does offer a selection of interesting empirical tests on intuitively sensible propositions that are most likely consistent with the view that foreign policy choices entail trade-offs between objectives. Fortunately, the usefulness of these empirical findings does not depend on one accepting the theoretical edifice that precedes them.

JOHN CONYBEARE
University of Iowa

Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action After the Cold War *by Ryan C. Hendrickson. Columbia, University of Missouri Press, 2006. 172 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $16.95.*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the premier Cold War military alliance, has given scholars much to write about since the collapse of its major adversary, the Soviet Union, in 1991. Experts have examined the alliance's efforts to face new security challenges, its enlargement across Europe, and its use of force in the Balkans. But as Ryan Hendrickson argues, no one has thought to analyze the role played by NATO's top civilian, the secretary general. Hendrickson sets out to do just that, illuminating how the first four post-Cold War Secretaries General—Manfred Wörner, Willy Claes, Javier Solana, and George Robertson—acted on questions involving NATO's use of military force.

These four individuals are inherently interesting characters. Each had significant foreign and/or security policy experience in his home country prior to assuming the leading position at NATO, and each brought a different style to the organization. Wörner, until his untimely death from cancer in 1994, pushed hard for the United States to show leadership on Bosnia, while Claes, who was soon forced to resign over a political scandal back home in Belgium, was less pushy with the Americans. Solana, about whom the United States was initially concerned, given his Socialist background, became an effective advocate for action in Kosovo. Robertson, known for his sense of humor (and his many references to his early work as a union representative in the Scottish whisky industry), continually hammered away at the need for NATO member states to develop sufficient capabilities in order to deploy military forces effectively in crises.

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Secretaries general turn out to be important in making sure all allied voices get heard when NATO faces major decisions, and they have been useful in the post-Cold War era as advocates for action when officials from capitals are reluctant to get involved. For all of them, a good relationship with the United States is central to their ability to function effectively.

Hendrickson makes good use of interviews with leading officials, but what is lacking in the book is more context for the activities of his subjects. When he cites a particular action by a secretary general as important, we never know enough about what was going on back in Washington, or between Washington and the major European capitals, to gauge its relative influence. It would be interesting, for example, to use the Freedom of Information Act to gain access to documents that could show us more of the interaction between the secretaries general and American officials.

But what the reader longs for most is the voice of the subjects. Wörner, sadly, is gone, and Solana is certainly difficult to reach, given his current job as the EU's high representative for the common foreign and security policy. But there is something missing in a book that focuses on four individuals, none of whom speak directly to the reader about the subjects under examination, either through interviews with the author or through private diaries and papers. How would they describe the role they played? Were they particularly proud of certain achievements or frustrated with any limitations of the job?

Hendrickson has performed a useful service by highlighting the role played by these four leading alliance diplomats. They are much less well known than their counterparts who lead the United Nations, but as NATO operates more and more outside of Europe, their activities will become of even greater interest to the rest of the world.

JAMES GOLDGEIER
George Washington University

Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm *by Neil E. Harrison, ed. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2006. 213 pp. $60.00.*

In the interest of immediate and full disclosure, I approach with great skepticism all work on complex systems approaches in international politics and all related work using agent-based models (ABMs) for macro analysis from micro-foundations. I want to believe in their ability to bring value added to our analysis of a changing world. Obviously, international systems are much more complex than simple realist or other rationalist portrayals. The mapping by Neil Harrison in the volume's introductory chapter of the difference between simple systems and complex ones is very well done, and his argument that the world falls into the complex system category is convincing. The notion

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of the emergence of systemic properties from the complex interaction of large numbers of agents is compelling, especially as an alternative to simplistic and mostly static images of the workings of the world.

Yet time and again, the applications of the approach to real-world phenomena disappoint. The very complexity recognized and typically detailed makes ultimate explanations appear to be those of an underdetermined system, that is, to be solutions but not unique and therefore fully satisfying ones. The emergent patterns of micro-level actors driven by simple rules (in what appears an almost inherently contradictory attempt to make complexity simple) seem likewise inadequate as explanations of the complex behavior of macro systems so convincingly described. Too often, sugarscapes reappear in the work and teasingly remind us of the relative simplicity of basic life in our childhood ant farms, but do not seem to help us understand the emergence of the post- (or now post-post-) Cold War era. It should be acknowledged immediately that this volume recognizes these issues and even lets David Earnest and James Rosenau provide a strong critique of the approach in a chapter titled "Signifying Nothing?"

All that being said, and in part because of it, this volume merits serious attention. The additional contributors, J. David Singer, Dennis Sandole, Walter Clemens, Matthew Hoffman, Ravi Bhavnani, Robert Axelrod, and Desmond Saunders-Newton represent multiple generations of the best of those involved in the field. They do very good jobs of demonstrating some of the teasing insights that the approach can generate. Sandole looks at ethnocentrism's foundations and projects the phenomenon upward to conflict resolution (through a very good analysis of alternative strategies in the prisoner's dilemma) and on to a range of post-Cold War unfoldings. Clemens builds on the concept of "societal fitness" (p. 73), linked to notions around coevolution, punctuated equilibrium, and more, to help us see Eurasia since the Cold War with new lenses. Hoffmann turns to environmental regimes, especially that on ozone depletion, and again helps make sense of, or at least provide candidate explanations for emergent patterns. Bhavnani provides some real insight on the emergence of ethnic norms and the violence in Rwanda. Axelrod reviews the purposes or uses of simulation, acknowledging that agent-based modeling does not always provide accurate portrayals of a given empirical phenomenon but can still provide generalizable insights about processes, a kind of mental tool-kit for use broadly in understanding complex patterns. Saunders-Newton provides a review of how various governmental organizations are seeking exactly such insights from the approach.

In short, the book is very much aware of the limitations as well as the strengths of complex systems analysis and ABM. On the whole, it does not over-promise with respect to the field, instead giving a clear portrait of where it now stands. Harrison and the book finish as they began, expressing belief in the contributions of complex systems analysis to theory building and policy analysis. I finish as I began, skeptical about how much of either is

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possible with the approach. Yet I conclude also with appreciation for a very useful volume.

BARRY B. HUGHES
University of Denver

Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq *by Ahmed S. Hashim. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2006. 322 pp. $29.95.*

Ahmed Hashim presents an excellent descriptive case study of the Iraq conflict. His historical narrative begins with the initial invasion as part of the conventional war and follows the growth and development of the insurgency into 2005. Additionally, Hashim gives a detailed description of the organizational structure, ideology, and overall goals of the various groups. We clearly see the complexity of the insurgency, which contains elements of ex-Ba'athists, Iraqi nationalists, Sunni partisans, and jihadists. Hashim further describes the various Shi'a organizations operating in Iraq, which adds to the rich nature of this study.

Hashim's account describes the onset of a security dilemma within Iraqi society. Though he does not use this term, his description of how the beliefs of ordinary Iraqis quickly moved from a view of Americans as liberators to one of Americans as occupiers is a classic example of how security dilemmas arise. Hashim argues that initially, numerous Iraqis adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the Americans. However, after the United States began dismantling key Sunni institutions, such as the Ba'ath party and the army, Sunnis came to view the United States as a threat, leading to an increase in insurgent activities. This increase prompted a strong military response from the United States, which only further inflamed the Sunni population. In the end, the United States found itself in conflict with Sunni insurgencies and disaffected Shi'a insurgencies, and in the position of trying to be seen as an honest broker between all three ethnic groups within Iraq. Hashim argues that the current situation in which the United States finds itself suggests that neither the Sunnis nor the Shi'a see the United States as such.

Additionally, Hashim's description of the various organizations within Iraq and their strategies is very useful for students of non-state actors. A key aspect of his discussion is the identification of hierarchical versus decentralized structures. He describes the various types of organizations, their leadership structures, and their tactics. And he further details each of the numerous movements operating in Iraq, providing the basis for an excellent understanding of the complexity of the resistance. He outlines how difficult cooperation is between the various groups, since each has independent preferences; he discusses how this makes negotiation very difficult but also offers an opportunity for coalition forces to exploit weaknesses within the larger insurgency.

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What makes Hashim's contribution so invaluable is that this work is an exceptionally rich case study of how insurgencies rise, and of the difficulties in negotiating peace between combatants. He appears very skeptical that the Iraq initially envisioned by U.S. policymakers will ever come to fruition, largely as a result of U.S. actions. Instead, Iraq faces a choice between a strong central structure favored by the Sunnis, a federal state favored by the Shi'a and the Kurds, or the dismemberment of Iraq, which is seemingly favored by no one. Hashim argues that at this point, there may be no viable solution that is favorable to U.S. interests: if U.S. forces were to leave, an internal conflict would probably erupt as a result of the security dilemma; if the Americans remain, the collaborators "will all be fighting for the last seat ... fleeing the green zone" (p. 389).

This book is an invaluable tool for scholars seeking to explain security dilemmas to students of international politics, and it outlines in a very articulate way all of the problems associated with insurgency, occupation, and peace processes. It is significant not only for its historical content, but also for its ability to teach students about these problems using an exceptionally important case.

NAVIN A. BAPAT
Pennsylvania State University

Intimate Ties, Bitter Struggles: The United States and Latin America Since 1945 *by Alan L. McPherson. Dulles, VA, Potomac Books, 2006. 224 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $21.95.*

This book offers the reader a nice up-to-date historical overview of U.S.–Latin American relations since 1945, as well as an introduction to the pre-1945 era. There is also mention of inter-Latin American relations, but within the context of the larger story. Theoretically, the author navigates the waters between diffusion (modernization) and dependency theories and thus provides a balanced look at U.S. political and economic influence south of the Rio Grande (*Río Bravo del Norte*).

The major advantage of the book is in its complete historical outline. With sufficient detail (and very interesting quotes), the author examines the impact of U.S. foreign policy on Latin America and Latin America's reaction to it. This includes an extensive examination of Cold War politics (chapters 1–4) and the beginnings of economic and cultural relationships after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Cold War era focus is the typical description of U.S. installation and/or support of anti-democratic regimes, human rights abuses, debt, and economic decline. Lacking is sufficient description regarding the various governmental and nongovernmental actions seeking accountability for these events. For example, there is little mentioned regarding the International Court of Justice case against the administration of Ronald Reagan for mining

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Nicaraguan waters. However, this critique should not be confused for the subject's complete neglect. The author does address "Anti-American Sentiment" in chapter 2, but this is mostly in the context of its feeding into Washington's anticommunist hysteria. He also peppers the book with some of the calls for redress. The post-Cold War chapter (chapter 5) focuses on the growth of economic interdependence, with attention to the neoliberal policy, also known as the Washington Consensus. However, the second half of the chapter offers greater originality and interest, with a description of the transnational nature of current relations. The fusion of Latino culture via immigration into the American mainstream, and its real and potential impact, was appetizing and drove me to desire more.

The major disappointment of the book was that the author did not carry on his argument sufficiently past the introduction. He proposes a theory that U.S.–Latin American foreign policy develops from unfavorable U.S. beliefs regarding the peoples and governments of Latin America, which in turn produce unfair attitudes. From this cultural-psychological perspective, the United States treated and treats countries of the western hemisphere's south differently from other countries. This is a very interesting approach, since many books on the subject tend to focus on asymmetric power relations. However, in the introduction, he demonstrates that even in the early days, when the United States and many Latin American countries were in a parity situation, the same attitudes that influence modern policies prevailed. He drives home this argument in regard to all the events of the pre-1945 era. This is not to say that he completely ignores the argument in the subsequent chapters. For example, the account of Harry Truman's views about whether to extend a Marshal Plan to Latin America addresses Truman's attitude that money spent in Europe would produce strong economies, whereas that spent in Latin America would be squandered. It is disappointing that more on this subject was not presented in the main chapters of the book.

Overall, this book is highly recommended for individuals who have an incomplete background in U.S.–Latin American relations. It is accessible to nonspecialists and would be a very good text for an upper-division course, given the ample facts described. It would also be a good text for graduate students who need a quick background read on the subject before tackling its complexity.

GASPARE M. GENNA
University of Texas

Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democracy and Ecological Rationality *by Walter F. Baber and Robert V. Bartlett. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2005. 288 pp. $24.00.*

The basic intuition at the heart of this intelligent book is as important as it is obvious, although few have recognized it or recognized it as clearly as the

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authors: in modern mass democracies, ecological sustainability does not have a prayer unless citizens care about ecological sustainability. Environmentalists cannot avoid engaging democratic theory. Not just any democratic theory will do, however. Theories of interest group democracy, because they take public opinion and entrenched interests as givens, cannot offer a viable framework for thinking through a transformation of public opinion and a convergence of interests. Citizens need to be convinced that the environment needs their full attention, and they need to come to a consensus on shared environmental goals. Only deliberative democratic theory, with its emphasis on public opinion formation (indeed *trans*formation) and the construction of agreement through dialogue, offers a promising model.

In fleshing out the relationship between deliberative democracy and environmental politics, the authors introduce three approaches to public discourse: the public-reason approach, exemplified by John Rawls; the ideal-discourse approach, exemplified by Jürgen Habermas; and the full-liberalism approach, articulated by James Bohman, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson. Although the authors lean slightly toward Bohman, they draw from all three in developing their positive picture. The view of politics and public discourse that emerges is rich and interesting, although sometimes the textual analysis of the selected authors is weak. Read this book to get an innovative, thoughtful, and persuasive vision of a deliberatively inspired environmental politics (or perhaps an ecologically inspired deliberative politics). Do not read this book to get the most nuanced or precise interpretation of Rawls, Habermas, or Gutmann and Thompson. Habermas and Rawls are depicted as erring on the side of impartiality in seeking a type of deliberation that transcends all differences. But the authors make the serious error of equating Rawls's idea of public reason with the original position. While Rawls clearly thinks that being reasonable means seeking reasons that all citizens could find persuasive, he does not think that we need to step behind a veil of ignorance in public discourse. Despite getting some of the details wrong, the authors nevertheless nicely set out the general divide in deliberative theory between an idealized and abstract picture of citizen deliberation that ends in consensus (Habermas and Rawls) versus a concrete and embedded picture of deliberation that ends in negotiated settlement (Bohman, Gutmann, and Thompson). In contrast, the authors want a concrete and embedded view of deliberation that ends in consensus.

By far the most interesting conclusion the authors come to with respect to deliberative theory is their opposition to the trend toward weakening the role of consensus and strengthening the place of cultural differences. They worry that such a move will exclude the possibility that citizens can come to a "unitary concept of ecological sustainability" (p. 117). Furthermore, they are suspicious that the trend toward placing greater value on cultural recognition might make culturally based practices off-limits for criticism. This, in turn, might hinder the "environmentalist hope of developing a new pattern of

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personal preferences . . . based on ecological awareness"(p. 117). The authors appear to think that multiculturalism is bad for the environment, at least to the extent that it makes us suspicious of consensus and convergence. Ecological sustainability requires that citizens in some sense rise above their cultural differences in recognizing a generalizable interest in ecological sustainability.

The book contains many interesting suggestions for identifying potential deliberative sites where citizens and experts can come together to forge the political will to put the rational solution into practice. But the bottom line of this book is that environmentalists need to get political, not in the sense of intensifying their lobbying in Washington, but rather, in the sense of forging a deliberative alliance with the people.

SIMONE CHAMBERS
University of Toronto

Democracy and Elections in Africa *by Staffan I. Lindberg. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 248 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $24.95.*

There are myriad reasons to be pessimistic about the current state of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria's recent federal elections have been roundly criticized, both domestically and intentionally, as particularly violent and fraudulent, even in comparison to the country's pitiful past exercises. In Senegal, long considered one of the continent's brightest success stories, major opposition groups announced that they would not participate in the June 2007 legislative balloting, citing their displeasure over the results of the February presidential election and perceived institutional biases against them. And, despite an increase in political agitation against his autocratic rule, Robert Mugabe's age may be the only hindrance to his remaining in power in Zimbabwe in perpetuity. In sum, the outlook for democratic governance in Africa can appear quite bleak.

Democracy and Elections in Africa comes as a welcome palliative to prevailing Afro-pessimism. Positioning himself as what he would call a "demo-optimist," Staffan Lindberg presents a number of important empirical findings that contradict the gloom-and-doom studies produced in the late 1990s on the declining quality of democratic processes in Africa and the re-entrenchment of often predatory rulers there. While there is certainly no reason to be exceedingly sanguine about the state of politics in the region, Lindberg finds that the quality of democracy in Africa is not only quite stable, but that it is also improving in a number of areas.

Broadly, Lindberg contributes two particularly significant findings, one relating to the quality of elections in Africa and the other to the causal effects of these institutions. First, in the period between the launching of the "Third Wave" in Africa—which many scholars date to Namibia's elections in

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1989—and 2003, neither the frequency nor the quality of elections in Africa has declined; rather, when one considers the entire period, elections are being held with increasing frequency, and in an increasing number of countries. In addition, the average quality of those elections, which Lindberg measures via attention to a number of variables intended to capture levels of participation (both elite and mass), competitiveness, and legitimacy, is at worst steady, and is in a number of important ways actually increasing. These findings contradict those conducted a half decade earlier, which found that the average quality of elections in Africa was in marked decline.

Perhaps even more significant are Lindberg's findings as to what he has called "the power of elections" (p. 71). In general, the holding of elections seems to generate significant improvements in civil liberties, such as freedom of expression and the rule of law. What is more, after a country has held three de jure contested elections without interruption, the likelihood of a democratic breakdown in the future declines considerably. In short, elections seem to play a large role in the consolidation of democracy in Africa. Quite surprisingly, these gains occur regardless of the quality of the elections themselves, suggesting that there are real advantages to the holding of such contests, no matter how flawed. For those in the democracy promotion community, this assertion is likely to be of considerable interest.

Although Lindberg is cognizant of the need to avoid "unabashed empiricism" (p. 103), his book is at times heavier on statistical findings than on theories developed to explain the observed patterns. For example, while he lists a number of possible mechanisms, all plausible, ranging from modified elite expectations and experiential learning to media development and rising associational activism, through which elections might yield their observed salutary effects, he leaves any significant analysis or testing of these propositions for another project or researcher.

Lindberg's greatest contribution with this research is perhaps the truly impressive data set he created for the project, which has measures for sixteen variables on 232 African elections. These data, many of which are summarized in information-packed appendices, are a boon to any analyst interested in African politics, or democratic development more generally.

JEFFREY KRUTZ
Columbia University

Globalization, Politics, and Financial Turmoil: Asia's Banking Crisis *by Shanker Satyanath. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 172 pp. $60.00.*

The interaction of three conditions determines the decision-making process in any policy framework including international finance: *the signaling condition* (or freedom for the chief executive to appoint top advisers who share his

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policy preferences), *the anti-cronyism condition* (or freedom from personal ties to the banking sector), and *the anti-gridlock condition* (or freedom to implement decisions). Failure to meet any of these conditions results in lax regulation. This book focuses on the signaling condition derived from "cheap talk" signaling (a game theory term indicating a form of cost-free communication prior to a play) to international financial policy making. Shanker Satyanath makes an important contribution in this area by empirically showing how imperfect or inaccurate information is highly probable under certain political circumstances in the area of international financial policy. Focusing on Southeast Asia in the years preceding the financial crisis of 1997–1998, Satyanath applies game theory to a study of bank regulation under free capital movement in selected countries. He identifies the political environments that are likely to embody credible commitments to stringent bank regulations and those that are likely to embody incredible commitments to tight regulation. In general, it appears from Satyanath's conclusions that assuming both democracies and dictatorships have a preference for strong bank regulation and an aversion to lax bank regulation, the authoritarian regimes are more likely to be better at bank regulation than democratic regimes. He shows that when advisers (such as the finance minister or central bank governor) have policy preferences different from those of the chief executive, they will have incentives to be vague about the state of the financial sector. Much of the analysis focuses on a situation in which the executive who is tough on regulation has advisers who are lax, and their mixed signals, bad signals, faulty information, or flat miscommunication prevents the executive from carrying out his tough policy and may produce a crisis. The argument could work as well in the other direction. Regulators and ministers knowing the executive's preference for laxity present a bleaker picture to ensure stronger regulation and avert a crisis. Indeed, one can imagine this type of policy preference mismatch happening frequently.

But the study also raises some questions. First, why this assumption of policy preference mismatch between the executive and the finance minister only in democracies? The finance minister, after all, is selected by and serves at the will of the executive in both regime types. Why would the democratic executive be more likely to choose someone with opposite ideas? If some authoritarian regimes are better at picking more appropriate advisers to carry out the executive's program, that seems to be a statement on good governance, not electoral system. If the signaling condition were restated with some "good governance" indicator, it would be stronger in asserting that those developing countries with strong governments are more likely to implement stringent banking regulations than those with weak governments. Also, it is a little difficult to fathom how numbers can be miscommunicated if not purposefully.

The broad implications of Satyanath's findings are that developing-country democracies should maintain capital controls in an era of globalized finance

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but dictatorships should not. This might mean that China should liberalize, but India should not. That all of Latin America should have capital controls, except perhaps Venezuela. The conclusions do not sufficiently take into account economic growth, size, debt levels, trade balances, or other macroeconomic figures. These points aside, this book makes a significant contribution to the progress of international relations by addressing the concept of incomplete and asymmetric information in international finance.

ANASTASIA XENIAS
Columbia University

It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics *by Francesca Polletta. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2006. 256 pp. $19.00.*

Four years ago, Francesca Polletta laid out both the strategic advantages and the considerable costs of participatory democracy. *Freedom Is an Endless Meeting* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002) presented a convincing account of how messy grassroots decision making allowed social movements like Students for a Democratic Society and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee to foster creativity while at the same time build solidarity. Internal trust, as exemplified by the sisterhood of the women's liberation movement, came at the price of an exclusivity that turned politically destructive. This acclaimed study of a half-dozen such movements advanced the understanding of how the micro-logics of social movement organizations influence their success.

Now Polletta continues her up-close look at movements for social change by focusing on their use of stories to organize cognition and steer action. She draws on stories told by social movement actors at multiple levels of commitment, from the deeply institutionalized (African American congressmen, court records) to the more occasional and spontaneous (students who participated in sit-ins, online discussions of the future of the World Trade Center site). While her data and methods are somewhat haphazard, she is seeing stories in action in a variety of contexts and levels, and her multiple angles of vision produce rich insights, if not a single elegant and testable thesis.

Some of her points are familiar from the work of historical sociologists like Margaret Somers and George Steinmetz and from micro-sociologists like Gary Alan Fine; for example, that narratives frame incoherent experience and suggest lines of action, or that "Stories make explicit the cultural *schemas* that underpin institutional practices" (p. 15). Polletta breaks newer ground in showing how the ambiguity of some stories and their rhetorical treatment can generate interpretive possibilities that can suit a variety of agendas. One chapter shows how African American congressmen and local activists both tell "their" Martin Luther King stories, the former using him in support of working

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within the political system and performing community service, the latter using him in support of radical, extra-institutional action.

Some stories are less susceptible to opposing interpretations. For example, when battered women who have killed their abusers tell their tales in court, they get trapped in a victim narrative—I was a victim until the day I snapped—that may not do them much good legally. Nor can they reinterpret themselves as not-really-a-victim, for this would undercut their case of self-defense. What they can do is draw on literary techniques, such as the rhetorical trope of irony, that de-familiarize the victim story and prompt fresh consideration. One woman describes how she had passively accepted the idea that her abusive boyfriend would eventually kill her until one day, in the middle of a beating when, as she was "sliding down my refrigerator" under his pummeling fists, she suddenly decided she wanted to live and began to fight back (p. 132). The jarring incongruity of violence and refrigerators destabilized the familiar victim narrative, forcing the jury into a more immediate encounter with the woman's experience.

Since she concentrates on progressive movements, radical rather than conservative protest, Polletta's analysis leaves the reader to wonder if stories play the same roles for traditionalists. Two plausible lines of thought suggest opposite hypotheses. One would be that left-wing movements involve greater degrees of (or aspirations for) social upheaval, and that therefore they need narrative framing to discipline action and avoid lapsing into anarchy. This is an application of Robert Wuthnow's "breakdown in the moral order" (*Meaning and Moral Order: Explorations in Cultural Analysis*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) or Ann Swidler's "unsettled times" arguments ("Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 [1986]: 273–286). The other would be that right-wing movements tend toward literalism and narrow interpretations, eschewing nuance and intolerant of ambiguity, so they use canonical stories to keep movement participants focused; Amy Binder's work on creationism or Kristen Luker's classic study of abortion politics suggests something of this sort. Some such comparisons that cross the political spectrum might be a logical next item on Polletta's research agenda.

WENDY GRISWOLD
Northwestern University

Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies *by Tristan Anne Borer, ed. Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. 328 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $35.00.*

This collection is the third of three volumes resulting from a major research project on post-accord peace building carried out under the auspices of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.

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The volume's objective, as editor Tristan Anne Borer states in her introduction, is to examine "whether truth-telling mechanisms can contribute to sustainable peace, and, if so, how and under what conditions" (p. 3). It is a welcome aim. Neither the post-conflict peace-building literature nor the transitional justice (TJ) literature has rigorously and systematically examined that relationship. The ubiquitous claim that "truth is necessary for peace," remains a largely untested hypothesis, rather than an empirically established fact.

Borer laments the literature's lack of methodological rigor and its "overly vague and aspirational" arguments (p. 3). The book's intention, she states, is to address those weaknesses; to focus on the empirical evaluation of the experience of truth telling after violent conflicts in order to move beyond "oft-repeated assertions in the existing literature about what truth-telling mechanisms *can* and *should* do into analyses of whether they actually *do* perform these functions" (p. 25). That formal truth telling has now become de rigueur in postwar peace processes makes it imperative to fully scrutinize the assumptions upon which those activities are based.

Despite this aim, however, the book's reach clearly exceeds its grasp. Borer's exhaustive, nearly fifty-page introduction stands out as one of the better chapters, providing a solid overview of the literature, and a lucid discussion of key conceptual and definitional issues. But the remaining chapters come up short, both individually and collectively, in accomplishing the task at hand. Many of the book's chapters, in fact, don't follow the editor's marching orders, while some (those by Juan Méndez and Pablo De Greiff) explicitly reject the central social-scientific premise that one can generalize from historical experience (p. 120) and isolate truth telling's independent effects on peace (p. 183) (an extremely disheartening view, given Méndez's position as UN special adviser on prevention of genocide and the influence of the International Center for Transitional Justice, of which he is president and De Greiff research director).

Indeed, a number of the chapters find it hard to remove the normative lens, so common in the TJ literature, and rigorously examine the empirical assumptions on which those claims are based. Instead, they acknowledge truth telling's ambiguous impact on post-conflict peace, and advance aspirational arguments about how to fix the process. Jennifer Llewllyn's chapter, an otherwise excellent work of political theory that carefully explicates the concept of restorative justice, argues that truth commissions would be far more effective peace-building tools if they were more consciously organized around restorative justice principles. Similarly, Debra DeLaet's chapter argues that truth telling would be more effective if it were more gender sensitive, while Brandon Hamber argues that truth-telling mechanisms would be more effective at conflict prevention if their architects were more sensitive to the impact of psychological trauma on victims and societies. De Greiff's chapter proposes a number of hypotheses on how truth telling can more effectively advance the rule of law. And though Méndez's survey of the Latin American experience with

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truth telling finds that it has had uneven success, he ultimately asserts that truth is a human right to be guaranteed and promoted, regardless of the effect it might actually have on the stability of post-conflict societies (pp. 143–144). The disconnect here between the project's stated intentions and its final product is obvious.

Rather than a systematic assessment of truth telling's utility, the book succeeds far better as an exercise in generating hypotheses and articulating an important future research agenda—an important but much less ambitious task.

DAVID MENDELOFF
Carleton University

The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO *by John H. Barton, Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling, and Richard H. Steinberg. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006. 256 pp. $29.95.*

Bringing together expertise from political science, law, and economics, these four leading scholars present a comprehensive analysis of the interaction between domestic and international politics in the evolution of the rules that govern international trade. Their central question asks how the trade regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor organization the World Trade Organization (WTO), has evolved in response to changing demands from its members. The greatest challenge for the regime will be to adapt institutional norms and principles that were designed to address border policy negotiations among an industrialized club to current negotiations among an expanded membership on topics that reach deep into domestic policies.

In the legislative process of trade rounds, bargaining power based on market strength allowed the United States and Europe to effectively shape GATT/WTO rules to serve their interests. Despite consensus decision rules, developing countries were marginalized. Even when they gained less from the distributive bargains than the major powers, they were better off to sign on than to be excluded from U.S. and EU markets (p. 66).

A key area of evolution in the regime has been increasing legalization of the judicial process for resolving trade disputes. The authors describe this as the "Americanization" of the dispute settlement process and show how the reforms closely followed U.S. demands (p. 74). At the same time, these reforms were a major goal of other members trying to restrain U.S. unilateralism. The dispute process has enforced agreements even when they have been opposed to the strong domestic interests of the major powers. For example, Japan's 1995 WTO complaint forced the United States to back down on its threat to impose unilateral sanctions on Japanese auto imports, while Brazil's legal victories in two WTO panels led both the United States and

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Europe to reform agricultural subsidy programs. Nevertheless, despite occasional losses in individual cases, overall enforcement of the rules benefits all members.

The analysis of the basic institutional framework shows that in many areas, what appears as institutional weakness—for example, small, centralized organization and exceptions for temporary deviation from the rules—has contributed to the strength of the regime. Such flexibility helps states maintain the political coalitions that allow continued commitment to free trade. Even the derogation from nondiscrimination principles through the rise of preferential trade agreements is portrayed as a "functional part of the trading regime" that builds political support for multilateral liberalization (p. 54). A more rigid institution would risk producing liberalizing outcomes that could not be self-enforcing, which leads the authors to voice concerns about the trend toward greater legalization. The authors are similarly skeptical about calls for greater transparency, concluding that secrecy often facilitates politically necessary deals.

Evaluating the effectiveness of an institution is a challenging task because the rules serve multiple interests and goals. As emphasized in this book, the trade regime supports trade liberalization, but also plays an equally important regulatory role by establishing rules of conduct to increase the predictability of trade relations. The authors themselves are skeptical about the gains for developing countries from a regime that has been dominated by power-based bargaining (p. 206). Yet the predictability of trade and defense against arbitrary protectionism hold the greatest value for vulnerable developing states that have high levels of trade dependence and lack bargaining leverage outside of the rules system.

The book is well written and achieves an admirable balance between depth and breadth in its analysis of a complex regime. As an up-to-date review of the trade regime, with original theoretical insights about international institutions, the book should be required reading for both scholars and practitioners of international trade policy.

CHRISTINA DAVIS
Princeton University

Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peace Building
by Siobhan McEvoy-Levy, ed., Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. 352 pp. $35.00.

This is an excellent compendium of research on largely micro-efforts at peace building aimed at youth, set in the context of country conflicts that remained violent and unjust after the conclusion of peace accords. The articles provide the context of conflicts in Guatemala, Colombia, Rwanda, Angola, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Palestine, and Israel. A few provocative thematic essays sum-

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marize the state of the literature on peace building, introducing the book's important and under-studied focus on youth, and arguing that youth can make or break sustainable peace efforts. The authors depict a sad but ubiquitous context, which is broader than peace building as conventionally defined, and which occurs only after peacekeeping has achieved an end to the most threatening violence. If peace building is considered to occur after any accord, no matter how ill-advised or short-lived, then the extent of dilemmas and predicaments is even larger.

The book's authors, who met periodically at the Kroc Peace Institute at Notre Dame University, generally agree that youth are an essential variable in peace building because of their frequent past participation in violence, as well as their demographic position as the majority influence in the future and the source of future leaders. The cases examine a variety of efforts, usually inspired by local leaders, but also funded by international foundations: training or inducing youth to empathize with their enemies, through shared story telling among Israelis and Palestinians; facilitated conversations with those who have built peace abroad; transforming educational histories and curricula in Bosnia and Israel; and sharing power in micro-contexts, such as North Belfast, in post-accord peace building.

The book attempts to bring forward the views and voices of underreported and often-ignored forces. The presumption is that peace building is not possible if groups who suffer are ignored. However, it is not really demonstrated that these important voices are crucial to peace building, as opposed to simply being interesting subjects of injustice. Their important gestures and examples, from the self-governing sewer communities of young children in Angola, depicted by Carolyn Nordstrom, to the peace communities of Colombia reported by Victoria Sandford, are really examples of failed peace building. The authors argue that these groups should be emulated, because they dramatically demonstrate that the just can prevail amid adversity. However, it is less clear that those with power would either be impressed or learn from these examples. In fact, these inspiring stories may strengthen the will to resist of the enemies of peace, who know how repression can work against peace. Rather than being contagious proponents of peace, these heroes are actually unintentional provocateurs to the violent. If so, then these nongovernmental efforts are possibly counterproductive, such as when the police feel they must attack innocent children, for example, for merely inquiring about unjust police killings. Or they are symptoms of injustice, whose repression may be necessary if progress is eventually to be reached, if the young peacemakers are to be impressed, and relieve their countries of the cyclical violence that predominates.

The book focuses on the peacemaking and peace building literature in anthropology. The literature from political science on national reconciliation and nation and state building is not often referenced in these cases within national case studies. Thus, except for the occasional references to public opinion

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surveys, these are micro-studies of communities and projects, usually involving small groups, not elite leaders. Personal story telling, for example, is interesting as a study of the role of narratives. While the initial impact of some stories is ordinarily fairly small, the reproduction of such stories through many repetitions and iterations magnifies the impact.

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
feature
Is there a "Qualified Teacher" shortage?
Washington—As American schools reopen, a 15-year effort to "professionalize" the field of teaching is running up against a stiff counterforce—the urgent need to fill classroom vacancies.
— Christian Science Monitor, August 26, 2002
The headlines in those early years of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) were consistently alarming. "As Standards Rise, Too Few Teachers," was the one the Christian Science Monitor story referred to above. "Federal Education Report Finds Shortage of Qualified Teachers," noted a headline in the Washington Times the following year.
In the flurry of activity surrounding implementation of NCLB's student proficiency mandates, the federal requirement to have a "highly qualified" teacher in every classroom by 2005 seemed more like an impossible goal. The concern predated NCLB, of course: "Clinton Addresses U.S. Teacher Shortage" was a headline from August 2000. But NCLB's demand that all new teachers hold at least a baccalaureate degree or higher, be fully licensed, and have demonstrated subject-matter competence in the areas they teach surely
prevailed to most public schools are: adequate to recruit and retain a competent teaching workforce. A much more productive line of inquiry is one that explores the costs of the inefficient, rigid structure of the teacher compensation system and the possible benefits of replacing it with a more market-based system.
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
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







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

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